ZANZIBAR POLITICAL STANDOFF: CUF LEADERS OFFER A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAR ES SALAAM 000261 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT AF/E FOR JLIDDLE, SHAMILTON AF/RSA FOR LMAZEL DRL FOR BCONNUCK, KGILBRIDE ADDIS ABABA FOR AU MISSION LONDON, PARIS, BRUSSELS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV KDEM TZ SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR POLITICAL STANDOFF: CUF LEADERS OFFER A COUNTERPROPOSAL TO CCM'S CALL FOR A REFERENDUM REF: A. DAR ES SALAAM 0224 ¶B. JOHNSON-LIDDLE APRIL 16 E-MAIL: FULL TEXT OF DRAFT CCM-CUF AGREEMENT Classified By: Ambassador Mark Green for reasons 1.4(b,d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The Civic United Front Chairman, Dr. Ibrahim Lipumba, told Western diplomats in a private meeting that his party has lost trust in President Kikwete who went back on his word by his April 2 public endorsement to hold a referendum in Zanzibar on the agreement negotiated by the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and CUF parties to ensure free and fair elections and a power-sharing government in Zanzibar. Lipumba stated that CUF is ready to consider the minor amendments that CCM proposed in its National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting March 28-29, if they are put in writing and the final decisions are made only by senior leaders, namely President Kikwete, President Karume and Malim Seif Hamad, the Secretary General of CUF. The Civic United Front would consider holding a referendum in 2009 if, and only if, prior to any referendum campaign or vote, President Amani Karume appoints several CUF representatives as ministers in his cabinet. ¶2. (C) In a separate briefing by the lead negotiator from the CCM team, Hon. Ngombale Kingunge, a senior CCM official and former Minister of State for Politics and Community Development, diplomats learned that a few days prior to the March 27-28 NEC meeting, President Karume heard a report on the CCM-CUF negotiations and had refused to consider the inclusion of any CUF members in the Government of Zanzibar (GOZ) prior to 2010. "We (CCM) cannot force him; we need to respect and understand President Karume's situation," Kingunge stressed. While Kingunge assured diplomats that should there be a referendum, the CCM party would campaign in favor of a post-2010 election power-sharing arrangement in the GOZ, post notes that Karume himself has never made such a promise (Ref A). Observers from both parties believe that President Karume and his close cohorts tried to completely "bury" any power-sharing arrangement with CUF during the March 28-29 CCM meetings, thus, forcing President Kikwete and other supporters of power-sharing in Zanzibar to settle for an advisory referendum as the only way to salvage even a weakened inter-party agreement, one that would not actually take effect until after the 2010 elections. End summary. CCM insiders deeply concerned -------------- ¶3. (C) While few CCM insiders are revealing details about the heated 8-hour argument over the CCM-CUF power-sharing agreement for Zanzibar during the CCM's National Executive Committee meeting on March 29, a senior NEC member, Hon. Abdulrahman Kinana, told Ambassador Green on April 10 that President Karume, who rarely if ever speaks in NEC meetings, took the floor more than seven times to argue his position. CUF International Advisor Ismail Jusa reported to PolOff that CUF learned Hon. Kinana was the only NEC member to defend the CCM-CUF agreement as negotiated, accusing CCM Zanzibar members: "You know you that you have never fairly won any election in Zanzibar." President Kikwete apparently only listened throughout the meeting. Hon. Kinana reached out to Ambassador Green to express his concern that President Kikwete has been severely weakened, not only in the eyes of CUF, but within the CCM party and among Tanzanian voters, by not honoring his December 2005 promise to the nation to find a fair and workable solution to the decades old political impasse in Zanzibar. CUF: No interim power-sharing, no referendum -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In a carefully worded briefing, Dr. Lipumba expressed to Dar-based diplomats on April 11 CUF's extreme disappointment and frustration at President Kikwete's inability to manage the outcome of the CCM March 28-29 NEC meetings. Lipumba outlined in detail every step of the CCM-CUF negotiations commencing immediately following President Kikwete's December 30, 2005 inaugural address promise to close the divide between Unguja and Pemba and DAR ES SAL 00000261 002 OF 004 between CCM and CUF in Zanzibar. One year of back-channel contacts with the assistance of the Norwegians resulted in formal negotiations that began January 7, 2007, with the intention Xbgotiations both CCM and CUF agreed that the previous elections had not been fair due to problems with the voters register, the Electoral Commission and state control of Zanzibar radio and TV. He lamented that for CUF it was "inconceivable" that the way to solve a problem based on seriously flawed elections in 1995, 2000 and 2005 was through another election. CUF's stand is that there is no constitutional basis for binding referendum and no need for an advisory referendum. Nevertheless, Dr. Lipumba said the CUF leaders would be willing to consider CCM's proposal for a referendum provided that prior to any referendum campaign or election, President Karume appoints CUF members to be ministers in his cabinet. CUF's Counterproposal -------------- ¶7. (SBU) CUF's response and counterproposal to CCM's call for a referendum is: -- "Since CCM says the National Executive Committee (NEC) has endorsed the draft memorandum in principle, then they should agree to sign the pact immediately and pave the way for its implementation." -- "CUF is willing to consider the 'minor amendments' that CCM says were requested by their National Executive Committee provided they are submitted in writing and in a comprehensive manner to CUF for our consideration and then discussed at a high level meeting involving the principals, i.e. Hon. Amani Karume and Mr. Seif Sharif Hamad under the chairmanship of President Jakaya Kikwete -- "CCM should agree to an interim power sharing agreement with CUF that will last until 2010 with the task of carrying out the various reforms agreed in the draft agreement and that will be responsible for the holding of a referendum in 2009 to decide on the permanent structure of power sharing." CCM Kingunge's view -------------- ¶8. (C) At the request of several diplomatic missions who sought to understand why CCM had suddenly reversed its position to now demand a referendum on the Zanzibar government power-sharing agreement, Hon. Kingunge outlined the official version of the "Butiama meeting", as the public is calling the CCM March 28-29 confab. Kingunge stressed that this bitter political divide is deeply rooted in Zanzibar's unique history, thus "winning or losing elections is life or death in Zanzibar." He noted while in the October 2001 "Muafaka II", the CCM and CUF had agreed in principle on the need for power-sharing or a "joint government", the just-negotiated and yet to be signed "Muafaka III" goes farther and outlines the structure of such a government. (Note: The whole point of power-sharing is to ease the resentment underlying all Zanzibari politics. Since at least the 1980s, the population of the Isles has been split evenly DAR ES SAL 00000261 003 OF 004 into two antagonistic political camps. End note.) ¶9. (SBU) Kingunge said the NEC had agreed "in principle" to this structure which represents the CCM-CUF compromise hammered out over many months (Ref B): -- winning party's candidate becomes the President; -- second place party's candidate becomes First Vice President; he/she cooperates with President to select the cabinet and run the government; -- a Second Vice President is appointed from the winning party; he/she chairs the House of Representatives and, if the President is incapacitated or resigns, becomes President; -- Cabinet ministers will be appointed proportionately by party based on the election results. ¶10. (SBU) However, the NEC demanded major changes to several other key points in the agreement, some of which the CCM party had originally put on the table in the course of the 14-month long negotiations. Per Kingunge these NEC amendments were for the "betterment of the accord." Also, NEC and President Kikwete had directed the CCM negotiating team to go back to CUF and discuss these proposed revisions in order to reach a final agreement. These changes include: Agreement states: To resolve differences and disputes within the government, a Reconciliation Council will be created "with two members from each party, (who) should come from high decision making organs of their party." CCM now says there is no need for this Council because the members would be "junior" to the President and First Vice President who may be in conflict. CCM's new proposal: If there is a conflict, the two parties should intervene, with no details on how the process would work. Agreement states: "On the same principle of creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and new political dimension in Zanzibar, President Amani Karume on his part will appoint a Government of National Unity in Zanzibar that will involve CCM and CUF immediately after this agreement is signed." The negotiating teams did not decide which portfolios would be assigned to which party, although CUF had presented a proposal to divide the important ministries into 8 for CCM and 7 for CUF. ¶11. (C) Kingunge told the diplomats the constitution of Zanzibar makes no mention of parties, and any member of the House of Representatives can be appointed as minister by the President. (Note: When the constitution was originally drafted and ratified, Zanzibar was under a one-party system. End note.) Kingunge and the CCM team met with Karume and President Kikwete prior to the March 28-29 meeting to discuss each point of the draft agreement in detail. Kingunge had strongly advised Karume to appoint two or three CUF ministers prior to the 2010 elections as a confidence building measure, "to show good will." Karume,s Answer -------------- ¶12. (C) Kingunge said Karume did not directly answer the proposal. Rather, he opined that if the goal of the negotiations was to find a long-lasting solution to the impasse in Zanzibar, how can appointing just one or two ministers accomplish that? "No, I will not entertain dishing out portfolios, one, two, three. We are working toward a long lasting solution, not an interim fix," he insisted. Per Kingunge, President Karume then suggested that since CCM,s goal is for the power-sharing agreement to succeed, the decision to include CUF in the Government of Zanzibar cannot be directed by the CCM Central Committee, but "should be made by the people of Zanzibar", and proposed a referendum. Although Kingunge did not say so explicitly, it appears that it was during these pre-NEC meeting consultations that President Kikwete agreed to the suggestion that no interim power-sharing agreement could begin prior to 2010, and that even the power-sharing agreement after 2010 should be approved by the Zanzibar electorate. Comment: Search for middle ground DAR ES SAL 00000261 004 OF 004 -------------- ¶13. (C) Although CUF has offered a counterproposal of sorts, Dr. Lipumba and his team are well aware that CUF's pre-condition for a referendum--that CUF members be included in the GOZ before 2010--is exactly where Karume is dug in with his adamant stance: "no power-sharing on my watch." However, key to the CUF proposal is the demand that from this point on, there be no more committee negotiations, but only discussions between Presidents Kikwete and Karume and Malim Seif Hamad. If the all sides, particularly President Karume, were to agree to this decision-making process, there would be a possibility that a middle ground could be found. ¶14. (C) We are working at every level to explore ways to move the reconciliation process forward in order to avoid the violence that Zanzibar elections have seen in the past. In particular, we are concerned that such instances as the killing of up to 35 persons and injuring of hundreds (Human Rights Watch Report, April 2002 estimate) in Pemba by the Zanzibar police in January 2001 during a post-election demonstration be averted. Proportionately, on an island with a population of only 350,000, this many deaths in Pemba was as serious as post-election violence that has garnered world-wide attention elsewhere in Africa. Our objective remains to encourage both CCM and CUF to agree to an interim power-sharing arrangement in the lead-up to the 2010 elections, as well as to put into law a permanent solution to the "winner-takes-all" system that has not allowed Zanzibar to mature as a democracy. ¶15. (C) Ambassador Green is regarded as an honest broker; CCM's Hon. Kinana reached out to him to express his concern that President Kikwete's credibility has been seriously damaged by the CCM Zanzibar hard-liners' success to sway the NEC toward their position. We meet with the opposition as well when they request, and encourage both sides to keep back channels open to the other party. Our concern is that time is not on either party's side: if President Kikwete does not take action, his ability to resolve the Zanzibar impasse will erode; while CUF's demonstration in Stonetown on April 12 was peaceful and orderly, privately CUF leaders tell us the patience of their rank and file members is nearly exhausted. ¶16. (C) President Karume's refusal to consider any compromise to allow power-sharing in advance of the 2010 elections is likely rooted in his fear that the extent of the personal wealth and the control of the Zanzibar economy that he, his family, and his CCM Zanzibar inner circle have accumulated during his eight years as President would be exposed should the Civic United Front hold any key positions in the GOZ. Even if CCM Mainland were to offer Karume assurances that he and his family would not be pursued for their thievery, he might be looking to examples of African leaders who were offered and took an amnesty, only later to be brought to justice (e.g. Charles Taylor, etc.) We regard President Karume's lack of flexibility to even consider the compromise position on an interim power-sharing agreement that Hon. Kingunge's CCM negotiating team worked hard to produce, as well as his insistence on a referendum election, as extremely worrisome. We trust a strong message to Karume that he needs to be part of the solution, and not to exacerbate the Zanzibar divide, will be delivered during his May 2008 visit to Washington D.C. GREEN