SYRIAN DISSIDENTS INDICATE GAP EXISTS BETWEEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000843 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, DRL LONDON FOR WALLER, PARIS FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KPAO SY SUBJECT: SYRIAN DISSIDENTS INDICATE GAP EXISTS BETWEEN KURDISH AND ARAB CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS REF: A. DAMASCUS 00842 ¶B. DAMASCUS 00788 Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Syrian dissidents Aref Dalila, Muhanad al-Hasani, and Fawaz Tello (all strictly protect) met with Poloff on November 19 for a wide-ranging discussion on the current state of civil society activism in Syria (ref A). During the meeting, the three men spoke briefly about a recent Kurdish protest in Damascus, the lack of non-Kurdish participation, and the disparate views among many pro-democracy advocates and Kurdish rights organizations. Dalila was released from prison on August 7 after serving over six years for his role in the 2001 Damascus Spring movement. Al-Hasani is Dalila's lawyer and also the president of the Syrian Human Rights Organization in Damascus. Fawaz Tello, a Damascus Spring activist who spent five years in prison, is now involved with the Damascus Declaration. END SUMMARY. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (C) A group of approximately 200 Kurds demonstrated in Damascus against Legislative Decree 49 on November 2 (ref B). The event was quickly suppressed by SARG police, who detained 192 individuals overnight. Following the protest, Kurdish contacts expressed disappointment over the lack of participation by non-Kurdish Syrian political opposition groups. Damascus representative of the Kurdish Future Movement Party Hervin Ose (protect),who participated in the protest and was detained by police, expressed resentment over the lack of interest of non-Kurds in joining the effort. She also noted that the signs and chants employed during the demonstration were not Kurd-specific but pan-Syrian. Poloff raised this subject with Dalila, al-Hasani, and Tello during a November 12 meeting, asking why no other Syrians had joined the Kurds and whether this signified discrepancies in how Kurds and Arabs approached civil society issues and Decree 49 in particular. -------------- -------------- DISSIDENTS' VIEWS ON KURDISH REACTION TO DECREE 49 -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Regarding the November 2 protest, Dalila said there had been no coordination between the Kurdish groups and other Syrian civil society groups. "They (Kurds) have not demanded different things from Syrians. And the Arabs agree with their demands; there are no differences in human rights (for Kurds and non-Kurds)." ¶4. (C) Tello tried to find a distinction between human rights and politics vis-a-vis the Kurdish demonstration, arguing that the Kurdish demonstration was purely political. He added that had he participated, he probably "wouldn't have come back," meaning SARG police would have dumped him back in a prison cell. ¶5. (C) Al-Hasani spoke longest and most pointedly about Kurdish civil society groups and their ambitions. He began by asserting they (non-Kurdish civil society groups) did not boycott the demonstration. He had discussed Decree 49 with Kurdish activists and agreed (with them) that the law was illegitimate. However, he disagreed with the Kurds on how the SARG was applying the new law. "The Kurds think they are targeted, but the point is to determine whether the law is against the interests of all people." The Kurds, al-Hasani continued, try to use this law for their own political interests. He did not elaborate on what those interests were. ¶6. (C) Multiple diplomatic contacts who have recently visited the border region in northeastern Syria agree that Decree 49 has jeopardized the economic well-being of Kurds in the region. One diplomat told poloff that an estimated 20 percent of the Hassake governate (approximately 200,000) have left for other parts of the country, mainly Damascus and Aleppo, this year. This figure is not based solely on the imposition of Decree 49, but reflects the impact of severe drought conditions as well. Nevertheless, the numbers point to economic depression and the lack of opportunity in the area. While Arab tribes in the region have been displaced by the drought, and even perhaps the decree, they are in the minority. The vast majority of those affected are Kurds. DAMASCUS 00000843 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) COMMENT: As previously reported, the size of the November 2 demonstration relative to the capacity Kurds have for putting boots on the street may suggest differing opinions among the Kurdish community itself on how best to tackle the problem. It may very well be, in the end, that Tello's rationale is closest to the truth for Kurds and non-Kurds alike: people are too afraid of SARG reprisals to join forces on any issue whatsoever. END COMMENT. CONNELLY