IMPACT OF RISING FOOD/COMMODITY PRICES ON TIMOR-LESTE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000128 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAGR EAID ETRD ECON TT SUBJECT: IMPACT OF RISING FOOD/COMMODITY PRICES ON TIMOR-LESTE REF: STATE 39410 DILI 00000128 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. Summary. While an estimated two-thirds of Timor-Leste's population is food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity, the worldwide increase in food and commodity prices has not yet led to social or political unrest in Timor-Leste. The increase in the price of food in the first quarter of 2008 was 3.2 percent, higher than the overall inflation rate of 2.6 percent. Timor-Leste's rural population relies on domestically-grown staples of maize and tubers. However, the price of rice - an important urban staple - is 40 percent higher than the historic norm, due to increased reliance on imported rice. While rice is grown in Timor-Leste, recent poor growing conditions and inefficient agricultural practices mean that the country is now dependent on imports for over half its rice supply. The GOTL's current official policy is to stabilize the rice market by providing 20 percent of the supply, but its uncoordinated, erratic, and opaque approach to the problem appear to deter private suppliers from responding to demand. Post believes that a more rational approach on the part of the GOTL, together with promotion of better agricultural techniques, would significantly alleviate these conditions. End summary. DEMAND ¶2. Eighty-five percent of Timor-Leste's labor force makes its living from agriculture, and maize is the most important food crop for 83 percent of these. However, while rice is the most important food crop for just 13 percent of the farming population, it is the commodity most affected by the worldwide increase in food prices. The reason is that, to date, Timor-Leste has maintained a practice of not importing maize - it only imports rice. Normally, Timor-Leste produces somewhat more than half of the approximately 100 thousand metric tons of rice it consumes annually. However, production has been lower the last two years owing to a combination of drought and flooding, high winds, and locust outbreaks in the western part of the country. As a result, imports now account for a majority of Timor-Leste's rice consumption, and the retail price of imported rice in Dili has risen by more than 40 percent over the historical level of about $0.35 per kilogram. Cassava and other tubers are also important staples and are typically substituted for maize and rice when stocks are depleted. �0A;SUPPLY ¶3. Agricultural productivity in Timor-Leste is extremely low. While 85 percent of the labor force makes its living from agriculture, the sector only accounts for about 30 percent of non-oil GDP. Basic agricultural techniques, such as the use of compost, are not widely applied, irrigation systems are poorly maintained where they exist, the lack of threshing and drying facilities results in a high proportion of broken rice, and adequate storage facilities are generally lacking. In addition, road networks are in grave disrepair, making it difficult for farmers to get products to markets. As a result of such structural problems, domestic agricultural production is not expected to respond to the worldwide increase in food prices. Rising food prices have, however, affected the availability of food assistance, most of which is provided by the World Food Program (WFP). As of April 2008, WFP stopped providing blanket food assistance to 70 thousand internally displaced persons (IDPs) - a welcome development - but is still contemplating the closure of its office in the enclave of Oecusse due to a resource shortage. ¶4. Other factors affecting supply include the above-mentioned weather and locust outbreaks in recent years. In addition, some humanitarian assistance provided to persons displaced by the 2006 crisis no doubt leaked on to the market at below-market prices once the situation became more stable, as has a civil servant rice subsidy that came into effect in mid-2007 and is expected to last until a civil service reform program is enacted, perhaps in mid-2008. These programs no doubt hurt the profitability of private traders. More importantly, however, following a shortage in February/March 2007, the Government became extremely sensitive to rice price increases and periodically leaked rice onto the market in an effort to maintain price stability. As a result, private traders stopped placing international orders and began acting only as distributors of Government-procured rice, most of which is sourced from Vietnam. Official Government policy has since changed, but the general inconsistency and opacity of Government rice policy has dampened the private traders' interest in reengaging in the market. Finally, any sign of instability - as DILI 00000128 002.2 OF 003 occurred with the recent assassination attempts on the President and Prime Minister - discourages shipping companies from traveling to Timor-Leste and results in higher shipping insurance premiums. POLITICAL IMPACT ¶5. To date, there have been no protests or instances of violence directly related to the most recent rise in the price of imported rice, which began in early 2008. However, the February/March 2007 shortage was believed to have exacerbated tensions lingering from Timor-Leste's 2006 political and security crisis. As a result, the Government became extremely sensitive to rice price increases and, as mentioned above, took measures to maintain price stability. In addition, the Government repeatedly postponed deadlines for the discontinuation of blanket food assistance to IDPs, even in the face of a September 2007 WFP assessment which found that IDPs were no more food insecure than the general population of Dili. In February 2008, the Government and WFP cut IDP food rations in half as an interim measure before complete discontinuation, which resulted in a very small number of peaceful protests in selected IDP camps but no outbreaks of violence. While WFP no longer provides food to IDPs (except as part of IDP return packages),the Government has chosen to extend the distribution of half rations through June 2008 using its own resources, an indication that there may still be some concern about potential violence. It should also be noted that since the attacks on the President and Prime Minister, the country has been under a state of emergency that includes a curfew. ECONOMIC IMPACT ¶6. Overall, food prices in Timor-Leste have risen by 3.2 percent in the three months to March 2008, higher than the average inflation rate of 2.6 percent for the same period. In the year to March 2008, food prices also rose 3.2 percent, though this was lower than the average inflation rate of 3.7 percent, driven largely by the housing sector. Within the general category of food, prices for cereals, roots, and their products (including rice) have risen 14.1 percent in the 3 months to March 2008. The price of imported rice in Dili is now estimated to be 40 percent higher than the historical price of about $0.35 per kilogram, though it is still less than the price during the February/March 2007 rice shortage. According to WFP, nearly two-thirds of Timor-Leste's population is food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity: 20 percent of the population is chronically food insecure, another 23 percent is highly vulnerable to food insecurity, and a further 21 percent is moderately vulnerable. Even though rice is principally an urban staple, and food insecurity tends to be more acute in rural areas, the rise in prices has likely resulted in increased food insecurity, particularly among the vulnerable. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ¶7. Shifting cultivation, often utilizing slash-and-burn methods, is widely practiced in Timor-Leste. As a result, the country is suffering from numerous environmental problems. However, these are structural in nature and cannot be attributed to the recent rise in prices for agricultural commodities. GOVERNMENT POLICY RESPONSE ¶8. In the face of rising world prices, the Government officially abandoned its policy of maintaining rice price stability, as it would have cost substantially more than the $5 million for "food security" included in the 2008 state budget. The Government is now seeking to cover only 20 percent of the country's import requirement, leaving the remaining 80 percent to the private sector. However, since the private sector has not responded to this official change in policy, the Government continues to be the principal source of imports, and many suspect it still leaks imported rice onto the market at subsidized prices. ¶9. As of mid-April, the Government had approximately 7,200 metric tons of rice in its stocks, amounting to about 6-7 weeks of the country's import requirement. There is an outstanding Government order for 16,000 MT of rice from Vietnam to be delivered in April, May, and June. However, given the turbulence of world markets and the policy responses of various rice exporters, this is order may not be secure - i.e., it may not come to Timor-Leste. It was reported that the Minister of DILI 00000128 003.2 OF 003 Commerce, Industry, and Trade recently traveled to Thailand to try to secure additional orders. International advisors have encouraged Government policy-makers to consider placing international orders for maize as a substitute for rice. ¶10. Since his return to Timor-Leste on April 17, President Josi Ramos-Horta has publicly advocated withdrawing more resources from the Petroleum Fund to finance additional rice imports through the state budget. However, the size of the Government budget has not proven to be a binding constraint to public investment to date. The formula that sets withdrawal limits from the Petroleum Fund provides ample room for the Government to meet such a need, which can be incorporated into the mid-year budget revision currently being prepared. IMPACT ON POST PROGRAMS ¶12. USAID supports WFP's operation in Timor-Leste, which is being squeezed as a result of rising food prices and the increased demands elsewhere. POLICY PROPOSALS ¶13. First, intra-governmental coordination on food security policy in Timor-Leste, including coordination of rice imports, needs to improve dramatically, and policy itself needs to be more transparent and consistent. The national food security committee is the appropriate body to lead such efforts and would benefit from stronger Ministerial engagement. Second, the Government should end the provision of blanket food assistance to IDPs and target all future food assistance according to clear and objective vulnerability criteria. This would imply an immediate end to the civil service rice subsidy as well. Finally, a system to track price movements of key staple commodities should be established, and, over time, policies to stimulate domestic food production should be considered. RECTOR