SOMALIA: UN SRSG EXPECTS DJIBOUTI TALKS TO FOCUS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000388 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KPKO SO DJ ER SUBJECT: SOMALIA: UN SRSG EXPECTS DJIBOUTI TALKS TO FOCUS ON CEASE-FIRE AND STATUS OF ARS REF: A. DJIBOUTI 380 ¶B. DJIBOUTI 377 ¶C. SECSTATE 41385 (NOTAL) Classified By: ERIC WONG, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. REASON: 1.4 (D). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. UN SRSG for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah seeks to implement "a new approach" to Somali peace talks, by inviting both Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) to send a limited number (7 each) of "technical" representatives to Djibouti, in order to focus on a limited agenda. Talks would focus on two security issues: a cease-fire, and a political role for the ARS--as either a Mogadishu-based opposition party, or a member of a coalition government for Somalia. Ould-Abdallah said talks would occur within the existing framework of TFG structures; thus, he would not/not entertain any discussion of the removal of the TFG President or Prime Minister. Ould-Abdallah said he would advise the ARS that Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia could not occur unless conditions conducive to peace were in place; similarly, the best way to support Somaliland was not through recognition but through promoting stability in Somalia. There was a "tentative understanding" that ARS representatives would support a UN--but not a hybrid UN/AU--peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Djibouti-based peace talks would complement ongoing efforts aimed at promoting reconciliation in Somalia, including addressing constitutional issues; security sector reform; and professionalization of the Somali army. Underscoring that the international community should "leave the talks to the Somalis," Ould-Abdallah expressed concern about the role of external actors, including Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) On April 22, Charge, GRPO, and Poloff met with visiting Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. UNDP ResRep Sunil Saigal, Nairobi-based UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) Public Information Officer Susannah Price, and UN Senior Political Affairs Officer Bruno Mpendo-Epo, accompanied SRSG Ould-Abdallah. -------------- -------------- DJIBOUTI SHOULD ONLY BE A VENUE, NOT AN ACTOR, IN SOMALI TALKS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) SRSG Ould-Abdallah said he would meet President Guelleh in order to ensure that Djibouti's ongoing efforts to host discussions between the TFG and the ARS (ref B) were synchronized with those of the United Nations. Ould-Abdallah said that in discussions with Guelleh, he would note Djibouti's ethnic ties with, and geographical proximity to, Somalia. However, in reality, Ould-Abdallah said, Djibouti provided "efficiency" as a discrete venue for Somali talks, due to the relative absence of international media, NGOs, or diplomatic missions in Djibouti. It was important to ensure that Djibouti's initiative was "on the same wavelength" as the SRSG's, he said, noting that TFG President Yusuf was "no friend" of President Guelleh. The USG should insist that Djibouti limit its role to serving as a venue; previous talks on Somalia had failed due to preoccupation with addressing "the sensitivities of member states" such as Uganda or Kenya, rather than seeking to promote peace, he added. The GODJ's invitation to next host "technical" representatives (7 each) from the TFG and ARS was compatible with UN efforts. -------------- -------------- DISCUSSING ETHIOPIAN WITHDRAWAL IS "NOT MY RESPONSIBILITY" -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Ould-Abdallah planned to meet with ARS representatives visiting Djibouti, in order to preview a possible agenda for the next stage of talks occurring in Djibouti at the beginning of May. Ould-Abdallah said he needed "to educate" the ARS on "what is acceptable." While some ARS representatives advocated Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia, Ould-Abdallah underscored that he could not speak on behalf of the GOE, and that the issue was "not my mandate, not my responsibility." Ould-Abdallah said he would tell the ARS that the best way to raise the issue of Ethiopia's withdrawal was to create conditions conducive to a withdrawal, i.e., by supporting a cease-fire. DJIBOUTI 00000388 002 OF 003 -------------- -------------- STATUS OF ARS IS KEY: OPPOSITION PARTY OR COALITION MEMBER? -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) The situation in Somalia was getting worse, Ould-Abdallah said. After 18 years of conflict, and innumerable long-term peace talks lasting from several months to several years involving thousands of participants, a new approach was needed, involving a limited number of participants and lasting a limited number of days. Talks should proceed for a maximum of 1-2 months; having "prolonged talks" would not only be "irresponsible" but would also be "fueling war," he said. Thus, his initiative would have "limited objectives", focusing on 1-2 security issues: (1) a tentative cease-fire, and (2) a political settlement, relating to whether the ARS would be an opposition party based in Mogadishu, or a member of the government coalition. Ould-Abdallah underscored the sensitivity of this agenda, noting that he had not briefed it to the UN SYG, due to concerns about leaks. ¶6. (S/NF) Discussions would occur within the framework of existing transitional institutions, and in support of the TFG which was to remain in place until December 2009. Ould-Abdallah said he therefore would not/not entertain discussion of the removal of the TFG President or Prime Minister. "It is not a negotiation from scratch." -- Power-sharing was key, Ould-Abdallah said, especially with a shattered economy and plundered natural resources. The TFG, ARS, and al-Shabaab all needed to learn lessons from the past; a "winner-take-all" position would allow a party to take power only for a few months, before being toppled. He said he had told the al-Shabaab that even if they were to emerge dominant, they too would likely be split into factions within six months. -- In discussions two to three weeks earlier, Ould-Abdallah said he had reached "a tentative understanding" with ARS representatives that the ARS would support a UN--but not a hybrid UN/AU--peacekeeping mission in Somalia. -- While representatives should be "prepared to discuss peace and security," additional issues, such as the status of Somaliland or land reforms, would not/not be addressed at this stage. "We cannot solve all the problems of Somalia at once," Ould-Abdallah said. Having visited Hargeisa following the February visit by AF Assistant Secretary Frazer, he said he found Somaliland "stable and functioning," but that recognition would lead Somaliland's opponents to coalesce to attack it. The best way to assist Somaliland was to promote stability in Somalia, he said. -- Technical discussions, involving 7 representatives each (from the TFG and the ARS),would precede political talks. Representatives would be designated by the TFG and ARS respectively; Ould-Abdallah said he refused to endorse a clan-based formula for designating representatives, as any more than 7 representatives from each side would be unwieldy. -------------- -------------- DJIBOUTI-HOSTED TALKS ONLY PART OF RECONCILIATION EFFORTS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ould-Abdallah said talks in Djibouti between the TFG and ARS were only "part of a process" to effect peace in Somalia. Other ongoing efforts included addressing constitutional issues; security sector reform; and professionalization of the Somali army. ¶8. (C) Commenting on the recent USG designation of al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization, Ould-Abdallah said he had not seen the full text of the designation, but could "not ignore" a statement from the USG, as a P-5 member. Nevertheless, he said he would counsel al-Shabaab and ARS representatives to support the "recognized government" of Somalia (i.e., the TFG),and to end violence. Those who had been designated as terrorists by the USG could only have such a designation removed at the request of their own government, he said, citing the (OFAC) designation of Al-Barakat head Ahmed Nur Ali Jamale. Ould-Abdallah said he had invited Somali businessmen to meet in January 2008 in Dubai, but that Jamale had been barred from traveling to his designation by the USG. DJIBOUTI 00000388 003 OF 003 Ould-Abdallah had told Jamale that the only way to have the terrorist designation removed was to have it be supported by a "stable, credible" government in Somalia; urging opponents to support the TFG was therefore key. -------------- WARY OF OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Noting that the USG was now transferring responsibility for the International Contact Group (ICG) for Somalia to him (ref C),Ould-Abdallah said the ICG had not succeeded, and that Egypt, Ethiopia, and Eritrea had been "most concerned" about becoming members. It was important for the international community to "leave the talks to Somalis," he said, as Somalia should be an issue for Africa, "not an Arab League problem." Ould-Abdallah said he hoped Saudi Arabia would tell the ARS to be cooperative; he expressed concern that Egypt and Saudi Arabia sought to make Somalia become "an Arab issue," rather than leaving it to African partners to address. He noted that as the UN had the means to fund the talks in Djibouti, external interference from other donors was not necessary. -------------- ERITREAN INCURSION INTO DJIBOUTI -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) Ould-Abdallah questioned why Eritrea sought to pressure Djibouti, citing reports of recent Eritrean incursion into Djibouti, and asking whether the incursion aimed at providing weapons to the ARS. Ould-Abdallah said he had warned the GSE in January 2008 about the potential consequences of being "blacklisted" by the USG. Charge replied that Djibouti sought to address recent tensions with Eritrea through quiet diplomacy (ref A); Ould-Abdallah agreed that a public statement by the USG would only serve to inflame Eritrea. ¶11. (S/NF) COMMENT. UN SRSG Ould-Abdallah's aim to use Djibouti as a venue for focused talks on security issues between a limited number of TFG and ARS representatives--and "not business as usual"--should be compatible with the GODJ's objectives. As host of IGAD, a member of both the African Union and the Arab League, and with a population largely comprised of ethnic Somalis, Djibouti is uniquely poised to host Somali peace talks. That Djibouti now faces a recent influx of refugees fleeing southern Somalia, which challenges Djibouti's limited economic resources and strains its humanitarian capacity, provides yet another incentive for the GODJ to exercise its good offices. END COMMENT. WONG