FOREIGN ADVISER EXPLAINS CTG'S VISION DURING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 000491

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DEPT FOR SCA/PB AND SCA/FO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PINS EAID ELAB ETRD BG
SUBJECT: FOREIGN ADVISER EXPLAINS CTG'S VISION DURING
AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
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1. (C) As it prepares for elections by the end of 2008, the
Caretaker Government is focused on ensuring the continuity of
the reforms it initiated after coming to office in January
2007, according to Foreign Adviser Iftekhar Chowdhury. He
noted that a key component of its strategy for achieving this
goal was to dilute the power of the Prime Minister by
strengthening the Presidency. The Caretaker Government (CTG)
was counting on the support of civil society and the
international community as the political process moved
forward. While Iftekhar presented a logical, compelling
vision, we are not clear how fully the rest of the CTG and
the Army share that vision.

Foreign Adviser Welcomes Ambassador to Bangladesh
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2. (C) The Ambassador paid an introductory call on Foreign
Affairs Advisor Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury April 29.
Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker),the MFA,s DG Americas, and the
Director of the Foreign Adviser,s office also participated
in the meeting. Iftekhar recalled fondly his tenure in New
York as Bangladesh,s Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, noting his excellent working relationships with the
Deputy Secretary (who was USUN Permanent Representative at
the time) as well as with Ambassador Bolton. Iftekhar noted
that Bangladesh and the U.S. had worked together to push
through much of the UN reform package that the USG had
proposed.


3. (C) The Foreign Adviser said that he was planning to
travel to Pakistan May 6 - 9, and would meet with the Prime
Minister, Foreign Minister, PPP Leader Asif Zardari, and
PML-N Leader Nawaz Sharif. He planned to deliver a message
from the Chief Adviser to the Pakistani Government and hoped
to "strike while the iron was hot." Iftekhar did not give
any indication of what message he would be carrying.

CTG Hopeful About Weathering Food Crisis
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4. (C) The Ambassador expressed interest in reports that the
Bangladeshi economy was beginning to rebound. He told
Iftekhar that the USG was responding to Bangladesh,s food
aid needs and hoped to soon be able to provide an additional
$10 million in food through WFP. The Ambassador also noted
that we would be making a contribution to efforts to respond
to the emerging famine in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The
Foreign Adviser, who had been given responsibility for
coordination in Sylhet Division, said the GOB had virtually
finished procurement for the upcoming "boro" crop in that
area. If the boro harvest meets expectations, the food
crisis should be "behind us," according to Iftekhar.
(Comment: This may be true in terms of gross food supplies,
but it still will not fully address the issue of
affordability of food for the most vulnerable populations.)
Iftekhar noted that the GOB had a great deal of experience
dealing with food issues and was confident they would be able
to manage the current situation.


5. (C) Turning to the global food situation, Iftekhar said
he had recently proposed in Accra that the UNSYG should be
personally involved in coordinating the global political
response. He said he was pleased that Ban Ki Moon had
recently announced that he would be setting up a group of
eminent persons to look at the food situation at the global
level. Bangladesh had provided input into that decision.
Also, Iftekhar revealed that Japan had suggested that
Bangladesh should provide technical assistance for a "green
revolution" initiative in Africa.

Political Process Moves Forward
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6. (C) Turning to elections, Iftekhar said that Chief
Adviser Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed would announce an "approximate"
election date soon. Iftekhar acknowledged that determining
the precise date for polls was within the purview of the

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Election Commission. He told the Ambassador that the
international community would be happy with the proposed
timetable. Iftekhar added that he and the other four
Advisers who had participated in the informal dialogue with
the political parties would report their findings to the
Chief Adviser on April 30. He said it was important to have
"broken bread" with the parties. His personal advantage as a
participant in the talks had been his familiarity with all of
the players, many of whom he had hosted during their foreign
travels.


7. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question, Iftekhar
noted that the CTG had to find a way to get the parties to
endorse the reforms as well. The CTG could not afford to be
seen as wanting to perpetuate its own existence. Still, the
CTG wanted to see the reforms that had been started endure
past December. Iftekhar acknowledged a danger it would all
go away unless the parties were brought on board.

A Magna Carta for BD?
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8. (C) For this reason, the CTG was proposing that the
parties agree to a "Magna Carta" before elections which would
be endorsed by the nation. In return, the parties would be
assured of gaining power after elections. Iftekhar said
that there was also discussion of changes in the institution
of the Presidency. The "Magna Carta" could include
amendments that would result in a sharing of power between
the President and Prime Minister. When questioned about the
need to amend the Constitution, Iftekhar noted that this
document "had not been written by God." Iftekhar
acknowledged that this proposal had not yet been endorsed by
the entire government.


9. (C) Looking at the formation of the next government,
Iftekhar admitted that the transition would have to be
carefully calibrated. He suggested a coalition arrangement
in which the majority party would fill most of the seats in
the cabinet but reserve some for other parties based on their
share of the vote. The President would be responsible for
protecting institutions like the Army and the independent
commissions. This would ensure civilian control, but
achieve a balance of power. Eventually, this would also
allow the country to overcome the differences between the two
former Prime Ministers. Iftekhar said he did not think that
the former PMs would want to return to office since the post
of PM would be diminished under the new system.

A Need for International Support
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10. (C) In order to achieve this outcome, there would be a
need for carefully calibrated support from Bangladesh's
international partners. The Ambassador assured the Foreign
Adviser that the USG would support the return to democracy.
Iftekhar said that we needed to work this partnership more
closely "than our cousins have done (referring to Pakistan)."
Iftekhar said that Bangladesh could prove to be a model for
the world, and in a generation could become like Singapore,
albeit with stronger democratic institutions. In addition,
Bangladesh was a moderate Muslim state, albeit one under
pressure from other forces including those from the Middle
East. The Ambassador highlighted the need to deny space to
terrorists in Bangladesh, in part because this would make it
easier for us to deal with radicalism in other parts of the
world. The Foreign Adviser agreed with this analysis.

Progress on Institutional Reforms Vital for the Future...
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11. (C) Iftekhar noted that the CTG's goal was for the
country to be known as a responsible international actor.
He boasted that "no bombs had gone off, no shots had been
fired in anger by the state," during the CTG's tenure. The
challenge, he said, was to institutionalize these
achievements. Iftekhar claimed that we were seeing a
reassertion of the Bangladeshi middle class' interests.
Focusing on civil society's "middle class" values, Iftekhar
said the CTG would not back down over the controversial
Women's Development Policy, despite opposition from Islamic
fundamentalists. He said that the Policy would be passed

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before the end of the government's term in December.


12. (C) Summarizing, Iftekhar said that the CTG was trying
to move ahead in four baskets of reforms: electoral; anti
corruption; governance; and institution building. In each
area the government needed to have buy in from the middle
class. Iftekhar said he had great faith in this class,
which had modern values and whose members made up the bulk of
the civil service and the army. He noted that they were also
the backbone of the thriving NGO community. While at times
these values were criticized for being too Western, Iftekhar
said the CTG considered them universal and defined the
"Spirit of 1/11."

...Domestic and International Pressure Needed
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13. (C) Hopefully, the force of domestic public opinion and
pressure from Bangladesh's friends would help keep the
reforms in place, according to Iftekhar. He highlighted the
establishment of an independent Election Commission and
Public Service Commission. (As an aside, Iftekhar
acknowledged that some of these changes had been difficult
for an entrenched civil service accustomed to "protecting
democracy, not practicing it.") He also reiterated the GOB's
commitment to establishing a Human Rights Commission.
Iftekhar said that the government could not be allowed to
deny human rights, and no government could be allowed to use
violence to keep itself in office. The main challenge moving
forward, Iftekhar said, was to choose the right kind of
people for the commission. The CTG was quietly looking for
individuals with the right profile and solid international
reputations.


14. (C) Iftekhar said that Bangladesh faced a problem in
adjusting the culture of the administration. Iftekhar said
that the Anti Corruption Commission had been fairly active,
and he hoped it would remain so. He acknowledged the
importance of having the right individuals in these
independent commissions, and said that the right man was in
the job as ACC Commissioner. Iftekhar noted he had worked
closely with the ACC Chairman when the latter had been
Bangladesh's Chief of Army Staff. Working together (with
Iftekhar in NY),the two had expanded Bangladesh's role in
international peacekeeping. By expanding into non-English
speaking countries like the Ivory Coast and Congo, Bangladesh
had grown to be one of the two leading contributors to PKO.


15. (C) Iftekhar admitted that the separation of the
judiciary from the executive would not be easy to complete,
since it went against 150 years of tradition and vested
interest. Those who favored the previous situation
complained that the judicial system now moved much more
slowly.

Labor Issues and Trade
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16. (C) Looking at the Middle East, Iftekhar said it had been
a challenge for Bangladesh to work with these countries on
worker rights issues. The UAE had signed a labor agreement
with Bangladesh, and Oman would soon do so. These countries
did not normally place much emphasis on worker rights.
Bangladesh had to be conscious of the need to protect this
important source of employment and remittances, but wanted to
ensure the best possible conditions for its workers.


17. (C) The Foreign Adviser said that he would save
discussion of readymade garment exports for another time, but
noted that he had written to every U.S. Member of Congress
arguing for increased market access. Bangladesh was making
a huge effort in this regard. The Ambassador alerted the
Foreign Adviser to a recent report by the AFL-CIO on the
shrimp industry in Bangladesh. While we had seen progress
in the EPZs and in some parts of the shrimp industry, the
picture was not so positive with respect to other parts of
the shrimp industry and to RMG manufacturing outside the
EPZs. It was important that Bangladesh make progress on
worker rights issues.

Comment
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18. (C) The Foreign Adviser was relaxed during the meeting
and clearly presented the CTG's vision for ensuring the
continuity of reforms through a carefully managed political
process. Still, there are a number of details that will need
to be resolved, and it will be important for the CTG to find
a way to get the political parties to agree to participate in
the process. Iftekhar puts a great deal of stock into the
ability of civil society to put pressure on the parties to
play along. While we agree that the desire for reform is
widely shared, the CTG needs to realize that its own
popularity is slipping by the day. Also, it is not clear
whether the Army and the CTG are fully in agreement about the
way forward.
Moriarty