C-NC8-00135: UPDATE ON TANZANIA COUNTERTERRORIST

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 000091 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS AF/E FOR JLITTLE, SHAMILTION; ALSO FOR AF/RSA S/CT FOR BPHIPPS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018 TAGS: PINR PTER PHUM PREL TZ SUBJECT: C-NC8-00135: UPDATE ON TANZANIA COUNTERTERRORIST ISSUES REF: STATE 07095 Classified By: Ambassador Mark A. Green, reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (SBU) In support of the upcoming POTUS visit to Tanzania, post is providing the following update on the Government of Tanzania (GOT)'s counterterrorism (CT) capabilities and cooperation (reftel). ¶2. (S/NF) How seriously does the Government of Tanzania (GOT) take the threat of terrorism including the political will to combat terrorism? Since the bombing of the U.S. Embassy Dar es Salaam compound in August 1998, the GOT has cooperated closely with the U.S. government on counterterrorism issues. The Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Service (TISS) which is directly under the President, currently President Jakaya Kikwete, has worked cooperatively with the USG against non-state actors such as Al-Qa'ida and its support networks in Tanzania. The Tanzanian security services and the Tanzanian National Police (TNP) continue to provide full cooperation to the extent of their capabilities in combating terrorism. Both TISS and the TNP have proven to be highly responsive to requests to investigate threats and to share pertinent information gleaned from these investigations with the USG. ¶3. (S/NF) Since 1998, the efforts of TISS have focused on the fugitives from the 1998 bombings and also on personnel associated with Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While a number of Islamic extremists are present in Tanzania, there are no known Al-Qa'ida operatives resident in Tanzania. However, there may be Al-Qa'ida supporters or those who sympathize with Al-Qa'ida present. We do know that Hizballah maintains a presence in Tanzania and has close links with the Iranian Embassy. In addition, NGOs such as the Africa Muslim Agency (AMA) are present in the country. We are unaware of the analytical capabilities of these non-state actors or the extent of their focus on U.S. facilities or personnel. ¶4. (S/NF) To what extent has the GOT engaged in public outreach to educate and sensitize the population on CT issues? What is the general populations view on the threat of terrorism and on the government's actions since 1998? Post has not observed public outreach projects by the GOT to educate or sensitize Tanzanian citizens on counterterrorism issues. Overall, the Tanzanian populace assesses the threat of terrorism in Tanzania to be low, and views terror threats as largely U.S. or western issues. The perception among many Tanzanians is that any act of terrorism would be perpetrated against western targets and not be likely to effect the daily lives of the average Tanzanian. A small subset of the population, bolstered to a certain extent by some elements of the local Islamic media, tends to view any CT action as inherently anti-Muslim. Likewise much of the same subset views the Government of Tanzania's acceptance of any USG assistance as anti-Muslim and has advocated strongly in local media outlets and mosques for the GOT to refuse any assistance from the U.S. whether CT related or in any other area. ¶5. (S/NF) To what extent has the GOT applied the 2003 Prevention of Terrorism Act to prosecutions and investigations Does the law continue to have political and/or public support? Since the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2003 was passed and signed into law, we are only aware of one case where investigators attempted to use this law. In 2006, TISS counterterrorism investigative efforts were essentially negated due to the prosecutors' inability to successfully prosecute the cases that were brought to trial as result of these investigations. Other than this attempt, we do not believe the GOT has successfully prosecuted under the Act. However, even though no cases have yet been prosecuted under the law, the Tanzanian National Police and other law enforcement authorities continue to use other existing laws to investigate and possibly prosecute suspected terrorist activities. Post has not observed either strong public support for nor a public outcry against the Prevention of Terrorism Act. ¶6. (S/NF) To what extent has the GOT strengthened security institutions since 1998? What steps, positive or negative, have been taken with respect to the police/ military/judiciary's capabilities to combat terrorism and enhance national security? Tanzania has made vast improvements in capacity building since August 1998 within both TISS and the Tanzanian National Police (TNP) which maintain investigative and analytical units to work counterterrorism issues. In September 2006, a hostage rescue team, the Crisis Response Team, was formed with volunteers from the TNP's Field Force Unit (FFU) and trained by the USG with Anti-Terrorist Assistance (ATA) funding through post's Regional Security Office ¶7. (C) The TNP have also welcomed the USG assistance to establish a forensic lab, and to train personnel in capacity building and in forensic techniques for the lab. In addition the National Police have cooperated closely in key ATA and INL training programs offered by the USG including on small arms trafficking, counterterrorism, civil disorder management, and community policing. ¶8. (S/NF) What steps has the GOT taken to enhance border, coastal and/or airport security? While most of the Tanzania's border with eight neighboring countries remains porous, the GOT has taken positive steps to enhance security and key border check points. Tanzania has had the Personal Identification Secure Comparison System (PISCES) in place at three international airports, two ports and one land border crossing since 2003. In late 2006, senior Tanzanian immigration authorities told the Consul that they were concerned the PISCES system was not being properly maintained and utilized, due in part to a cut in USG funding for this program. As a result, S/CT sent a site assessment team to Tanzania in May 2007 to ascertain what was needed to bring PISCES fully on line, as well as to connect the systems at each port of entry to both the Immigration and the TISS headquarters. This upgrade and linking of the PISCES system has been funded and scheduled to be on-line by October 2008. ¶9. (S/NF) A September 2006 U.S. Coast Guard inspection of four Tanzanian ports found all but the Port of Zanzibar to be International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) compliant. The Tanzanian port authorities are willing to cooperate on maritime security, but their resources, including capacity, training and experience, and equipment are severely limited. In January 2008, the Tanzanian National Police were directed to increase security along the Kenyan border in response to the disturbances and unrest following the contested general elections on December 27, 2007. These measures indicate that the TNP has the ability to increase border security quickly in response to a specific situation. ¶10. (S/NF) Describe the cooperation between the various security-related ministries on CT issues. How well do the police and prosecutors work together? TISS, which is under the direction of the President, is the primary GOT focal point on counterterrorism issues. There is also ongoing cooperation between TISS and the National Police on CT issues including cooperation on CT task forces. Also, any arrests made as the result of a TISS CT investigation are of course carried out by the TNP. The Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) has its own intelligence unit (DMI). While we are unaware of any regular cooperation between TISS, the TPDF and the National Police on CT matters, the Chief of the TPDF currently chairs a domestic Tanzanian internal security organ that includes both TISS and the Tanzania National Police. In December 2006, Diplomatic Security's ATA-program funded a week long seminar in Dar es Salaam for representatives of this security organ from TISS, TPDF and the National Police. The focus of the workshop was to highlight benefits of a National Counterterrorism Center, including improved interagency cooperation and information sharing, as well as the steps needed to create such a center. ¶11. (C) The establishment of a Tanzanian National Counterterrorism Center is a priority for Tanzania; the GOT has identified a lead person from the TNP and a site. However, plans and a timeline for the center are progressing slowly due to limited funding. To enhance the GOT's understanding of the benefits of National CT Center, in October 2007 S/CT funded the trip for one officer from the TISS counterterrorism unit and one officer from the CT unit of the National Police to visit Yemen's National CT Center in Sana'a. Both officers recognized through this experience the necessity to finalize and fully staff Tanzania's National Counterterrorism Center, but budget constraints remain. While decisions on financing the Center have to be made at a higher level, the GOT does realize that once full functional, a National Counterterrorism Center would bring together multiple agencies to exchange information and cooperate on CT. ¶12. (S/NF) To what extent does the GOT cooperate with regional partners on CT issues? Outside of participating in Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) meetings on CTR cooperation, has he GOT made major strides to cooperate closely whether East African countries? There is limited GOT cooperation with regional partners on CT issues through the East African Community (EAC),which now includes Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda in addition to Tanzania. These five nations cooperate through an EAC program: the East African Regional Strategy for Peace and Security. This group has several target areas and includes standing committees on Counterterrorism, on Light Arms and Small Weapons, on Disaster Management and on Cross Border Crime. In late 2007 the GOT established a relationship with the Government of Sudan; however, the extent of CT cooperation is unknown. The GOT also has worked bilaterally with the Kenyan government on CT issues in the past and Tanzania has a permanent position in the Interpol Office in Nairobi. In addition, the National Police have good contacts with many of their regional neighbors, and have participated in regional CT programs with officers from neighboring countries through programs at the USG-funded International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Gaborone, Botswana. ¶13. (S/NF) Do the Tanzanian intelligence services view CT as a priority? Are both the working level and senior members receptive to work on CT issues? How well are the services equipped to work on CT issues? Counterterrorism efforts are a high priority for the Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Services (TISS) and for the National Police. TISS has a dedicated unit focused exclusively on CT collection. That said, TISS does place a higher priority on monitoring internal political opposition than on CT issues. TISS cooperation with the USG is largely driven from the top down. TISS is relatively well-equipped to work on CT issues, they still lack many necessary resources to meet western standards. However, TISS consistently demonstrates a willingness to cooperate with the USG to the best of their ability when presented with a potential threat. While the Tanzanian National Police works very closely on CT issues with TISS and with the USG, for TNP such areas as cross border crime, anti-narcotics investigations and other internal domestic investigations would be considered higher priorities than counterterrorism. GREEN