ZEBARI CONDEMNS 10/26 ATTACK, SEEKS TO RE-ASSURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000800 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/I, AND NEA/ELA NSC FOR ABRAMS/MCDERMOTT PARIS FOR WALLER LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018 TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER SY IZ SUBJECT: ZEBARI CONDEMNS 10/26 ATTACK, SEEKS TO RE-ASSURE SARG ON SOFA REF: DAMASCUS 793 Classified By: Classified by CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 b and d . ¶1. (C) Summary: In a hastily arranged November 11-12 visit to Damascus, Iraqi FM Hoshyar Zebari delivered a letter to a skeptical President Asad from PM Maliki reassuring Syrian leaders the SOFA would not allow U.S. troops to launch attacks on Iraq's neighbors. Zebari publicly "rejected" the October 26 Abu Kamal operation, while privately telling FM Muallim and Asad the Iraqi government had received no advance warning of the alleged U.S. raid. According to the Iraqi Charge in Damascus, Syrian officials put heavy pressure on Zebari to denounce the October 26 attack, while apparently asking the GOI to convey a demand that the USG "consult" with the SARG in any future counter-terrorist operations. Asad told Zebari that Syria would host the November 22-23 Border Security Working Group (BSWG) meeting as planned, and that Syrian PM Otri would reschedule his visit to Iraq "sometime after (President-elect) Obama takes office." Bashar also extended an invitation to PM Maliki to visit Damascus after Otri visits Baghdad. We expect the SARG will use the BSWG to denounce the October 26 operation and attempt to discredit the SOFA and U.S. military presence in Iraq. End Summary -------------- --- SARG Frames Zebari Visit As Conciliatory Gesture -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Iraqi FM Hoshyar Zebari visited Damascus November 11-12 and held meetings with FM Muallim and President Asad. Presidential Advisor Buthayna Shabban and D/FM Faisal Miqdad joined Zebari's November 12 meeting with Asad, after which Zebari and Muallim held a joint press conference. The Syrian press highlighted Zebari's rejection of the October 26 U.S. military strike at Abu Kamal and Iraqi reassurances contained in a letter from PM Maliki to Asad that the SOFA would not allow for permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq or the use of Iraqi territory to launch U.S. attacks against neighboring countries. Syrian press accounts framed the visit as a conciliatory gesture by Iraq to restore relations with Syria. -------------- Zebari Faces SARG Anger over Abu Kamal -------------- ¶3. (C) According to Iraqi Charge Hassan Abd al-Aziz, Zebari's visit came in response to intense SARG pressure for the GOI to condemn the October 26 Abu Kamal attack and to revise the SOFA explicitly to prevent any U.S. military attacks on Iraq's neighbors from Iraq. Abd al-Aziz said Syrian V/FM Miqdad had threatened a strong Syrian response (to include cessation of Syrian cooperation in assisting Iraqi refugees and even ordering Abd al-Aziz to return to Iraq.) Zebari responded positively to the Iraqi Embassy's request for a visit and message from PM Maliki to calm bilateral tensions. ¶4. (C) In what Abd al-Aziz described as a tough meeting, Asad pressed Zebari on the October 26 Abu Kamal operation, calling it an attack on the Syrian people. Asad demanded Zebari publicly condemn the American administration for its "attack against the Syrian people." He also conveyed Syria's strong opposition to a SOFA that would undermine the GOI's legitimacy by allowing permanent American military bases in Iraq and granting the U.S. military unlimited ability to launch attacks on Iraq's neighbors. The U.S. was dealing with Iraq "as children" rather that treating it as a sovereign government, alleged Asad. Bashar said Syria opposed the security agreement and did not trust U.S. promises to withdraw its troops by 2011. -------------- Zebari Condemns U.S. Attack But Defends SOFA -------------- ¶5. (C) Zebari pushed back, telling Asad he would not take DAMASCUS 00000800 002 OF 003 orders from the Syrian government on what to say publicly. Iraq wanted better relations with Syria and to reassure Asad that the SOFA posed no threat the Syria or Iraq's neighbors. But Asad's November 9 speech (ref A) criticizing the Iraqi government for supporting the SOFA had not helped. The Iraqi government was working with the U.S. military to stabilize the security situation and had negotiated one of the most host-friendly SOFAs in the world. The U.S. had committed to withdrawing its troops by 2011 and Iraq expected it to fulfill its obligations. ¶6. (C) On the Abu Kamal attack, Zebari told Asad that no one in the Iraqi government had advance knowledge. Only the head of Delta Force knew, Zebari insisted. The Abu Kamal attack was not the first such case of U.S. Special Operations actions in the region, continued Zebari. Delta Force had also launched a raid in Irbil during which several Iranian diplomats were apprehended. No one in the Iraqi government had received advance warning in this instance, claimed Zebari. In both cases, the American military had targeted individuals believed to be supporting the insurgency in Iraq. -------------- Bashar Wants CT Coordination? -------------- ¶7. (C) According to Abd al-Aziz's account, Bashar replied the U.S. had no right to conduct attacks unilaterally. Syria had demonstrated its intent to crack down on foreign fighters seeking to enter Iraq and had arrested some 1,300 extremists, 250 of whom were linked to al-Qaeda. Asad complained that the U.S. had failed to live up to its promises to cooperate with the SARG during previous Border Security Working Group meetings. He implied that Zebari should pass a message that Syria insisted that any future counterterrorism actions would require advance coordination, arguing that Syria could take actions that would ensure that all the extremist elements could be "rolled up." -------------- Tensions Defused, Suspicions Still Linger -------------- ¶8. (C) Abd al-Aziz assessed Zebari's visit had succeeded in defusing growing bilateral tensions, but Asad and the Syrian regime continued to harbor deep suspicions about American ambitions in Iraq, he said. The letter from PM Maliki provided the SARG with sufficient cover to resume better relations without damaging the regime's image. In return, the SARG was willing to signal its willingness to proceed with normalization of relations, but only "sometime after (President-elect) Obama takes office." Abd al-Aziz predicted Syrian PM Otri's trip to Iraq would probably not take place until at least February, and that a PM Maliki visit to Damascus might occur a few months after that. -------------- SARG Wants to use BSWG to Hammer SOFA -------------- ¶9. (C) In the meantime, Abd al-Aziz predicted little movement in the SARG's willingness to grant agrement to Iraq's Ambassador-designate to Syria, Alaa al-Jawadi. (Comment: Iraqi Embassy sources erroneously told us in late October that agrement had been granted to al-Jawawdi. End Comment.) Abd al-Aziz also confirmed press reports that Syria would be hosting the November 22-23 BSWG as previously planned. "The Syrians are going to use the event to come after you," he predicted. ¶10. (C) Comment: If the Iraqi Charge's account is accurate (as it has been in the past),Zebari's visit gave the SARG a modest PR victory, but the Syrian regime failed to obtain any concessions on the SOFA. We find it interesting that Asad's call for U.S. cooperation in future CT operations tacitly acknowledged the presence of foreign fighter facilitators in DAMASCUS 00000800 003 OF 003 Syria. Regarding the November 22-23 BSWG, Abd al-Aziz' assessment is spot on: Syria can and no doubt will use the meeting to bash the Abu Kamal operation, SOFA, and continuing U.S. military presence in Iraq. As one of the countries that urged the creation of the BSWG, we would find ourselves in an awkward position were we not to attend, particularly if our allies did. At the same time, showing up without talking points on Abu Kamal and a coordinated position with the GOI and friendly countries would leave us vulnerable to unchallenged SARG accusations. CONNELLY