TIMOR-LESTE PRESIDENT RECALLS FEBRUARY 11; PLANS FOR THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000091 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/20/2018 TAGS: PREL TT SUBJECT: TIMOR-LESTE PRESIDENT RECALLS FEBRUARY 11; PLANS FOR THE FUTURE DILI 00000091 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Hans Klemm, Ambassador, EXEC, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. President Jose Ramos Horta warmly thanks President and Mrs. Bush for their recent statement of support. During a March 18 meeting with the Ambassador in a Darwin hospital, Timor's President, critically wounded during a February 11 assassination attempt, said he was unable to explain his attacker's motivation. Horta stated, however, he was confident that he was the victim of "hostile intent" by Major Reinado. President Horta intends to return to Dili by mid-April and will seek to restart a political reconciliation process he had overseen before February 11, as well as the delivery of an amnesty for acts committed during the 2006 crisis. Although his thoughts were still centered on the events of February 11, Horta was in good spirits, resting comfortably and in no evident pain. End Summary. ¶2. (C) President Jose Ramos Horta warmly thanked President Bush for his "very kind" message of encouragement during a March 18 meeting with the Ambassador in Darwin. President Bush's words "meant a lot to me," said Horta. He also fondly recalled a get-well phone call from Senator Tom Harkin that he received during the week of March 10. Horta appeared to have lost considerable weight, but was in good spirits, ambulatory and seemingly well on the way to recovery. Most of the extended conversation surrounded his shooting, plus Horta's plans to recontinue a broad political reconciliation process suspended by February 11. ¶3. (C) His recounting of the morning of February 11 largely tracked with second hand accounts that we have heard earlier. Ramos Horta said he is convinced that Major Reinado came to his residence with "hostile intent." Upon entering the President's compound with force, Reinado disarmed several of Horta's bodyguards, smashed open doors, roughly forced the President's kitchen staff to lie face down on the floor, and aggressively searched the compound for Horta. Fortunately, a neighboring child who witnessed the commotion alerted ONE of the military guards overlooked by Reinado, who then killed the intruder and one of his men. Horta was about a kilometer away on a morning walk at this point when he heard a burst of automatic weapon fire. ¶4. (C) When he heard the shots, the President returned to his residence followed by two military escorts and ran into an Australian acquaintance. He told Horta that the shots were the result of maneuvers being held nearby by the Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF). This upset Horta as he had not been notified of ISF maneuvers in the area. The statement turned out to be false, but it led the President to double his pace in order to find out what was going on. ¶5. (C) As he neared his home, Horta saw a military vehicle had gone off the road right in front of his entry way (Reinado's men had fired on the vehicle believing it to be military reinforcements, but it had only been a soldier dropping off his wife who worked at the President's home). As he walked in front of his house, ONE of the President's guards alerted him to a gunman. Horta stated he saw and recognized the shooter ("tall for a Timorese and wearing a stocking hat"),but did not know his name. As the President turned away from his assailant, he was shot twice in the back. "If I hadn't turned away," recalled Horta, "I would be dead." ¶6. (C/NF) President Horta then lay bleeding for "twenty or thirty" minutes before a battered ambulance with a driver but no medic arrived. Horta was sharply critical of the ISF and the Ministry of HEALTH for the poor emergency medial treatment he received (he claimed to have lost four liters of blood) and for failing to pursue his attackers. He said he would wait to read the final reports of inquiry on the events of that morning, but he is inclined now to ask SRSG Khare to dismiss the UNPOL Commander and Deputy Commander, and ask Australia to recall the ISF Commander for their poor performance. He acknowledged that his Timorese military (F-FDTL) protection unit also failed to perform to expected standards. ¶7. (C/NF) Ramos-Horta could not explain the motivation of Major DILI 00000091 002.2 OF 002 Reinado except to speculate that his reputed lover, Angelita Pires, inspired him to violence. Horta dismissed rumors that FRETILIN was behind the attacks, stating leader Mari Alkatiri was incapable of such an act. He said he had no confidence in the ability of Timor's Prosecutor General to conduct a thorough or professional investigation of the attacks. The President strongly thanked the Ambassador for the FBI's quick assistance and listened grimly as the Ambassador described their experience in Dili. ¶8. (C) Horta confided he would move to a private residence in Darwin on March 19 and hopes to return to Dili by mid-April in time for the planned visit of Monaco's Crown Prince. The President expressed optimism that he could restart the process of reconciliation between the ruling and opposition parties that he had led up until February 11 despite Prime Minister Gusmao's reluctance (the PM, said Horta, believes FRETILIN leaders bring no goodwill to the process). The President also said he would press the parliament to enact a legal process leading to amnesty for actors in the 2006 crisis. The Ambassador cautioned again that the U.S. would oppose a general amnesty without the establishment of full truth and justice. Horta acknowledged this and said he envisions a process by which all those subject to a 2006 UN Commission of Inquiry recommendation would testify to a special council and accept responsibility for their actions before receiving amnesty. Victims of 2006 violence would be compensated generously. ¶9. (C) A key motivation for a process leading to an amnesty, explained Horta, was to avoid the "utterly unthinkable" prospect that Brigadier Taur Matan Ruak, commander of Timor's military, might face jail time for his "unpolitical" actions during the 2006 crisis. An amnesty may not be ready by May 20 as previously planned, but Horta hoped it might be in place by the country's August 30 Independence Day celebrations. ¶10. (C) Comment. President Horta's thoughts were perhaps unsurprisingly centered on the events of February 11. He frequently spoke of what was to have taken place had his initiative to bring Reinado to justice borne fruit instead of himself becoming a victim of violence. He put blame directly on Reinado for the attacks, rejecting the possibility of a conspiracy, although he faulted those who had supported Reinado (including several priests) for leading him astray. He showed little interest in discussing post-February 11 developments, such as the influx of petitioners into Dili. His heart belongs instead, for better or worse, to political processes he initiated prior to February 11, including reconciliation among Timor's leaders and an amnesty for participants in the 2006 crisis. KLEMM