SECURITY MISSTEPS DAMAGE DILI'S RECENT PERFORMANCE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000066 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL TT SUBJECT: SECURITY MISSTEPS DAMAGE DILI'S RECENT PERFORMANCE Subject: Former Western guerilla commander discusses Timor's challenges ¶1. (SBU) Summary. We traveled to Gleno February 28 to assess how events in the capital are playing in a district west of Dili. Gleno was calm, markets were bustling, and its citizens share the same surrounding the February 11 attacks on the President and Prime Minister. Possible F-FDTL operations in the district to assist in the capture of the 2/11 perpetrators were treated with caution . An ex-FALINTIL senior commander with great regional stature told us the events of 2/11 were the fault of Timor-Leste's elites because of their preoccupation with infighting and lack of emphasis on real problem solving. He emphasized that as long as genuine solutions are not applied to the core problems, turbulence will continue. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Senior defense official and political assistant traveled to Gleno - the administrative seat of historically restive Ermera District - February 28 and met with ex-FALINTIL Region 4 Commander Ernesto "Dudu" Fernandes, Father Enrique Barreto, and PNTL Ermera District Commander Sub-Inspector Mateus Mendes. Each spoke of similar themes and concerns in response to questions about 2/11, the ongoing military petitioners saga, and the specter of possible F-FDTL operations in the district. As for Gleno itself - a town that has seen more than its share of martial arts groups violence, politically-fueled blood rivalries, and heavy fighting during the Indonesian Occupation -- it appeared as calm as it ever has over the course of the past two years. Children were seen playing in the streets, the central market was bustling, and outlying areas were awash with normal activity. ¶3. (SBU) Both Father Barreto and Sub-Inspector Mendes said that the district's population is wholly confused over what happened on 2/11, and added that their was no signal that something was about to occur in the days prior to the events. Mendes went on to say that the local community was completely at ease with the presence of the Reinado group, that they were always well-behaved, and that the local population reciprocated by showing them plenty of support. ¶4. (SBU) "Dudu" - Fernandes' resistance-era nom de guerre meaning either "to push" or "to resist" in the local vernacular - went into much greater detail in discussing the current �0A;situation, as well as its root causes. First, he stated that he is as confused as everyone else about the events of 2/11. He, along with Reinado, Church officials, local political leaders, and others had been in talks as late as February 8 to construct a traditional sanctuary on the grounds of the Church complex in Gleno for the purpose of holding a reconciliation conference that would involve all national political and Church leaders. The proposed three-day conference, planned for February 16-18, would have sought some form of acceptable solution regarding the Reinado and military petitioner issues, and to have the Church bless the decisions. Dudu believes that at some point over the weekend, "someone definitely got to Reinado for some unknown reason", and 2/11 followed. Dudu then went on to add that if the result of ongoing joint Timor-Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL) and National Police (PNTL) operations results in the death of the leader of the remnants of Reinado's group, Gastao Salsinha, the truth behind what really happened would never be revealed. He and the local Church have received clear indications that Salsinha wants to surrender, and Dudu added that they would all stand with Salsinha on the day he decides to turn himself in. ¶5. (SBU) Dudu underscored that his and the local population's support of both the Reinado group and the military petitioners, of which Salsinha was the original spokesman, arise from grievances that date back to the origins of F-FDTL in 2000-2001 following the departure of the Indonesian occupiers. During that timeframe, what remained of the FALINTIL guerilla force that was scattered about four distinct military regions (Dudu was the Region 4 Commander),was brought together in cantonment near Aileu, just to the east of Ermera District and 45 kilometers south of Dili. According to Dudu, rivalries began almost immediately between him and then Region 1 Commander, Lere Anan Timur (the current F-FDTL Chief of Staff) and then Region 2 Commander, Falur Rate Laek (the current F-FDTL Training Base Commander),both considered to be prominent symbols of the eastern (Lorosa'e) population. He added that both Lere and Falur were critical of the fighters from the western (Loro'monu) population as they were perceived not have resisted the Indonesians as the easterners did. This rivalry carried on into the formation of F-FDTL, which Dudu decided not to join in order DILI 00000066 002.2 OF 002 to live a normal life after so many years in the bush. ¶6. (SBU) Fast forward to 2006, when President Xanana Gusmao's now famous (or infamous) March 23 speech managed to drive an even deeper wedge between the Lorosa'e and Loro'monu populations. F-FDTL was on the verge of collapse following the desertion of almost 40% of its ranks, nearly all of whom were from Loro'monu districts. Dudu asserts the power struggle between Gusmao and then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri caused the breakdown in the F-FDTL and both are guilty of using the Lorosa'e - Loro'monu issue for personal advantage. Their struggle gave rise to the military petitioners and later to Reinado. On the eve of 2/11, virtually none of the grievances which arose from the Aileu cantonment, and later enflamed the 2006 crisis, had been resolved. ¶7. (SBU) Moving to the present, with Reinado dead, Salsinha on the run and possibly on the verge of surrender, and the military petitioners engaging in dialogue with the government, Dudu affirms that there is now a golden opportunity to arrive at a solution. He states, however, that solution depends on F-FDTL Commander Taur Matan Ruak (TMR) doing an about face from his oft-stated, and seemingly intractable position opposing the return of the petitioners to the military. If TMR would compromise, and gain the support of Lere and Falur, Dudu believes Timor would begin to heal the Lorosa'e and Loro'monu conflict that began in the troubled birth of F-FDTL. Without complete buy-in from the F-FDTL leadership, said Dudu, any offer made by the Government to the petitioners will fail and the Lorosa'e - Loro'monu conflict will continue. ¶8. (SBU) Lastly, Dudu expressed concern regarding possible F-FDTL operations in pursuit of the 2/11 attackers in Ermera District. As long as the soldiers conducted themselves well and did nothing to upset the local inhabitants, then such operations could occur without incident. He expressed some confidence in the abilities of the commander of the ongoing field operations, Major Ular Rihik, and it should be noted that Ular was Dudu's deputy during the Indonesian occupation and knows Ermera and its people well (Ular is from the Lorosa'e district of Viqueque). However, Father Barreto said in strong terms that if F-FDTL soldiers found themselves in a fight with Salsinha and his men, the people of Ermera would unequivocally stand by the latter as they were their sons and symbols of a struggle which involved all of them. ¶10. (SBU) Comment: F-FDTL can be described as being more a council of tribal chiefs rather than a defense force with normal traits such as adherence to a chain of command. During the resistance, the senior leaders of the modern-day F-FDTL were in many ways equal to one another, and occasionally in opposition to each other's interests. This bred intense rivalries, and it has been said that the reason TMR was "allowed" to become the F-FDTL Commander is because there was a consensus among the other ex-FALINTIL leaders that he alone had the ability to conduct himself in a sufficiently civil way, commensurate with what is expected of a defense force chief. Additionally, it should be noted that in FALINTIL, assassinations of key leaders did happen, and severe extrajudicial punishments to include killings were sometimes deemed an important component to the force's discipline and survival during the long, 24 year struggle against the Indonesian occupation. End comment.KLEMM