Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DHAKA292
2008-03-05 07:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dhaka
Cable title:  

CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS REMAIN A TENSE AND TROUBLED

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KCOR KDEM BG 
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VZCZCXRO5553
PP RUEHCI
DE RUEHKA #0292/01 0650753
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050753Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6396
INFO RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 8353
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2079
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 9578
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0547
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0217
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0216
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 0137
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0107
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 1202
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0104
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 000292 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KCOR KDEM BG
SUBJECT: CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS REMAIN A TENSE AND TROUBLED
CORNER OF BANGLADESH

Classified By: CDA a.i. Geeta Pasi; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 000292 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KCOR KDEM BG SUBJECT: CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS REMAIN A TENSE AND TROUBLED CORNER OF BANGLADESH Classified By: CDA a.i. Geeta Pasi; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The political situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) remains tense, and in spite of positive statements by the government, the peace accord continues to languish. POLOFF and AIDOFFs recently visited the CHT under the auspices of the UN Development Program to assess the human rights and political situation and assess the impact of UN projects funded by AID in the area. The main problems continue to be land rights and development. Ethnic Bengali settlers continue to take (or be given) land traditionally farmed by the indigenous population, resulting in tension and occasional violence. According to local indigenous leaders, the military, which exercises control over law and order, involves itself in these local disputes, generally in favor of the ethnic Bengalis. In addition, the three CHT districts are cut off from the rest of the country, with no cellphone coverage permitted by the government, ostensibly for security purposes. We see an opportunity to reengage in the region and have planned follow-up discussions with local officials and UNDP. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) POLOFF and AIDOFFs visited two of the three CHT districts in early January under the auspices of the UN Development Program (UNDP). This was the first visit to the area by embassy officers since 2005. The purpose of the visit was to assess on-going U.S.-funded UNDP programming in the area, as well as the political and human rights situation. BACKGROUND: A TROUBLED CORNER OF THE COUNTRY ============================================ ¶3. (SBU) The Chittagong Hill Tracts consist of three districts -- Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachhari. Until the partition of British India in 1947, 97 percent of the population belonged to indigenous tribes, primarily the Chakma, Tripura and Marma. Under the British, the CHT was an "excluded area" exempt from the normal British administrative system of Bengal. Although it had a minimal Muslim population, the British gave the CHT to Pakistan as part of a deal to prevent Pakistan from claiming Calcutta. Pakistan removed the CHT,s "exclusive" status, opening it up to Muslim settlement. In 1961 international donors, including the U.S., funded the damming of the Karnaphuli River to provide hydroelectric pow
er for Chittagong. The dam flooded the tribal capital of Rangamati town as well as some of Bangladesh,s most fertile valleys. The displaced population of Rangamati, which was mostly ethnic Chakma and Buddhist, was forced to flee to the highest hilltops with little notice. These hilltops are now a string of islands that form Rangamati today. The flooding of the town, which most tribals attribute to the Chakmas, pro-Indian orientation, remains a source of bitterness to this day. ¶4. (SBU) After independence, open hostilities began between militant tribal groups, led by the Parbattya Chattagram Jama Songhat Sonniti (PCJSS -- the former Rangamati Communist Party),and the government, which accelerated efforts to settle ethnic Bengalis in the CHT. After over two decades of increasingly violent clashes, the Awami League government signed a peace accord with the PCJSS in 1997. The accord created a new ministry for CHT Affairs, called for the closure of most army bases in the region, and devolved most government responsibilities to the local level. Almost from its inception, the accords have been stymied by opposition from local leaders from the Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP),both of which saw implementation as a threat to their parochial interests. UNDER STATE OF EMERGENCY, NOT MUCH CHANGE ========================================== ¶5. (SBU) According to UNDP and local leaders, there has been no measurable increase in the already heavy army presence in the CHT since the declaration of a state of emergency. (NOTE: The Bangladesh Rifles also has a strong presence in the CHT and operates out of of number of counter-insurgency operation camps. END NOTE.) Some policies of the caretaker government that have disrupted life elsewhere, like slum demolition and DHAKA 00000292 002 OF 004 evictions, have also been less common in the CHT, primarily because they would adversely affect ethnic Bengali "settlers" the government has encouraged to move to the area. ¶6. (SBU) The indigenous population welcomed some government initiatives, such as the arrest on corruption charges and murder of former Khagrachhari member of parliament Wadud Bhuiyan, who is said to have been responsible for torching the Chakma village of Lemuchhari in 2003. Local tribal leaders complained to us, however, that in the sweep of arrests, several innocent PCJSS leaders were also detained. The state of emergency also has done nothing to slow the flow of ethnic Bengali settlers to the area. FOOD CRISIS PROMPTED BY BAMBOO FLOWERING ======================================== ¶7. (SBU) While visiting Rangamati, we heard for the first time about a serious food crisis in the CHT areas bordering India. Every 40 to 50 years, a particular species of bamboo flowers in the CHT and neighboring eastern Indian states. The flowering unleashes an explosion in the rat population which eats all the local crops, resulting in a food crisis. The last such crisis, in the 1950s, prompted an insurgency in the Indian state of Mizoram. The flowering has started again, and according to Rangamati Hill District Chairman Jagat Jyoti Chakma, this has prompted serious food shortages that are affecting between 20,000 and 50,000 indigenous Bangladeshis. USAID, working with the United Nations, is developing a response to this situation. (Reftel) DEFORESTATION ANOTHER CONCERN ============================= ¶8. (SBU) Control of land and natural resources is a major source of friction between indigenous peoples and Bengali settlers. The Kasalong Reserve Forest in Khagrachhari, and other natural forests in the three hill districts, have been dramatically deforested as a result of illegal logging and land grabbing. Thousands of tribal people, driven from the villages in Khagrachhari, were pushed into Kasalong, which has resulted in a nearly 75 percent depletion of the forest. During the visit, we discussed including protected areas in the CHT under a new AID protected area co-management project that would include a conflict mitigation element as well as community forestry. A similar initiative has been successfully implemented in northeastern Bangladesh and would serve as a model. CHT and UNDP officials welcomed the suggestion. A NEGATIVE PICTURE PAINTED BY LOCAL OFFICIALS ============================================= ¶9. (C) The peace accord called for elections to three district councils. These district councils would then appoint members to a CHT Regional Council. Since elections have not yet been held, the government has appointed members to the district councils. Former PCJSS leader JB Larma currently heads the Regional Council, although he complained to us that he has no power and the Council, created by the peace accord he helped negotiate, remains toothless. ¶10. (C) Larma was pessimistic about the overall situation. A 30-year veteran of the CHT insurgency and a senior leader of the PCJSS, he has come under severe criticism from within his party for signing the accord in 1997. Larma complained that, contrary to the provisions of the accord, the military exercises absolute control of the CHT, and that our conversation and his "every move" were carefully scrutinized. (NOTE: Our movements were heavily proscribed by police during our entire trip. END NOTE.) He said that under the accord the local councils, and not the deputy commissioners, should be responsible for administration of the three districts, including responsibility for law and order. Nevertheless, the Council remains powerless and the deputy commissioner and army call all the shots. The state of emergency has only heightened his anxiety. "I am afraid any day I could be arrested," he told us. He asked the U.S. to use its influence with the government of Bangladesh to pull back the army and begin implementing the accord. DHAKA 00000292 003 OF 004 CHAKMA CHIEF CLAIMS SITUATION "WORSENING" ========================================= ¶11. (SBU) We also met with Raja Devasish Roy, the Chakma circle chief and hereditary leader of the Chakma people. As per the CHT peace accords, he, along with two other indigenous circle chiefs, plays a key role in revenue collection, land management, and conflict mitigation. Roy is a prominent barrister-of-law and human rights advocate who has served on several UN panels on indigenous rights. (NOTE: Three days after we met with Roy, the caretaker government announced he had been appointed Special Assistant to the Chief Adviser with the rank and status of State Minister, responsible for the ministries of CHT Affairs and Forestry. END NOTE) ¶12. (C) Roy stressed the main problem in the CHT is the Bangladesh government,s (and military,s) intentional efforts to hamper development. As a result, the CHT has some of the lowest development indicators in the country, including the child mortality rate and education levels. Roy cited the military prohibition on mobile telephony and internet access in the CHT as an "enormous" hindrance to development. It can take a full day to reach villages in outlying areas with messages, and the detrimental effect the communications blockade has on business development is significant. ¶13. (C) According to Roy, in the past six to seven months the situation in the CHT has deteriorated, with a spike in the number of land conflicts between indigenous and settler groups. The army often intervenes on the side of the ethnic Bengalis, ignorant of the facts of the case and uninterested in who holds title to the property. Roy shared with us his concern that, given the heightened tensions, the situation could grow violent again. Roy welcomed the U.S. presence in the CHT, and emphasized as we departed all that is required is a bit of good will on the part of the government. "The Hill Tract problem doesn,t need as miracle to resolve," he said. (NOTE: CDA a.i.'s subsequent meeting with Roy is reported septel. END NOTE) A VISIT TO THE CHT,S "FRONT-LINE" ================================= ¶14. (C) With UNDP, we visited two clusters of indigenous villages in Khagrachhari district which are being engulfed by new Bengali settlements. Lemuchhari village was reconstructed in 2003 after a gang of settlers allegedly under the control of former MP Wadud Bhuiyan torched all the tribal homes and forced the entire population to flee. Villagers told us the police tried to warn them, but were powerless to intervene. The army camp, on the other hand, played an active role in abetting the violence. The international outcry against the then-BNP government was so strong the secretary of the CHT ministry granted permission for UNDP to commence reconstruction without consulting Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. When we visited, villagers complained they were once again at risk: all their land titles were burned when the village was torched, and settlers are now building on the villagers, farmland. We saw new settler homes being constructed in fields as close as 200 feet from the village in some areas. (NOTE: The leadership of this village is very activist, and held a press conference in Dhaka on the tenth anniversary of the signing of the peace accords to protest the encroachment of their land by settlers. END NOTE.) ¶14. (C) En route to the nearby indigenous village of Maddya Lemuchhari, we saw brand new government-provided pre-fabricated metal shelters on the side of the road, some already partially assembled into homes. As we walked through a Bengali settler village to reach of Lemuchhari, a crowd formed and began asking why we were only assisting the tribal people. "We are poor and need assistance too," said the leader, a bearded man wearing an Islamic cap. UNDP later pointed out that the government openly provided food supplies, pre-fabricated housing and other subsidies to settlers that the indigenous population did not receive. DHAKA 00000292 004.2 OF 004 ¶15. (SBU) We walked only a few hundred meters further, along a narrow path through a rice paddy, to reach Maddya Lemuchhari. We could see several new metal settler homes on the hills right above the village center. When we arrived in the village, the community committee implementing UNDP,s quick impact fund project there briefed us on how their project had been detrimentally affected by settler activity. According to UNDP and the villagers, they had planned to build a plant nursery on land near the village, but before they could start construction settlers seized the land and built homes on it. These new metal houses were visible about 500 feet away, towards the main road. (COMMENT: We found the failure of this project particularly troubling since it was being partially funded through AID funding to UNDP. END COMMENT.) COMMENT: U.S. ENGAGEMENT MAKES A DIFFERENCE =========================================== ¶16. (C) The CHT is often neglected, because of its remote location and the difficulty getting government permission to visit. The human rights situation in the area is the worst in the country and in spite of lip service by the caretaker government, there has been little movement to implement the peace accords to date. With the appointment of Devasish Roy, however, the government may finally be signaling a desire to change the status quo. ¶17. (C) As with other issues, demonstrating U.S. interest in the CHT sends an important message to the government. As a donor to the UNDP,s programming there, the USG has a vested interest in ensuring our money is well-spent and projects are not blocked. The Country Team is discussing follow-up steps to partner our human rights and governance concerns with programs designed to mitigate conflict, such as the community forestry project. We will also raise the issue, with our Bangladesh government and military interlocutors, of lifting the restrictions on cellphone and internet coverage, in an effort to bolster development in the region. A follow-up visit to the CHT, again under UNDP auspices, is planned in the coming months. Pasi

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