MAJOR CHANGES IN TIMOR-LESTE FISCAL POLICY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000184 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR E. EEB, AND EAP/MTS; PLEASE PASS FOR INFO: USAID E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN PREL TT SUBJECT: MAJOR CHANGES IN TIMOR-LESTE FISCAL POLICY ¶1. Action requested - see para 13 below. ¶2. (SBU) Summary. The Timor-Leste National Parliament will begin debate this week on a massive supplementary budget that marks a departure from the country's historically conservative fiscal policy. If enacted and fully implemented, the government would outspend in 2008 what it spent in the eighteen months to December 2007 by more than 2-1/2 times. Given the Timorese government's weak executive capacity, it is not likely to spend but a fraction of its planned budget, but the new framework is nevertheless worrisome. It includes withdrawals from the country's modest Petroleum Fund at a rate that exceeds its sustainability; it establishes a fund to finance a potential enormous growth in subsidies for fuel, food and construction materials; and it foresees substantial increases in both consumption and investment programs that will severely test the government's weak capacity to execute programs. The intent is deliberate, however. The government believes the country continues to face a serious danger of instability. To assure stability and have any hope of long term development, the government is choosing now to boost both public sector investment and consumption. We and several other development partners (Australia and the EC most prominently) are concerned about the risks, both to the sustainability of the country's only significant source of mid-term revenue (the petroleum fund) and likely invitation to corruption that aspects of the budget may represent. We should encourage the government to fully consider the risks and better explain its policy to its development partners and Timorese civic society. End summary. ¶3. (U) The national parliament will begin debating in plenary the week of July 14 the government's proposed 2008 supplemental budget. This budget represents a major shift in Timor-Leste's fiscal policy. In 2002-2006, the country adopted a very conservative fiscal policy due to weak revenues and a decision not to borrow. More recently, disciplines contained in the law governing the country's Petroleum Fund (a sovereign wealth fund that collects revenues from exploitation of Timor's modest oil and natural gas reserves) limited spending. The 2008 supplemental budget, however, will introduce an aggressively expansionary fiscal policy. Planned expenditures in the supplementary budget of $426 million will more than double the government of Timor-Leste's (GoTL) original 2008 budget of $348 million. If fully obligated, government spending will equal 160% of forecast non-oil GDP in 2008, versus only 80% in 2007. The new level of planned expenditures in 2008, $773 million, will exceed all money spent by all of the previous budgets since independence in 2002 combined. While the rise in world oil prices has increased the estimated sustainable income (ESI) that can be withdrawn from the Petroleum Fund to $396 million in 2008, the supplementary budget will require a withdrawal from the Fund that exceeds the limit implied by ESI by nearly 75 percent. ¶4. (U) The supplemental budget includes large increases in spending on arguably productive programs by the ministries of agriculture (extension programs and tractors),infrastructure (power generation),social solidarity (the introduction of an old-age social welfare program),the prime minister's office ($20 million for IDP reintegration) and elsewhere. Their implementation will be tested by Timor-Leste's weak administrative and executive capacity. Indeed, the GoTL has proven able to execute only 50-60 percent of its planned expenditures in recent years and less than 20 percent of its capital development budget. In fact, it is highly unlikely that the GoTL could execute the proposed supplementary budget without exposing itself to a greater risk of corruption. Examples may be emerging already - several suspicious procurement actions were recently revealed, including for patrol boats, rice, and power infrastructure. ¶5. (U) Even more troubling, the budget proposes the establishment of a $240 million Economic Stabilization Fund (ESF) to address recent and potential future price rises in commodities such as rice, fuel, and construction goods. At present, there are very few disciplines surrounding the ESF. Indeed, the GOTL's July 2008 Budget Document suggests the ESF could be tapped to intervene in markets for a wide variety of goods. How it might do so and under what circumstances are not specified. As a result, the scope for oversight is limited, and the risk of abuse is high. DILI 00000184 002 OF 003 ¶6. (SBU) The GOTL's capacity to administer a program to intervene in a potentially wide-ranging set of markets is extremely limited and therefore also presents a risk of corruption. In recent history, the GoTL has failed to maintain a steady supply of rice imports, manage a strategic food reserve, develop a targeted food assistance program, and even collect world price data on key commodities in a systematic manner. Interventions in the markets for the goods widely suspected of being initially targeted by the ESF - rice, fuel, and construction materials - reflect a strong urban bias, whereas indicators of socio-economic well-being are almost universally worse in rural areas, where three-quarters of the population lives. ¶7. (SBU) Depending on how the ESF is implemented, it could very well undercut the incentive for farmers to increase rice production and be a drag on private sector activity more generally. Higher prices provide the incentive to produce, whereas the GOTL's intervention in markets, particularly the rice market, would reduce the prices producers receive for the goods. As such, subsidizing rice would undercut the GOTL's objective of increasing domestic food production and negate the impact of investments it is making to do so, such as the $5 million allocated for the purchase of tractors in the 2008 budget. And, once introduced, subsidies are typically politically difficult to remove and therefore could, in the longer-term, result in increased strain on the GOTL's fiscal position if they are maintained. ¶8. (SBU) Although key parliamentarians suggest minor alterations may be made by the parliament, the government is believed to have the necessary votes to pass the supplementary budget in close to its original form by July 25 or 28. The GOTL has no debt and the supplementary budget will require no borrowing. In violating the Petroleum Fund's ESI provisions, however, the budget poses the danger of setting a pattern in future where the fund repeatedly is raided by amounts exceeding the ESI. If the Petroleum Fund's financial sustainability is undermined, so goes the government's sole meaningful source of revenue for the foreseeable future. ¶9. (SBU) The Finance Minister, in an extended discussion with the ambassador on July 11, explained that the decision to shift to a more expansionary fiscal policy was deliberate with an over-riding goal of promoting social and political stability. In a post-conflict state such as Timor-Leste, stability must be the government's highest priority. Noting that the country has been repeatedly wracked by instability in its short history of independence, including a near total collapse in 2006, the finance minister stated the country simply cannot afford another crisis - "this is our last chance; the international investor community will not allow us to fail again." The government sees possible sources of serious instability in the country's high rates of poverty and unemployment, in the not-yet fully reintegrated IDPs, and in the recent spikes in prices for rice, fuel and other commodities (indeed, rice shortages sparked violence in 2007). Consequently, it decided to act to counter these and other sources of instability by expanding infrastructure projects (the capital investment budget will total $150 million in 2008),widening programs to assist farmers, introducing and funding a welfare program for the elderly, and establishing the ESF to provide a buffer against price shocks. The supplemental budget as a whole is designed to meet the "people's needs while not losing sight of medium and long term development objectives," said the minister. ¶10. (SBU) The finance minister told us that she hopes never to have to utilize the ESF, although its use is likely at minimum to continue a rice subsidy. It is being created to provide a fiscal buffer just in case "something serious goes wrong" with key commodity prices, with a primary goal to provide food security. When pressed on the government's weak administrative capacity, a shortcoming she is quick to acknowledge, the minister nevertheless believes the government now has systems in place to effectively manage the ESF if needed. Alternative policy responses to the rising price level such as a cash grant program are "morally and politically unacceptable" to Timorese. The minister defended the supplemental budget as providing an appropriate mix of spending on consumption and investment given Timor's state of development. Given a notably weak private DILI 00000184 003 OF 003 sector and continuing obstacles to inbound foreign investment, the public sector must act as the driver of growth at this stage of Timor's development. She also supported increased spending on programs that have failed in the past due to weak executive capacity, such as a project to provide tractors to communities of farmers. It should not be assumed that this government's ministers will fail just because the last government's did, the minister stated. ¶11. (SBU) The ambassador, noting serious concerns with many aspects of the supplemental budget, urged that the finance minister, or the prime minister, at minimum fully explain the change in direction of the government's fiscal policy. The government's intentions are not well understood within the donor community, or by civil society in Timor-Leste. A discussion with the donor community could address shortcomings regarding absorptive capacity, the sustainability of the Petroleum Fund (the finance minister reconfirmed that the government is moving to change the fund's investment strategy to include instruments other than U.S. treasury bonds to raise its returns),incentives to corruption, and the government's ability to implement subsidy programs without doing major harm to the country's private sector. The finance minister twice replied that she would seriously consider the proposal to open a dialogue with the donor community and the ambassador offered to assist in arranging a meeting. ¶12. (SBU) We have shared our concerns with the ambassadors from Australia, New Zealand, and the European Commission, as well as the charges of Portugal and Japan. The Australian ambassador expects to receive instructions from Canberra soon; the EC ambassador has raised concerns with the budget in public fora and is eager to coordinate a joint approach. We have also discussed GOTL fiscal policy-making with the UN SRSG, who is concerned that the GOTL leadership is not taking sound advice. We understand the local reps of the Bank/Fund have weighed in with the government, but the finance minister suggested a serious loss of confidence in these institutions has occurred. ¶13. (SBU) Action requested: Embassy Dili requests instructions to approach senior GOTL leaders, including the prime minister, to convey concerns with recent GoTL fiscal policy. The purpose of an intervention should not be to halt or seek major changes in the purposed 2008 supplemental budget - we anticipate this legislation will be passed by the national parliament within two weeks. We instead should emphasize our strong support for the government's effort to provide stability; indeed, that stability is paramount to the economic and social development of Timor-Leste. We should highlight, however, the risks that the government's expansionary fiscal policy creates, especially given the country's weak absorptive capacity, to include providing additional incentives to corruption as well as raising the already high inflation rate of 10%. We should note the debilitating role public subsidies have had in the creation of a vibrant private sector in many developing countries. We should encourage the government to better explain its policy to both Timorese civic society and its development partners. Finally, we should encourage the government to move promptly on its anti-corruption agenda, including the creation of an anti-corruption commission with strong investigatory and enforcement powers. (Note: The latter point offers one bright note: the government will hold a large public consultation with civic society on July 14 on its proposed creation of a strong anti-corruption commission.) We will share proposed talking points by email with State EAP/MTS. KLEMM