BANGLADESH--NOT FOR THE FAINT OF HEART

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DHAKA 000242 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ASEC PTER ECON BG SUBJECT: BANGLADESH--NOT FOR THE FAINT OF HEART Classified By: CDA A.I. GEETA PASI, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The goal of free, fair, and fully participatory elections in Bangladesh by the end of 2008 remains achievable, but numerous potential obstacles stand in the way of realizing that objective, with some key observers starting to hedge their bets. With less than a year remaining before elections, there needs to be a concerted effort on all sides to reach agreement on a political exit strategy for the Caretaker Government and the Army. The fate of the two imprisoned former Prime Ministers continues to loom large and remains the most intractable problem facing the regime. While the USG and the international community can help facilitate the dialogue among all the players (political parties, civil society, the Caretaker Government, the Army, etc.),in the end success (or failure) will depend on the commitment of Bangladeshis to the goals of January 11. End Summary Crystal Ball Gazing =================== 2.(C) In a best case scenario, by the end of 2008 Bangladesh will hold parliamentary elections judged to be free, fair, and fully participatory. Soon thereafter, the Caretaker Government (CTG) will hand over power to an elected government that reflects the will of the Bangladeshi people. The Bangladesh Army will end its day to day involvement in managing the work of government and return to focusing on primary missions such as national defense and international peacekeeping. The newly-elected government will ratify the actions of the CTG, lift any remaining provisions of emergency rule, restore proper civil-military balance, and continue to implement the reform process begun after January ¶11. A new President and Prime Minister will be appointed and begin to restore dignity and credibility to those offices. Business confidence will rebound, with the new government engaging in constructive dialogue with development partners to improve the lives of Bangladesh's most vulnerable citizens. Political parties will continue internal reforms and a loyal opposition will emerge within the parliament, which will become the recognized forum for debate over national issues. Hartals and violent street demonstrations will be a thing of the past. In retrospect, the sacrifices of the previous two years will be seen to have been worthwhile and Bangladeshi citizens will chart their course to a brighter future. There will be no return to the status quo before January 11, 2007. ¶3. (C) Easier said than done. While the above &best case8 scenario is plausible, this future is by no means certain. In recent weeks, some key local observers as well as outspoken representatives of civil society have begun to discount the prospects of the CTG fulfilling its mandate, in particular a successful return to democratically elected government by the end of 2008, claiming more time is needed to implement programs and reform institutions. It is clear that there are a significant number of potential obstacles that must be overcome in order to ensure a positive exit for the CTG and its supporters. This cable will outline some of the most pressing issues and conclude with some recommendations for how the USG and international community can help influence events in the coming months. Electoral Roadmap On Track for Now ================================== ¶4. (C) The Election Commission (EC) continues to make important progress in overseeing the registration of Bangladesh,s estimated 90 million eligible voters. As of today, approximately 45% of voter registration has been completed. The army, which is conducting the registration, believes it can complete this task on schedule (by June/July) in order to allow for appropriate review and correction of the lists and elections to be held in the final quarter of ¶2007. That is the good news. ¶4. (C) At the same time, the capacity of the EC to facilitate positive reform and lasting change is limited. The EC's attempts to catalyze internal political party reforms have been stymied. On February 24 the EC begins the second round of consultations with the parties on the new electoral laws, even before it meets with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (currently tied up in a court case over who represents the now-splintered party). The EC has also hinted that it may relax the requirements for party registration to benefit smaller parties, even as it prepares to propose other DHAKA 00000242 002.2 OF 005 institutional changes such as establishment of a bicameral legislature and amendments to parliamentary procedures. It is unclear which reforms will be implemented before elections, and which will be left for the next parliament to decide. Elections in municipalities, including Dhaka are currently slated for April/May. These elections could serve as a useful "dry run" and help build confidence in the electoral process. At the same time, there are questions whether or not elections can be held under a State of Emergency, with some speculating that a decision to lift restrictions could precipitate violence. Some have gone so far as to argue that violence surrounding municipal elections could be used as a pretext for canceling national elections. BNP'S Future Looks Dim ====================== ¶6. (C) While the Awami League has remained outwardly united and able to present a more or less common front as it prepares for the next round of dialogue with the EC, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is in disarray. The GOB,s efforts to promote reform within the BNP and sideline former Prime Minister Zia by encouraging reformers to wrest control of the party from the Zia clan have backfired. The reformist group, led by former Finance Minister Saifur Rahman, is demoralized and bitter about how it was misled by representatives from the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI),the behind the scenes broker on political issues. Khaleda Zia loyalists believe the Supreme Court will soon rule in their favor and annul the results of an October 29 meeting which appointed Saifur Rahman as acting Chairman of the Party. While there is now much discussion within BNP ranks of &unity8 it is unclear whether the two factions will be able to overcome their differences. Meanwhile, BNP coalition partner the Jamaat Islami Bangladesh is under pressure by those calling for trials of war criminals, which could possibly sideline senior party members. A greater threat is that the Jamaat could be barred from registering as a party, as has been demanded by a vocal minority of former freedom fighters. (See septel on the Jamaat's problems). Government of National Unity: Still Plan B =========================================== ¶7. (C) The establishment of a &Government of National Unity8 is a notion that predates the January 11 declaration of a state of emergency. Most recently, discussion has focused on this option as a possible substitute for elections and a mechanism for excluding the two former Prime Ministers from office. Politicians from all parties report being approached by DGFI and enticed (or coerced) into agreeing to participate in such a Government. There have been few takers from the major parties, however, since most politicians realize that without their party's backing they have little political viability as individuals. Those who are most enthusiastic about the proposed GNU have been roundly dismissed as individuals likely to be "selected" but who cannot in their own right be "elected." While there have been efforts by DGFI to test the waters regarding a "Government of National Unity" its architects realize that this is a potential solution fraught with problems. At best, this initiative seems to be a fallback option should it prove impossible to hold elections can guarantee an outcome acceptable to the Army. One rumored version of this approach is that DGFI will attempt to forge a "national front" of small parties to contest elections and serve as their proxies in a new government. What does the Army Want? ======================== ¶8. (C) Uncertainty and speculation remain rife regarding the true intentions of the Army and the Chief of Army Staff General Moeen Uddin Ahmed. In public and private Moeen consistently states that he has no political ambitions. At the same time, he has also said repeatedly that the political situation will not be allowed to revert to a status quo pre-1/11, and he has been openly critical of the past performance of politicians. Recent headlines surrounding the launch of a book comprised of Moeen's speeches have focused on his call for Bangladesh to practice its "own form of democracy." Most observers agree that there is little incentive for the army as an institution to physically seize political power, and overall an anti-coup mentality exists within the military. Many in the military view threats to be excluded from participation in PKOs were they to seize power DHAKA 00000242 003 OF 005 as hollow, given the international community's reaction to coups in Pakistan, Fiji, and Thailand. At the same time, Bangladesh's army has grown accustomed to the international prestige gained, as well as the financial benefits earned, from participation in PKOs and is not likely to take actions that would risk future participation. As a result, it is probably more important for Bangladesh army officials to realize that it would be practically impossible to continue to send significant numbers of soldiers to PKO missions if the bulk of the 150,000 man army had to be devoted to domestic missions. ¶9. (C) It is almost certain that General Moeen will seek an extension as Army Chief before his three year appointment expires in June. When he does, many will be quick to draw parallels to former military dictators Ziaur Rahman and Hussein Muhammad Ershad, but there will likely be little surprise or opposition to Moeen extending his term. What would obviously be much more controversial would be a decision by Moeen to seek the Presidency, in particular while in uniform. The idea continues to be discussed among Dhaka's chatterati, and apparently even on the cantonment. At the same time, there is also discussion of the army orchestrating selection of the next President from the ranks of the civilian politicians. Most observers also expect to see the establishment of a "National Security Council" intended to institutionalize an Army role in national decision making. Accompanying this would likely be an adjustment of the relative power of the President and Prime Minister to restore some balance of power between the two. ¶10. (C) There are continuing periodic reports of friction between Moeen and the other architects of the 1/11 state of emergency, particularly other senior officers. It appears that this small group is under increasing pressure to demonstrate to subordinates that the sacrifices of the past year will prove to be worthwhile. At the senior level of the army at large, opinion may be divided on next steps. Moeen clearly has the most to lose and needs to deliver both to his senior officers as well as to the rank and file. Moeen,s ongoing visit to India will fuel speculation from within the military as well as the rest of the conspiracy-prone population that India controls, or is trying to control, the Army Chief. Minus Two, Plus Two =================== ¶11. (C) By far, the most vexing question for Bangladesh's future is what to do about the two former Prime Ministers. While the ideal outcome might be some type of &Sonia Gandhi8 solution whereby the two accept a largely ceremonial role in the future, it has become apparent that this cannot be imposed on either from outside. Rather, they must be convinced that it is in their best interest to accept a deal that excludes them from office (either national or party) in exchange for freedom and the ability to exert influence from behind the scenes. Complicating the situation for Begum Zia is the question of the fates of her two sons, both of whom are currently behind bars awaiting charges. There are (albeit at times overstated) health concerns with both Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia,s two sons, and to a lesser extent Begum Zia herself. ¶12. (C) The fate of the two Begums, as well as others detained as part of the CTG,s anti-corruption drive, could hinge on a pending decision by the Supreme Court on a challenge by Sheikh Hasina,s lawyers to the Emergency Power Rules. While there have been conflicting precedents at the High Court level, the Appellate Division must now rule on whether the EPR are unconstitutional because they allow for ex-post facto punishment for crimes committed before January ¶11. The ruling in this case will also place renewed scrutiny on the independence of the judiciary. Most observers believe the court will uphold the CTG's position on the EPR. ¶13. (C) Some believe time is on the side of the two Begums and predict there will be increasing pressure on the government to release them as elections draw closer. There are conflicting reports regarding negotiations that have taken place between the two leaders and the CTG and the commitment of both sides to engage in serious talks to avert a crisis. All agree, however, that the two former Prime Ministers still enjoy widespread popularity within their parties and in the population at large. Given this, the most viable option for them may be to try to outlast the CTG and its supporters. DHAKA 00000242 004 OF 005 Political Dialogue About to Begin ================================= ¶14. (C) In response to calls from the political parties and the international community, the CTG is inching towards initiating a dialogue with the parties on the country,s political future. We have been told that the CTG will likely appoint an individual, or group of individuals, to conduct this dialogue on its behalf. The dialogue will likely include representatives of civil society, as well as politicians, and will focus on a common set of principles to guide the country,s political evolution (such as Dr. Kamal Hossain's proposed "Charter for National Unity.") While a positive step, this dialogue will likely not be sufficient for resolving the numerous outstanding issues standing in the way of elections (most notably the fate of the two former Prime Ministers). Also, to the dismay of the parties, the Army will likely not play a direct role in the dialogue, leading some to question its importance (as the Army is viewed as the power behind the throne) as well as the generals' true intentions. Possible External Shocks Abound =============================== ¶15. (C) If the above political challenges were not enough, the CTG could still be rocked by external shocks such as renewed violence on universities or in the garment industry, or a crisis over food supply or prices. Headlines continue to be dominated by reports of increased cost of living and growing misery for Bangladesh,s middle and lower classes. On top of this, with the memories of last year,s floods and cyclone, coupled with the recent avian influenza outbreaks, the government is getting a reputation of being &unlucky8 in the eyes of superstitious Bangladeshi citizens. If the army has to be called upon to provide significant support to efforts to contain AI or food riots, its capacity to complete voter registration on schedule may be jeopardized. Business Community Frustrated ============================= ¶16. (C) There is considerable frustration in the business community about government inertia. Businessmen claim the CTG's reform efforts are incomplete, stalled, or at best moving very slowly, including regulatory reform efforts. The CTG had an opportunity to reenergize itself with the cabinet shake up in January, but the new Advisers have not yet shown themselves to be more effective than their predecessors (septel will report on the CDA a.i.'s initial meetings with the new Advisers). Lack of implementation of reforms is only going to worsen in the coming year, as civil servants keep their heads down in an attempt to avoid possible retaliation by a future government. Business people and economists agree decisive action is needed to keep the CTG's institutional reforms going and to help boost business confidence, but most predict the coming year will be one marked by paralysis. A common refrain is that a clearly defined exit strategy that has political party buy-in is the only way to combat government inertia and bolster investor confidence. Comment: Role for the USG And International Community ============================================= ======== ¶17. (C) One of the most pressing problems for the CTG and the Army is the degree of uncertainty surrounding many of the most vital components of the "exit strategy." The confusion is exacerbated by limited CTG capacity, lack of confidence in the political system, as well as a lack of communication and trust between the principal actors, most notably the political parties, the Army and the CTG. While much ink is spilled in the press with the results of seminars, press conferences, and speeches, there is very little direct communication. A role that the USG can play is to facilitate dialogue between all sides and help to keep all focused on the concrete steps needed to create an environment conducive to holding elections. In this regard, recent high level visits by USAID/ANE's Mark Ward, and State/SCA PDAS Don Camp were useful in keeping the focus on the issues that need to be resolved. We also should think ahead to the ways in which the USG and the international community can build confidence between the parties and help "guarantee" a political solution while resisting the constant drumbeat of calls for the USG to get directly involved in mediating between the parties. This delicate balancing act will be increasingly critical as elections approach. Finally, our assistance programs, DHAKA 00000242 005 OF 005 particularly those targeted at cyclone reconstruction, food security, and AI prevention, can help cushion the potential external shocks. In sum, as the year progresses, Bangladesh will continue to be a difficult place for the faint of heart. While we can help promote an outcome in the best interests of Bangladesh and the international community, in the end, Bangladeshis themselves hold the key to determining their future. Pasi