WHEELS UP FOR TIMOR-LESTE CUBAN MEDICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000070 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS, WHA/CCA, AND WHA/FO - MCCARRY E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/4/2018 TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM CU ID TT SUBJECT: WHEELS UP FOR TIMOR-LESTE CUBAN MEDICS DILI 00000070 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Henry M. Rector, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Dili, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. On February 24, the government of Timor-Leste facilitated the departure of four Cuban doctors to the U.S. under the Special Public Benefit Parole Program (SBPB). Timor-Leste appreciates the support of the Cuban medical mission's 200-plus doctors and nurses operating in the country, and has 700 students currently studying in Cuba. CUBA therefore enjoys considerable goodwill with the GOTL. However, in the course of five months of diplomatic wrangling, Cuban Ambassador Ramon Hernandez Vasquez managed to overplay his hand, exasperating the GOTL leadership with his stubbornness and ever-changing, unreasonable demands. Post notes that the United Nations Integrated Mission In Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was helpful in this affair, reminding the GOTL of its human rights obligations under international agreements not to hinder the medics' departure. End summary. ¶2. (U) In November 2007, the Ambassador informed Foreign Minister Zacarias Albano Da Costa that we had received four applications from Cuban doctors for entry into the U.S. under the Special Public Benefit Parole Program. Da Costa thanked Ambassador for his commitment to transparency in this matter and designated the MFA's Director for Bilateral Affairs as our point of contact. ¶3. (C) The three previous SPBP cases the embassy processed in 2006 and mid-2007 attracted the attention of the highest levels of the GOTL, primarily due to their concern for the future of the 200-plus strong Cuban medical mission in Timor-Leste and the 700 Timorese students studying in Cuba. Foreign Minister Da Costa initially regarded this as a U.S.-Cuban bilateral problem, telling the DCM in late November, "you will have to work this out with the Cuban Embassy directly." When told that this would be impossible for well-known diplomatic reasons, the GOTL attempted to broker terms acceptable to the Cuban Ambassador in Dili, Ramon Hernandez Vasquez. ¶4. (C) This proved impossible. Ambassador Hernandez was at first intransigent, promising that the doctors would never leave Timor-Leste. He then changed his tack slightly, maintaining that the four Cubans were now stateless, and that the government of CUBA did not want them back. This effectively stalled the process. In early December, post contacted to the Human Rights Unit of the United Nations Integrated Mission In Timor-Leste (UNMIT) for its views on the matter. Its director, Wilbert van Hoevell, immediately expressed his concern and directed his staff to prepare a memorandum. This resulted in a non-paper which argued that the GOTL was obliged by both its own Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights not to hinder the Cubans' departure. The Ambassador made these points in a December 12 letter to the Foreign Minister. We understand that UNMIT chief Atul Khare also addressed the matter with Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao at about this time. Also at about this point, the Cuban medics' predicament began attracting some coverage in the Australian, U.S., and Portuguese media. 5.(C) This led the GOTL to take a firmer line with Ambassador Hernandez, who then agreed to issue the medics travel documents valid for return to Havana only. He also stipulated that the GOTL would be required to purchase return tickets to Havana for the four, which would presumably not be used. The GOTL counter-offered to purchase tickets to a third country, which Ambassador Hernandez rejected. Finally, the GOTL acquiesced to Hernandez's conditions. The four Cubans would be required to purchase return tickets to Havana, which they would present to the Cuban Ambassador in exchange for travel documents to facilitate their departure from Timor-Leste. ¶6. (C) It was at this point that Ambassador Hernandez overplayed his hand. Citing instructions from Havana, he demanded that the medics travel to CUBA via South Africa (allegedly in order to avoid being waylaid by "counter-revolutionaries" in Europe),and that they not depart Timor-Leste together, but rather one by one over a period of a week. Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao and Foreign Minister Da Costa then realized that Ambassador Hernandez was negotiating in bad faith. The GOTL's point man on DILI 00000070 002.2 OF 002 the matter, MFA Secretary General Joao Camara, told Hernandez that this would be a human rights violation. He sent the Cuban embassy a note verbale containing an ultimatum to the effect that if the Cuban Ambassador did not provide travel documents by February 20, the medics would be permitted to depart Timor-Leste using a laisser-passer issued by the GOTL. ¶7. (C) In the end, the four Cubans departed on February 24 using a Timorese laisser-passer. They transited Bali, Indonesia, and entered the U.S. via Guam. This did not require an Indonesian visa, but post anticipates that Havana may formally protest to the Indonesian government. ¶8. (C) Comment. Post notes the constructive role played by UNMIT's Human Rights office. We believe that the GOTL was not aware of its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights until UNMIT brought them to its attention. We understand that the current Cuban medical mission will be rotated out in March, and we are not aware of any changes that have been made in the terms of its replacement's deployment here that might impact on future SPBP beneficiaries. Secretary General Camara was reluctant to discuss this with us SIPDIS in detail. We hope, however, that the GOTL is now persuaded that it is futile to attempt to broker a compromise with Havana on this issue. End comment. KLEMM