KHALEDA ZIA CONSOLIDATES LEADERSHIP AND BNP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 001120 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/PB AND SCA/FO E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PHUM KDEM BG SUBJECT: KHALEDA ZIA CONSOLIDATES LEADERSHIP AND BNP ADJUSTS TO LIFE AFTER TARIQUE RAHMAN REF: DHAKA 1069 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY ======= ¶1. (C) Former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia has moved steadily to consolidate control over the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) since her release from prison on September 11. At her direction, the BNP registered with the Election Commission prior to the October 20 deadline and subsequently met with the Caretaker Government Advisers to continue negotiations on the roadmap towards the December 18 elections. Internally, former "Reformist" elements of the party worry about their future even as the BNP leadership decides how to respond to the Government's proposed "negative list" of potential candidates to be barred from the election. Meanwhile, the BNP's alliance partners jockey for position. The BNP's prospects for winning the December elections have diminished, but the party will remain a major factor in the country's politics regardless of how many seats it wins. BNP Registers and Continues to Negotiate ======================================== ¶2. (C) Those hoping for broadly inclusive elections in December breathed a collective sigh of relief when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its principal alliance partner the Jamaat Islami Bangladesh (JIB) submitted their registration forms to the Election Commission on October 20. In a sign of its flexibility, the Election Commission had earlier extended the deadline by one week to accommodate the BNP and its ally, but the EC had also signaled it would not consider further delays. At the deadline, the BNP blinked and agreed to register, albeit only after the party's recalcitrant Secretary General clarified publicly that the decision to register did not mean the BNP had renounced the option of boycotting the elections at a later date. Still, in order to comply with the registration requirements, the BNP amended its constitution to bring it in line with the requirements of the new political party law. ¶3. (C) Following the party's decision to register, a BNP delegation met on October 23 with the Caretaker Government's negotiating team led by Education Adviser Hossain Zillur Rahman. After the meeting, a BNP spokesman announced that the two sides had agreed "in principle" to six of the seven BNP demands. While others in the BNP later backtracked, the result was an uncharacteristically positive public tone from the BNP leadership regarding the political reform process and the implementation of the electoral roadmap. While she did not participate in either meeting, Khaleda Zia's hand was clearly evident behind the shift in the party's position. The BNP's newfound spirit of cooperation was foreshadowed by Khaleda's two meetings with Hossain Zillur Rahman and her conversation with the Ambassador on October 6 (reftel). As a result, the threat of a BNP boycott of the elections has become both less likely and less credible. Pressure to Exclude both Reformists and Bad Actors ============================================= ===== 4.(C) While Khaleda Zia has reactivated the party's formal decision making structures, most notably its Standing Committee, she has been slow to welcome former "reformists" back into the fold. Standing Committee members Saifur Rahman and Lt. Gen. (ret'd) Mahbubur Rahman have been allowed to participate in formal meetings, but have not been involved in any of the negotiations with the Advisers. Instead, Secretary General Khondker Delwar Hossain, Office Secretary Rizvi Ahmed, Assistant Secretary General Nazrul Islam Khan, and other loyalists have been at the forefront. Prominent BNP reformists like former Education Minister Dr. Osman Farook and former Food Minister Kamal Yusuf have complained to us that they are unsure about their future within the party. While some (including Yusuf) have been able to meet with Khaleda, others (such as Farook and reformist Secretary General Hafeez Uddin Ahmed) have been unable to get audiences with the party Chairperson. Some reformists fear Khaleda may deny them nominations for parliamentary seats as punishment DHAKA 00001120 002 OF 003 for their disloyalty. While assuring us they are not prepared to sacrifice their dignity by "crawling back" to Khaleda, these reformists are worries about being left out if the BNP returns to power. In a telling move, the BNP's delegation to a National Democratic Institute Conference on October 27 did not include any reformists. ¶5. (C) At the same time, the BNP and Awami League leaderships have received from the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI)"negative lists" of individuals whom DGFI does not want to see receive nominations from the parties. Reportedly, more than twice as many former BNP parliamentarians are on the negative list than Awami League former parliamentarians. Some BNP supporters fear that by excluding these candidates, and given the tenuous standing within the party of the reformist faction, the BNP might have difficulty in putting forward a credible slate of candidates. Moreover, in several key areas (including Sylhet, Chittagong, and Dhaka),the local BNP party structures have suffered serious divisions between reformists and loyalists. As a result, some BNP supporters now believe their party has no chance of winning in December. Some argue that as a result the party should seek a delay or cancellation of elections. Khaleda Establishes In-House "think tank" ========================================= ¶6. (C) Much of the criticism of the 2001 - 2006 BNP Government centered around the parallel administration established by Tarique Rahman and his cronies at the notorious "Hawa Bhaban" (BNP Headquarters). Senior BNP officials complained that Hawa Bhaban controlled access to Khaleda Zia and provided her with advice on national and political issues. Tarique Rahman left Bangladesh on September 11, and the party offices moved out of Hawa Bhaban, but Khaleda Zia continues to rely on an informal network of advisers. These advisers have set up shop in a residential area located in the Diplomatic Enclave, where Begum Zia has established her private office. The team of advisers, who act as the BNP's in-house think tank, is led by former Energy Adviser Mahmudur Rahman, and includes former bureaucrat Mushfiqur Rahman, former Ambassador to the U.S. Shamsher Mobin Chowdhury, and a handful of other individuals with personal ties to the Party Chairperson. Zia has entrusted this group with drafting the Party's election manifesto, and it also appears to have a role in setting her schedule. Four Party Alliance Looks at Division of Seats ============================================= = ¶7. (C) During the BNP's darkest hours, when Khaleda Zia and her son were in prison and DGFI was trying to splinter the party, the Jamaat Islami Bangladesh (JIB) remained loyal to the BNP Chairperson and committed to the alliance. The government's inability to break not only the BNP but also its alliance with JIB helped convince the CTG and Army leadership that they had to cut a deal with Khaleda Zia and allow Tarique Rahman to go free. Now, many JIB leaders are expecting to be rewarded for their loyalty. Seeking to take advantage of the vacuum within the BNP which might be created by the negative list and by Zia's presumed disdain for the reformists, the JIB wants to increase the number of alliance nominations for its supporters. One senior JIB official recently told us his party wants to get the alliance's support to contest 80 seats in the coming campaign--a significant increase over the 30 seats it was allocated in the 2001 polls. While the BNP is unlikely to give in to this demand, many have pointed to an enhanced role for the JIB within the Four Party Alliance in the future. The two junior members of the Four Party Alliance (a faction of the Islamic Oiko Jote and a faction of the Bangladesh Jatiya Party) also hope to gain an increased number of seats. Comment ======= ¶8. (C) In the immediate aftermath of her release from prison, Khaleda Zia and the BNP enjoyed a boost in popularity. The BNP's strategy remains simple--to run against the CTG and to paint the Awami League as DHAKA 00001120 003 OF 003 collaborators with the military-backed government. While this strategy could succeed given the widespread unpopularity of the regime, the BNP's most significant weakness is its internal disarray. Regardless of whether it wins these elections, however, the BNP will remain a major force in Bangladeshi politics. For the medium term, Khaleda Zia's strategy may simply be to keep the party together and keep open the possibility of her son Tarique's return to power. It is in our interest that the latter not happen. Our best chance of averting Tarique's return is to see alternatives develop within the BNP and to see internal party reform continue. The stakes are huge in this large Muslim-majority country with a history of both internal and transnational terrorism. Moriarty