(S) NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR

S E C R E T DHAKA 001012 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/PB AND SCT E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2008 TAGS: PREL PTER PINR PINS PGOV BG SUBJECT: (S) NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR GENERAL ON CT COOPERATION, INTERNAL SECURITY AND REFORM PLANS Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY ======= ¶1. (S) During a September 22 courtesy call, National Security Intelligence (NSI) Director General Major General Sheikh Mohammad Monirul Islam told the Ambassador that among his goals was to professionalize NSI and oversee an increase in the size and capabilities of the service. NSI was monitoring the internal security situation closely and was focused on maintaining an environment in which free, fair, and credible elections can be held. Monirul assessed the political parties would participate positively in the upcoming parliamentary and upazilla elections. Monirul down-played recent threats from Islamic extremists, saying they needed to be watched, but that extremists enjoyed little public support in Bangladesh. Overview of NSI =============== ¶2. (S) The Ambassador paid a courtesy call on the NSI's Director General Major General Sheikh Mohammad Monirul Islam at NSI Headquarters on 22 September. The Ambassador was accompanied by the RAO Counselor. Monirul kicked off the meeting by giving an overview of NSI. He said that his goals as DG were to professionalize and increase the size and capabilities of the service. Monirul noted that previous NSI DGs had been directed by previous political administrations to use NSI to support party agendas. Monirul planned to change that and was striving to make NSI more objective in its analysis of internal and external affairs. Monirul stated that it was NSI's duty to serve the national interest and not any one political party. Since his appointment to DG/NSI in April, Monirul had obtained a 20 percent deputation raise for military and police officers assigned to tours in NSI. A typical rotation in NSI for these officers was four to six years. Monirul was working with the Chief Adviser and Ministry of Finance to secure funding to significantly increase the size of NSI as well as obtain new vehicles and equipment. Conditions for Elections Improving ================================== ¶3. (S) Monirul assessed the conditions for elections in Bangladesh were improving and that they would occur without much trouble. The security services and the Army intended to ensure free, fair, and credible parliamentary and upazila (county) elections were held as scheduled in December 2008. Monirul said that the Chief Advisor had made the right decision in postponing the upazila elections until after the parliamentary elections, hinting that this was required to get buy-in from the BNP and Awami League. Encouragingly, Monirul said that one of his goals was to help minority religious and ethnic groups participate in the elections. The Ambassador asked if the upcoming campaign season would be less corrupt than pervious elections. Monirul hoped it would be, as the politicians had a short 45-day window to campaign as directed by the Election Commission. Monirul added the likelihood of hartals or violent street protests was slim and the parties were agreeing that political rallies would be peaceful and not upset the daily lives of people in the capital. Not Worried about Islamic Extremists ==================================== ¶4. (S) Monirul played down recent threats from Hizbut Tahrir, saying their threats to protest against the government were hollow. He defended recent arrests of HT activists in Rajshahi saying they were distributing leaflets that were anti-government and inciting people to support their agenda to create an Islamic state in Bangladesh. NSI is also monitoring the activities of Jama'at Mujahidin Bangladesh and particularly Harakut-ul-Jihad-Islami-Bangladesh (HUIJi-B),which are reorganizing as a political party called the Islamic Democratic Party. All extremists groups in Bangladesh were being monitored; the government did not want the country to become another Pakistan. While NSI continued to monitor the aforementioned groups, Monirul assessed that at the end of the day, Islamic extremists would not succeed in Bangladesh as there was little to no public support for them. Waiting for Direction from the New Political Government ============================================= ========== ¶5. (S) Monirul was uncertain how much longer he would be with NSI. A typical NSI DG assignment was for two years, but the DG served at the pleasure of the prime minister. Assuming he stays in place, Monirul would like to expand NSI's cooperation with foreign intelligence organizations and he plans to seek authority and political cover to do so from the next prime minister. Within NSI, he also will seek a more aggressive reorganization to go along with his current plans to increase the size and capabilities of the service. Among the changes he will propose is retiring officers who have served in NSI for more than 30 years. At the same time, he wants to develop a cadre of younger motivated civilian officers. Request for Support for the New Government ========================================== ¶6. (S) The Ambassador asked if there was anything the U.S. Government could do for NSI. Monirul said at this time, the best assistance the U.S. Government can give Bangladesh would be to support the new government. The new government would require U.S. support as it continued to tackle a myriad of problems such as corruption and economic difficulties. More engagement between the U.S. Government would naturally follow. Moriarty