SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONAIRE (SEPQ) FOR FALL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000231 SIPDIS FOR DS/DSS/IP AND DS/IP/ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/15/2018 TAGS: ASEC PTER TT SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONAIRE (SEPQ) FOR FALL 2008 REF: 07 STATE 52805 CLASSIFIED BY: Henry M. Rector, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Dili, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d),(g) -------------- POLITICAL VIOLENCE -------------- ¶1. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS ¶A. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS? No ¶B. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? No ¶C. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? Demonstrators at times pass the US embassy en route between locations, but no demos have taken place in the areas around diplomatic facilities. ¶D. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION? N/A ¶E. ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY DOMESTIC ISSUES? N/A ¶F. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? Anti-government demonstrations in April 2006 turned into riots. Both anti- and pro- government demonstrations that took place in June 2006 were basically peaceful, but were accompanied by increased security concerns and some incidents throughout the city, although not at the site of the demonstrations. In some demonstrations in 2007, violence was directed against demonstrators. In one incident, a demonstrator traveling to Dili from Liquica was struck by a rock thrown at him at the airport roundabout. He subsequently fell out of the vehicle he was in and was run over by another vehicle. Demonstrators were also been attacked when returning from Dili back to the eastern districts. Such events have occurred in both Metinaro and Manatuto. ¶G. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES? In 2007 several USG vehicles were were damaged by rocks thrown by youth during episodes of political violence. There is no evidence that USG vehicles or personnel are being targeted. In these cases, the drivers unintentionally found themselves at the disturbances in which rival gangs were throwing stones at each other and randomly at passing vehicles. ¶H. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATORS EVER PENETRATED OUR PERIMETER SECURITY LINE? No. ¶I. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? Anti-government unrest followed the announcement of the new government in August 2007. This was not been in the form of demonstrations per se, but hostile groups burning buildings, throwing stones at vehicles, etc. ¶J. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? No ¶K. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION? DILI 00000231 002 OF 004 The largest demonstrations against the government in 2006 were about 3-4,000. Average demonstrations are much smaller, wth 500 or fewer paticipants ¶L. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? Generally peaceful. In 2008, the few demonstrations that have led to and arrests were exceptional. ¶M. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY? See 5 G ¶2. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS ¶A. IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN ORGANIZED AND VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS). No interstate conflict, with exception of occasional minor cross-border problems involving smuggling and localized disputes. The dissident military police commander implicated in May 2006 violence as well as seizing weapons from national police was killed during an attack on both the President and Prime Minister in February 2008. His followers (numbering fewer than 20) are all now in custody. ¶B. IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR? Issue mentioned in 6.A is generally not an active conflict and is localized in western districts. ¶C. IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION? No ¶D. HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN ORIENTATION? No ¶3. (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES ¶A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL-TRAINED? The National Police (PNTL) within the capital city disintegrated during the 2006 crisis and under the leadership of the UN is being gradually reconstituted. Most PNTL personnel are now back on the job, but working under UN Police Command. As a new force that has often been politicized they are still very much in development and cannot be described as fully trained and professionalized. Last year UNPOL granted the PNTL, independent authority in Dili. ¶B. HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING. Training has been provided by ICITAP in the past and was well received. PNTL have also participated in FBI training and in courses at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok. PNTL have responded well to such training, but much more is needed. ¶C. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS, WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES? Localized and petty corruption is a common problem. There are unconfirmed reports of widespread corruption in the immigration department. ¶D. ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS? No. Intelligence services are essentially non-operational. The National Intelligence Service (SNI) is undergoing reorganization but faces a lack of qualified personnel. However, the occupation-era clandestine network which branches throughout society potentially has the ability of providing security and political institution leaders with intelligence on opposition operations. ¶E. HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S. EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT? N/A ¶F. ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN DILI 00000231 003 OF 004 RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE TO SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES? N/A - no significant terrorist threats ¶G. HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE SECURITY? Yes ¶H. HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD; GOOD/AVERAGE;POOR) Average, new security requirments imposed by the GOTL and UNPOL have been imposed with moderate success. ¶I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS AGENCIES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE) Average to ineffective; see 3.C. ¶J. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE) Average to ineffective; see 3.C. -------------- INDIGENOUS TERRORISM -------------- ¶4. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS ¶A. ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN COUNTRY? No ¶B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. NA ¶C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? No ¶D. WERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS? N/A ¶E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS? No ¶F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY, OR U.S.-RELATED TARGETS? No ¶G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE? N/A ¶H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS? NA ¶5. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS ¶A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT ANTI- AMERICAN)IN COUNTRY? No. ¶B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. N/A ¶C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED? N/A DILI 00000231 004 OF 004 ¶D. WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE? N/A ¶E. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE ATTACKS? No -------------- TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM -------------- ¶6. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS ¶A. ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A PRESENCE IN COUNTRY? PROVIDE NAMES. No ¶B. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THIS PRESENCE? IS IT AN OPERATIONAL CELL? FINANCIAL CELL? SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA CELL? N/A ¶C. IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? N/A ¶D. ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE GROUPS? No ¶E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? No ¶F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA, SUDAN, ET. AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI- AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS? N/A. None of the above countries have diplomatic representation in Timor-Leste and we are unaware of the presence of any other nationals from these countries. ¶G. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE TERRORIST ELEMENTS? Loose control of police weapons inventory within the country as well as porous borders mean that availability of weapons is likely. However, weapons assessed to be in country at this point include primarily those purchased for police or military use, but not sufficiently controlled, or left over from independence conflict. RECTOR