Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DHAKA409
2008-04-07 10:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dhaka
Cable title:  

SIGNS OF CHANGE IN ROHINGYA CAMPS, BUT LONG-TERM

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL PREF BG 
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VZCZCXRO5020
RR RUEHCI
DE RUEHKA #0409/01 0981057
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071057Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6570
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0148
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0228
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 8430
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0118
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 8392
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2118
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 9624
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0588
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0226
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 1237
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0670
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DHAKA 000409 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PREF BG
SUBJECT: SIGNS OF CHANGE IN ROHINGYA CAMPS, BUT LONG-TERM
SOLUTION STILL NOT IN SIGHT

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Jon Danilowicz; reason
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DHAKA 000409

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PREF BG
SUBJECT: SIGNS OF CHANGE IN ROHINGYA CAMPS, BUT LONG-TERM
SOLUTION STILL NOT IN SIGHT

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Jon Danilowicz; reason 1.
4(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The plight of Burmese Rohingyas living in
southeastern Bangladesh is dire, but the government of
Bangladesh is taking some steps to improve conditions. In a
recent visit to the region, POLOFF visited the official and
unofficial Rohingya camps and met with local UN
representatives. The government of Bangladesh (GOB) has
taken several positive steps to improve camp conditions over
the past 18 months; in addition,hit is preparing to move
10,000 illegal Rohingya migrants from a slum on the banks of
the Naf River to a safer location. In spite of these
positive developments, however, a long-term solution to the
Rohingya situation still appears beyond reach. END SUMMARY.

DIPLOMATIC VISIT TO THE CAMPS
=============================


2. (C) In mid-March, POLOFF visited the official and
unofficial Rohingya refugees camps in the Cox's Bazar area in
southeastern Bangladesh, across the border from Burma. Also
participating in the visit, which was organized and led by
the local office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR),were representatives from the Australian High
Commission, European Commission delegation, and Danish
Embassy. Over two days, the group visited the official,
UNHCR-supervised camps at Kutupalong and Nayapara, the
makeshift, unofficial settlement on the western bank of the
Naf River in Teknaf, and the site where the government
intends to relocate the Teknaf settlement in the coming
months.

TWO OFFICIAL CAMPS AND ONE UNOFFICIAL SETTLEMENT
============================================= ====


3. (C) There are two "official" Rohingya refugee camps in
southeastern Bangladesh near Cox's Bazar: Nayapara and
Kutupalong. According to UNHCR's 2007 camp census, there are
currently approximately 27,500 residents in the two camps;
approximately 16,700 in Nayapara and 10,800 in Kutupalong.
Only 22,000 of those are considered by the GOB to be
"officially registered" and thus entitled to World Food
Program (WFP)-provided rations. In addition, the unofficial
Teknaf settlement contains some 10,000 or more Rohingyas.
Because they are not officially considered refugees, UNHCR
and the WFP cannot provide any services to them, although one
non-governmental organization (NGO),Medicins sans Frontieres
(MSF) Holland runs a clinic and feeding center there. There
are no accurate figures on the number of illegal Rohingya
migrants ("Rohingyas of concern," in UNHCR parlance) that
reside outside these camps in southeastern Bangladesh, though

some estimate the number at over 200,000. Many Rohingyas go
back and forth across the border for a minimal bribe each day
to conduct trade, and families live on both sides of the
border.

"SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ATTITUDE"
================================


4. (C) In late 2006, UNHCR reported a significant change in
attitude regarding the Rohingya refugees on the part of the
government of Bangladesh (GOB). This turn-around began
shortly after several high-level diplomatic visits to the
camps, including a trip there by Assistant Secretary Ellen
Sauerbrey in August 2006. According to UNHCR, GOB officials
told them "we don't want the refugees, but we need to take
care of them as long as they are here." UNHCR attributed
this change of heart to pressure from the international
community and negative media coverage of conditions in the
camps.

OLD PROBLEMS STEMMED FROM CORRUPT OFFICIALS
===========================================


5. (C) Many of the problems in the official camps stemmed
from the former Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner
(RRRC),the local representative of the Ministry for Food and
Disaster Management (MFDM). Shoyebur Rahman, who served as
RRRC until August 2006, was allegedly corrupt, extracting

DHAKA 00000409 002 OF 005


bribes from the police sent to provide security at the camps,
levying tolls on refugees wanting to leave the camps to work
illegally, and refusing to distribute relief supplies unless
he received a cut. As a result of his actions, two refugees
died in the camps in 2006 after the RRRC refused to permit
the distribution of UN-provided medicines to the camp
apothecaries. Arbitrary arrests used to be common, with the
going rate to police for an arrest being 200 to 300 taka
(three to four USD).

"KICKBACK AND CORRUPTION NETWORK HAS COLLAPSED"
============================================= ==


6. (C) According to UNHCR, Shoyebur's replacement, Ahmed
Hossain Khan, represented a sea change in dealing with the
problems of the camps. Khan worked closely with UNHCR to
eliminate corruption in the camps, for example by dismantling
the corrupt network of "majees" or local camp leaders who
were part of Rahman's network of corrupt thugs and enforcers.
The majees were replaced by elected "block" representatives,
and for the first time in the official camps, refugees were
able to choose their leaders. Together, Khan and UNHCR also
instituted a requirement for female representation in the
camp councils, to ensure that women, who head up 22 percent
of households in the camps, were adequately represented.
During our visit to the camps, several former majees
approached us to complain about UNHCR; however, the majority
of refugees we spoke with were relieved the majees no longer
held sway over them. In addition, the GOB transferred the
Assistant Superintendent of Police for Cox's Bazar, as well
as the two GOB officials in charge of day-to-day running of
the camps. All were said to have participated in the
previous RRRC's network of corruption. Today, according to
local UNHCR representative Jim Worrall the "kickback and
corruption network has collapsed."

IMPROVED SHELTERS
=================


7. (C) Perhaps the single most notable development has been
the replacement of dilapidated and collapsing refugee
shelters with new buildings. The old shelters, which dated
back to the late 1990s, were infested with termites and had
so sunk into the ground occupants had to crouch to enter and
could not stand up once inside. In late 2006, UNHCR finally
received permission from the GOB to commence a pilot shelter
program in Kutupalong. Based on recommendations from
refugees, the RRRC constructed 85 new shelters in 2007 and
expanded the program to Nayapara. Construction of the new
shelters continues apace, with phased demolition of the old
shelters and new ones being built on the freed-up land.
Refugees living in the old shelters eagerly questioned us
about when they would be moving into the new facilities;
those already resident in the new shelters proudly showed off
their new, and vastly improved, quarters.

IMPROVED RATION DISTRIBUTION PLAN
=================================


8. (C) Since 2007 the GOB has been more cooperative on the
ration issue. Earlier, they denied UNHCR's census figure for
the camps, and insisted rations could only be provided for
the 22,000 refugees who were registered. This disregarded
births, deaths, and marriages, and resulted in rations
intended for 22,000 being stretched to reach 28,500. Because
of this lack of proper rations, and a failure to provide
adequate medical care in the camps, the malnutrition rate in
the camps was estimated at 12.56 percent in 2005, well over
the already high southeastern Bangladesh average of nine to
ten percent. In 2007, however, the GOB did an about-face,
agreeing to permit UNHCR to issue identity cards to refugees
this year. These identity cards will replace the earlier
"family" ration books as the required document for receiving
rations. This will eliminate the trade in family books and
ensure the entire camp population, rather than just 22,000,
receive sufficient rations. UNHCR is currently negotiating
with the GOB and WFP to provide rations to the entire
population once the identity card project is completed.

PROLIFERATION OF NGOS

DHAKA 00000409 003 OF 005


=====================


9. (C) Another change in the camps from August 2006 is the
presence of numerous NGOs. During her visit, A/S Sauerbrey
urged the government to permit NGOs to provide services such
as vocational education, medical care, and other social
services in the camps. Today, for example, MSF runs medical
clinics in both camps (in addition to a medical clinic in the
unofficial camp in Taknaf). Handicapped International, funded
by a PRM grant, is working in the camps to improve conditions
for handicapped refugees and generate social awareness, and
the NGO Phals is working with UNICEF to improve education in
the camps.

EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES SLOWLY EXPANDING
========================================


10. (C) Primary education is expanding in the camps, with
plans to shift from the old Burmese curriculum to a
Bangladeshi one. Currently, schools offer classes from
kindergarten through grade five; there are plans to extend
this to grade six. UNICEF was permitted in 2007 to take over
the formalized education program. In addition, NGOs are
teaching vocational classes such as soap making and
school-bag production, and we spoke to some self-starting
young men in their 20s who on their own acquired a computer
and were teaching themselves word processing and other
computer skills.


11. (C) In spite of these developments, however, educational
opportunities for refugees are extremely limited after grade
five and the vocational programs are still only reaching a
fraction of the camp population. While the switch to the
Bangladeshi curriculum -- and the teaching of the Bangla
language -- is not uniformly popular, since many refugees
still want to return to Burma eventually, it could make it
easier for students eventually to enter schools outside the
camps for secondary education. Government restrictions on the
sale of refugee-produced products mean the soaps and other
goods made in the camps cannot be sold outside for profit,
but are for use only within the camps.

NEW ARRIVALS TO CAMP POSE NEW CHALLENGE
=======================================


12. (C) One serious problem is the arrival of over 3,000
non-registered Rohingyas from the surrounding communities to
the outskirts of Kutupalong in the past several months.
Flimsy, makeshift shacks clung to the hillsides just outside
the camp; according to UNHCR they were increasing every day.
UNHCR told us these illegal Rohingya migrants, many of whom
have lived and worked in local villages for many years, were
driven from their homes by local village officials during the
recent voter registration process. We spoke to several
Rohingyas in the process of constructing these shelters.
Initially, they tried to convince us they were from the camp,
and simply needed more space; however, once they realized we
were not connected to the GOB, some spoke of how they were
expelled from their villages by local officials. According to
UNHCR, even legitimate Bangladeshi citizens of Rohingya
origin have faced problems during the voter drive; one
Rohingya women, who is married to a prominent businessman and
has lived in Bangladesh since before independence in 1971
(and thus is legally Bangladeshi) was denied the right to
register and accused of being illegal. Since accurate
documents are difficult to come by, proving citizenship can
be challenging. UNHCR expressed concern this new influx
could destabilize the current situation and put additional
strain on Kutupalong's stretched infrastructure.

PLANS TO RELOCATE THE UNOFFICIAL TEKNAF SETTLEMENT
============================================= =====


13. (C) During our visit, we also toured the unofficial
Teknaf settlement, as well as the construction site at Leda
where the GOB intends to relocate the Teknaf residents in the
coming months. The settlement, perched on the western bank of
the Naf River, is, in the words of one MSF worker "one of the
worst places on earth." Over 10,000 unofficial, illegal
migrants are believed to reside there. A massive warren of

DHAKA 00000409 004 OF 005


bamboo shanties, covered with UNHCR plastic sheeting, extend
from the side of the main highway all the way to the river
bank. During high tide, water rises several feet, inundating
the shelters; in the monsoon season, the entire site is
awash. For several years, the GOB refused to take any action
to improve the settlement. According to UNHCR, corrupt local
officials turned a blind eye to the camp because of kickbacks
they received from local businesses that drew on camp
residents for cheap labor. MSF was the only NGO permitted to
work in the settlement, and became one of the only sources of
medical care and food. According to MSF, malnutrition in the
Teknaf campruns at between 23 to 24 percent.


14. (C) In 2007, after several high-profile diplomatic visits
and negative press coverage, it agreed to relocate the entire
settlement inland to a new site. While this was welcomed by
the international community, it is, according to UNHCR, a
daunting logistical challenge. The GOB plans to begin moving
residents to the new Leda site, approximately ten kilometers
away, in a matter of weeks; no public information has been
disseminated to the camp residents about how they will be
moved there though. In addition, new arrivals, hearing
mistakenly that UNHCR will be giving them new homes, are
coming to Teknaf every day. As a result, new shelters --
constructed in the past three to four months -- now balance
perilously on man-made dirt berms that extend beyond the camp
out to the river and mudflats. These new residents will
probably not be eligible for the move, since the GOB is using
an informal census completed nearly a year ago, before most
of the new arrivals.


15. (C) We visited the Leda site to see how construction was
commencing. Progress was slow; originally, the GOB told us
they intended to move the residents there last October, but
Cyclone Sidr in November 2007 and logistical delays since
then have pushed the timeframe back. Now, they believe the
first Rohingyas will be moving to Leda by early May. The
European aid agency ECHO, through the NGO Islamic Relief, is
providing most of the funding for the construction of
shelters, as well as a water and sanitation systems and
roads. While we were there, hundreds of workers were
erecting new bamboo shelters, digging wells, and constructing
latrines. Already, though, UNHCR says the site might not be
big enough to accommodate all the Teknaf residents. Another
concern is that ECHO has made clear it will not be funding
the upkeep of the camp; since it is not an official camp, it
does not fall under UNHCR's agreement with the government,
and thus it is uncertain who will pay to provide the required
services once the move is completed.

GOVERNMENT MAY BE TAKING A STEP BACKWARDS...
============================================


16. (C) In spite of the progress in resolving short-term
issues in the camps, UNHCR expressed concern to us that the
GOB might be hesitating again. Khan, who has served as RRRC
since 2006, was recently replaced by a technocrat from the
Science and Technology Ministry. We met with him on one of
his first days in the office. While stressing the importance
of continuing a good working relationship with UNHCR, he
seemed unaware of many of the responsibilities of his new
position. For example, he was unaware the GOB the RRRC had a
key role in moving the Teknaf camp to Leda. In addition to
concerns about the new RRRC, UNHCR also told us the GOB was
once again dragging its heels in signing its annual
sub-agreement with UNHCR. (NOTE: The GOB signed the 2006
sub-agreement in October of that year, and only after
pressure from the diplomatic community. The 2007 agreement
was signed at the beginning of that year, following a change
in government. END NOTE.) UNHCR said that the GOB may be
reverting to the negotiating tactics of 2006, including
insisting UNHCR fund wasteful expenditures such as extra
Ministry drivers for Dhaka and financing high administrative
costs. Spending for projects planned for 2008 cannot go
forward until the sub-agreement is signed, hence the
importance in getting it approved quickly.

TOWARDS A LONG-TERM RESOLUTION?
===============================


DHAKA 00000409 005 OF 005



17. (C) While short-term conditions in the official camps
appear greatly improved, and the GOB has taken some serious
steps to alleviating the humanitarian nightmare in the Teknaf
settlement, a long-term resolution to the Rohingya issue is
extremely complicated. Most of the official refugees told us
they would return if conditions were conducive, but they
simply did not feel safe going back now. Voluntary
repatriation has completed dried up in the past two years;
there were no repatriations at all in 2007. (NOTE: In 2007,
Burma and Bangladesh could not agree on one family that said
it wanted to go back, and that repatriation fell through. END
NOTE.) Integration of the Rohingyas into the local community
is anathema to the GOB; even UNHCR admits that giving
citizenship to the official refugees would prompt a new
influx of refugees from Burma over the border. Third-country
resettlement remains an option, but most countries have
stringent eligibility requirements, and only a few hundreds
refugees have been resettled in the past few years.


18. (C) UNHCR is promoting the idea of "opening up the camps"
-- i.e., letting them blend into the surrounding villages, in
the hope that subtle, versus formal, integration, might be
more appetizing to the GOB. As part of this plan, the UN
Development Program (UNDP) is encouraging development
initiatives that focus on the entire Cox's Bazar region, not
just the camps, in order to demonstrate to the local
community that there are benefits to accepting the Rohingyas.
Taking note of this approach, PRM built into its grants to
Handicapped International and Austcare a requirement that the
projects benefit both the camps and the surrounding
communities. UNHCR has expressed its appreciation to the USG
for bringing these to NGOs into the camps and serving as a
model for how the development community should approach the
issue. The Embassy Country Team is discussing whether any
existing programs, in areas such as health and education,
might expand to include some of the communities in Cox's
Bazar.

COMMENT: A LONG ROAD AHEAD
==========================


19. (C) There has been significant progress over the past two
years in terms of improving the conditions in the official
refugee camps. In addition, it is nothing short of a
breakthrough for the GOB to have agreed to relocate the
Teknaf camp. The caretaker government is stretched thin now,
and it is unlikely it will be able to take a controversial
decision like normalizing the status of the Rohingyas living
in Cox's Bazar; this will most likely have to wait for a new,
elected government. UNHCR has stressed the importance of USG
engagement on this issue, and credited us with having helped
push the GOB to undertake these changes. While a long-term
resolution may not be in sight now, these small steps are
nonetheless important and our involvement in this issue
continues to yield positive humanitarian results.
Pasi

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