CIVIL SOCIETY CASTS WARY EYE TOWARDS POST-ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 001137

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/PB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PINS KDEM PHUM BG
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY CASTS WARY EYE TOWARDS POST-ELECTION
FUTURE

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
========


1. (C) As the likelihood of parliamentary elections taking
place as scheduled on December 18 has increased, prominent
members of civil society have become increasingly vocal in
expressing their concerns about what happens after the
political parties return to power. In general, civil society
welcomed the January 11, 2007, State of Emergency and the
Caretaker Government's efforts to fight corruption and reform
Bangladesh's dysfunctional political system and culture.
After 22 months, civil society remains skeptical about the
capacity of the political parties or their leaders to prevent
a return to the confrontational winner-take-all politics of
the past. On balance, most who supported the Caretaker
Government's agenda appear to have concluded that an Awami
League victory (and Sheikh Hasina's return as Prime Minister)
represents the lesser of two evils. This is based on their
assumption that Khaleda Zia and the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party would be most likely to seek retribution against the
architects of January 11, potentially provoking a crisis.
Unless Khaleda Zia allows the more progressive members of the
BNP to return to prominence within the party, these skeptics
may be correct in their assumptions.

December 19 and Beyond
======================


2. (C) With the Election Commission prepared to announce
the election schedule the week of November 2, uncertainty
about the conduct of Bangladesh's December 18 polls has begun
to fade. In recent days, however, a number of our key civil
society interlocutors have shared their gnawing concerns
about what will follow the elections. Many prominent civil
society actors openly welcomed the January 11, 2007
declaration of a State of Emergency, arguing then and since
that intervention by the Army was necessary to avert chaos.
Prominent voices saw the subsequent formation of the
Caretaker Government led by Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed as an
opportunity to address dysfunction within Bangladesh's
political system, most notably corruption. As a result,
leading activists applauded CTG efforts to fight corruption,
reform institutions, and push for changes within the
political parties. As the months went by, however, much of
the initial enthusiasm faded, in part because of civil
society's discomfort with the role being played by
Bangladesh's military (notably the Directorate General of
Forces Intelligence) behind the scenes. Gradually, most came
to accept that there was a limit to what an unelected
government could achieve and that there was no alternative to
returning power to the political parties and their leaders.


Can You Teach an Old Prime Minister New Tricks?
============================================= ==


3. (C) Matiur Rahman, editor of Bangladesh's largest daily
newspaper, "Prothom Alo," spoke for many when he shared with
the Ambassador on October 29 doubts that either Awami League
leader Sheikh Hasina or BNP Leader Khaleda Zia have changed
in any fundamental ways. Matiur said he remained convinced
that both leaders, their family members, and party cronies
had engaged in massive corruption during their tenures in
office. For his part, Tapan Chowdhury, a former Caretaker
Adviser and one of Bangladesh's leading industrialists, has
expressed his fears that political parties would fall back on
their time-tested strategies of organizing strikes and
violent demonstrations.

Lingering Concerns about Retribution
====================================


4. (C) Dr. Debapriya Bhattacharya, the former Executive
Director of Bangladesh's Center for Policy Dialogue and
current GOB Envoy in Geneva, pointed to the emerging advisors
surrounding Khaleda Zia and predicted they would be focused
on vengeance if allowed back into power. Potential targets
of retribution could include military officials as well as
members of the CTG and their civil society supporters. To
support his assertions, Debapriya pointed to a recent suit

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filed by Khaleda's advisor Mahmudur Rahman against Anti
Corruption Commission Chairperson Lt.Gen (ret'd) Hasan Mashud
Chowdhury. Debapriya, Matiur, and others also expressed
their concern that the BNP would interfere with military
assignments and promotions, as they had in the past. Former
Foreign Secretary Farooq Sobhan, who currently heads the
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, echoed a common complaint
voiced by many of our contacts when he commented that the BNP
saw him as pro-Awami League, while Hasina's party saw him as
a Khaleda loyalist.

Space for Extremists
====================


5. (C) Prothom Alo has been at the forefront of journalistic
efforts to expose the activities of extremist groups,
including the JMB, HUJI-B, and ULFA. The paper has
criticized efforts by the HUJI-B offshoot Islamic Democratic
Party to register with the election commission. The paper's
editor, Matiur, refuted assertions by Bangladeshi
intelligence agencies that the IDP represented a vehicle to
"de-radicalize" HUJI-B militants. Matiur shared his
assessment that these violent extremist organizations
remained active and depended on the security services turning
a blind eye to their activities. He was particularly
concerned about possible support from Pakistan and China to
these extremist organizations. Matiur noted significant
arms seizures in Chittagong and Mymensingh, which he linked
to these extremist groups and their networks. He asserted
that in Mymensingh DGFI had taken control of weapons seized
by the police and returned to terrorist groups. Matiur and
others believe that the 2001 - 2006 BNP Government turned a
blind eye to the activities of these extremist groups, and
feared that the groups were looking forward to a BNP-Jamaat
return to power.

Comment: The Awami League: Lesser of Two Evils?
============================================= ===


6. (C) Given a choice, most of our civil society contacts
tell us that they regard the Awami League and Sheikh Hasina
as the lesser of two evils. This preference has been fueled
by concern over the fate of the former "Reformist" elements
within the BNP, who have been sidelined by Khaleda and the
party leadership. At the same time, even those who would
prefer to see an Awami League victory fear that Hasina will
follow her arch-rival's lead and move to isolate those within
her party who rose to challenge her leadership during the
past 22 months. At present, a leadership vacuum exists at
the top of both parties, and it is uncertain who might emerge
to assume key positions after the election. In general, our
best hope for a slightly better democracy following elections
rests with the institutional changes made by the Caretaker
Government during its tenure. As Bangladesh moves forward
with transformational elections in this large Muslim majority
country with a history of domestic and transnational
terrorism, we need to be on guard against those who would
seek to turn the clock back to the bad old days of
confrontational, corrupt politics.
Moriarty