SOMALIA: UN SRSG EXPECTS DJIBOUTI TALKS TO FOCUS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000388

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KPKO SO DJ ER
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: UN SRSG EXPECTS DJIBOUTI TALKS TO FOCUS
ON CEASE-FIRE AND STATUS OF ARS

REF: A. DJIBOUTI 380

B. DJIBOUTI 377

C. SECSTATE 41385 (NOTAL)

Classified By: ERIC WONG, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. UN SRSG for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah
seeks to implement "a new approach" to Somali peace talks, by
inviting both Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) to
send a limited number (7 each) of "technical" representatives
to Djibouti, in order to focus on a limited agenda. Talks
would focus on two security issues: a cease-fire, and a
political role for the ARS--as either a Mogadishu-based
opposition party, or a member of a coalition government for
Somalia. Ould-Abdallah said talks would occur within the
existing framework of TFG structures; thus, he would not/not
entertain any discussion of the removal of the TFG President
or Prime Minister. Ould-Abdallah said he would advise the
ARS that Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia could not occur
unless conditions conducive to peace were in place;
similarly, the best way to support Somaliland was not through
recognition but through promoting stability in Somalia.
There was a "tentative understanding" that ARS
representatives would support a UN--but not a hybrid
UN/AU--peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Djibouti-based peace
talks would complement ongoing efforts aimed at promoting
reconciliation in Somalia, including addressing
constitutional issues; security sector reform; and
professionalization of the Somali army. Underscoring that
the international community should "leave the talks to the
Somalis," Ould-Abdallah expressed concern about the role of
external actors, including Arab states such as Saudi Arabia
and Egypt. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) On April 22, Charge, GRPO, and Poloff met with
visiting Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
(SRSG) for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. UNDP ResRep Sunil
Saigal, Nairobi-based UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)
Public Information Officer Susannah Price, and UN Senior
Political Affairs Officer Bruno Mpendo-Epo, accompanied SRSG
Ould-Abdallah.

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DJIBOUTI SHOULD ONLY BE A VENUE, NOT AN ACTOR, IN SOMALI TALKS
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3. (S/NF) SRSG Ould-Abdallah said he would meet President
Guelleh in order to ensure that Djibouti's ongoing efforts to
host discussions between the TFG and the ARS (ref B) were
synchronized with those of the United Nations. Ould-Abdallah
said that in discussions with Guelleh, he would note
Djibouti's ethnic ties with, and geographical proximity to,
Somalia. However, in reality, Ould-Abdallah said, Djibouti
provided "efficiency" as a discrete venue for Somali talks,
due to the relative absence of international media, NGOs, or
diplomatic missions in Djibouti. It was important to ensure
that Djibouti's initiative was "on the same wavelength" as
the SRSG's, he said, noting that TFG President Yusuf was "no
friend" of President Guelleh. The USG should insist that
Djibouti limit its role to serving as a venue; previous talks
on Somalia had failed due to preoccupation with addressing
"the sensitivities of member states" such as Uganda or Kenya,
rather than seeking to promote peace, he added. The GODJ's
invitation to next host "technical" representatives (7 each)
from the TFG and ARS was compatible with UN efforts.

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DISCUSSING ETHIOPIAN WITHDRAWAL IS "NOT MY RESPONSIBILITY"
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4. (C) Ould-Abdallah planned to meet with ARS representatives
visiting Djibouti, in order to preview a possible agenda for
the next stage of talks occurring in Djibouti at the
beginning of May. Ould-Abdallah said he needed "to educate"
the ARS on "what is acceptable." While some ARS
representatives advocated Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia,
Ould-Abdallah underscored that he could not speak on behalf
of the GOE, and that the issue was "not my mandate, not my
responsibility." Ould-Abdallah said he would tell the ARS
that the best way to raise the issue of Ethiopia's withdrawal
was to create conditions conducive to a withdrawal, i.e., by
supporting a cease-fire.


DJIBOUTI 00000388 002 OF 003


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STATUS OF ARS IS KEY: OPPOSITION PARTY OR COALITION MEMBER?
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5. (S/NF) The situation in Somalia was getting worse,
Ould-Abdallah said. After 18 years of conflict, and
innumerable long-term peace talks lasting from several months
to several years involving thousands of participants, a new
approach was needed, involving a limited number of
participants and lasting a limited number of days. Talks
should proceed for a maximum of 1-2 months; having "prolonged
talks" would not only be "irresponsible" but would also be
"fueling war," he said. Thus, his initiative would have
"limited objectives", focusing on 1-2 security issues: (1) a
tentative cease-fire, and (2) a political settlement,
relating to whether the ARS would be an opposition party
based in Mogadishu, or a member of the government coalition.
Ould-Abdallah underscored the sensitivity of this agenda,
noting that he had not briefed it to the UN SYG, due to
concerns about leaks.


6. (S/NF) Discussions would occur within the framework of
existing transitional institutions, and in support of the TFG
which was to remain in place until December 2009.
Ould-Abdallah said he therefore would not/not entertain
discussion of the removal of the TFG President or Prime
Minister. "It is not a negotiation from scratch."

-- Power-sharing was key, Ould-Abdallah said, especially with
a shattered economy and plundered natural resources. The TFG,
ARS, and al-Shabaab all needed to learn lessons from the
past; a "winner-take-all" position would allow a party to
take power only for a few months, before being toppled. He
said he had told the al-Shabaab that even if they were to
emerge dominant, they too would likely be split into factions
within six months.

-- In discussions two to three weeks earlier, Ould-Abdallah
said he had reached "a tentative understanding" with ARS
representatives that the ARS would support a UN--but not a
hybrid UN/AU--peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

-- While representatives should be "prepared to discuss peace
and security," additional issues, such as the status of
Somaliland or land reforms, would not/not be addressed at
this stage. "We cannot solve all the problems of Somalia at
once," Ould-Abdallah said. Having visited Hargeisa following
the February visit by AF Assistant Secretary Frazer, he said
he found Somaliland "stable and functioning," but that
recognition would lead Somaliland's opponents to coalesce to
attack it. The best way to assist Somaliland was to promote
stability in Somalia, he said.

-- Technical discussions, involving 7 representatives each
(from the TFG and the ARS),would precede political talks.
Representatives would be designated by the TFG and ARS
respectively; Ould-Abdallah said he refused to endorse a
clan-based formula for designating representatives, as any
more than 7 representatives from each side would be unwieldy.


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DJIBOUTI-HOSTED TALKS ONLY PART OF RECONCILIATION EFFORTS
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7. (C) Ould-Abdallah said talks in Djibouti between the TFG
and ARS were only "part of a process" to effect peace in
Somalia. Other ongoing efforts included addressing
constitutional issues; security sector reform; and
professionalization of the Somali army.


8. (C) Commenting on the recent USG designation of al-Shabaab
as a terrorist organization, Ould-Abdallah said he had not
seen the full text of the designation, but could "not ignore"
a statement from the USG, as a P-5 member. Nevertheless, he
said he would counsel al-Shabaab and ARS representatives to
support the "recognized government" of Somalia (i.e., the
TFG),and to end violence. Those who had been designated as
terrorists by the USG could only have such a designation
removed at the request of their own government, he said,
citing the (OFAC) designation of Al-Barakat head Ahmed Nur
Ali Jamale. Ould-Abdallah said he had invited Somali
businessmen to meet in January 2008 in Dubai, but that Jamale
had been barred from traveling to his designation by the USG.

DJIBOUTI 00000388 003 OF 003


Ould-Abdallah had told Jamale that the only way to have the
terrorist designation removed was to have it be supported by
a "stable, credible" government in Somalia; urging opponents
to support the TFG was therefore key.

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WARY OF OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT
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9. (S/NF) Noting that the USG was now transferring
responsibility for the International Contact Group (ICG) for
Somalia to him (ref C),Ould-Abdallah said the ICG had not
succeeded, and that Egypt, Ethiopia, and Eritrea had been
"most concerned" about becoming members. It was important
for the international community to "leave the talks to
Somalis," he said, as Somalia should be an issue for Africa,
"not an Arab League problem." Ould-Abdallah said he hoped
Saudi Arabia would tell the ARS to be cooperative; he
expressed concern that Egypt and Saudi Arabia sought to make
Somalia become "an Arab issue," rather than leaving it to
African partners to address. He noted that as the UN had the
means to fund the talks in Djibouti, external interference
from other donors was not necessary.

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ERITREAN INCURSION INTO DJIBOUTI
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10. (S/NF) Ould-Abdallah questioned why Eritrea sought to
pressure Djibouti, citing reports of recent Eritrean
incursion into Djibouti, and asking whether the incursion
aimed at providing weapons to the ARS. Ould-Abdallah said he
had warned the GSE in January 2008 about the potential
consequences of being "blacklisted" by the USG. Charge
replied that Djibouti sought to address recent tensions with
Eritrea through quiet diplomacy (ref A); Ould-Abdallah agreed
that a public statement by the USG would only serve to
inflame Eritrea.


11. (S/NF) COMMENT. UN SRSG Ould-Abdallah's aim to use
Djibouti as a venue for focused talks on security issues
between a limited number of TFG and ARS representatives--and
"not business as usual"--should be compatible with the GODJ's
objectives. As host of IGAD, a member of both the African
Union and the Arab League, and with a population largely
comprised of ethnic Somalis, Djibouti is uniquely poised to
host Somali peace talks. That Djibouti now faces a recent
influx of refugees fleeing southern Somalia, which challenges
Djibouti's limited economic resources and strains its
humanitarian capacity, provides yet another incentive for the
GODJ to exercise its good offices. END COMMENT.
WONG