NEW SYRIAN BORDER LAW TARGETS KURDS, KURDS REACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000788 SIPDIS PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM SY SUBJECT: NEW SYRIAN BORDER LAW TARGETS KURDS, KURDS REACT REF: DAMASCUS 000203 Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The SARG issued a legislative decree in September that restricted property ownership, acquisition, and other land-use rights along Syria's borders. While the SARG claims the law applies to all Syrian borders, there is mounting evidence of selective enforcement targeting Kurdish businessmen, landowners, and laborers in northern and northeastern Syria. Kurdish contacts believe this decree is part of a larger SARG Arabization effort in the region. Syrian police squelched a recent Kurdish public protest against the law. End Summary. -------------- LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Restrictions on Kurdish property ownership date back to the 1952 issuance of Legislative Decree 193, wherein the SARG created a series of bureaucratic licensing hurdles meant to obstruct Kurdish access to agricultural lands. In order to acquire a license of ownership, an individual submitted requests to the Ministry of Agriculture, which then referred the request to the Ministry of Defense for approval. If approved, the request continued its journey to the Ministry of Interior (MOI),where it passed into the hands of intelligence authorities for review. Refusals of licensing requests were absolute, and no legal recourse of appeal existed. ¶3. (SBU) In 2004, the SARG issued Article 41 to replace Decree 193. While the new article retained most of Decree 193's obstacles to land ownership, it added that anyone circumventing the licensing process could be sentenced to up to two years in prison and/or fined up to 100,000 Syrian Pounds. -------------- THE LATEST LEGISLATIVE TACTIC -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The SARG announced on September 10, 2008 the issuance of Legislative Decree 49, which modified the language of Article 41. The new language states "It is not permitted to sell, modify, or acquire the rights of owned property within the border area; neither is it allowed to make use of the property through an investment, renting it out, or in any other manner for a period exceeding three years without an issued license. The category of 'property' encompasses all built-up land and empty land that lies inside, as well as outside, the planned areas." (Note: this translation combines the work of Post's LES and an English language brief provided by the Yeketi Party.) The new law intensifies SARG's efforts to clamp down on property transactions along its borders and broadens the operational scope of earlier legislation. Presumably the law would prevent existing landholdings from being passed to legal heirs as well. ¶5. (SBU) The definition of "border" appears fluid. In the 1952 decree, the border regions included the area around Quneitra, all of al-Zawyai, and all areas adjacent to the Turkish border to a depth of 25 kilometers, according to Kurdish interlocutors. Post has no specific information on how the decree applied to the Syria-Iraq border. Over the years, however, SARG behavior indicated the border region extended as far as the town of al-Hassaka, which is roughly 60 kilometers away from the Syria-Turkey boarder and approximately 50 kilometers from the Syria-Iraq border. Kurdish contacts state that the new decree has chilled economic activity even deeper into the interior as people are waiting to assess the full impact of the decree. According to the decree, the MOI still must issue executive instructions on this law. Whether and when the MOI will do so remain unknown. This uncertainty only exacerbates the problem for many Kurds trying to clarify ownership issues and make a living. -------------- KURDISH REACTION -------------- ¶6. (C) All our Kurdish contacts have stressed to us the DAMASCUS 00000788 002 OF 002 significance of Decree 49 to their community. Massoud Akko (strictly protect),a Kurdish writer, journalist, and civil society activist with no party affiliation, told poloff that economic activity had all but ground to a halt along the border near Qamishli in northeastern Syria. Not only are Kurds prevented from buying and selling businesses, he said, but all on-going and proposed construction projects have stalled. As a result, the many Kurds working as laborers in the construction industry have left these regions in search of employment elsewhere. Akko also surmised that SARG fear of investment money coming across the border from Iraqi Kurds might have played a role in the regime's ambitions. ¶7. (C) In comments that echoed Akko's, Damascus representative of the Kurdish Future Movement Party, Hervin Ose (strictly protect),told poloff the SARG suspected a vague political threat in the remittances coming from Kurds in Europe. European Kurds had been investing, or trying to, in properties in the border regions, Ose reported. She argued these remittances reflected many European Kurds' desire to return to their "traditional lands" in the future. ¶8. (C) Ose's comments noted many Kurds had recently left the area to find work in the urban centers. She contended that, with Decree 49, the SARG wanted to transform the current demographic situation in the Kurdish regions. "Arabs," she predicted, would have little trouble acquiring property. She added that perhaps a few Kurds would be able to hold out and wait for Kurdish buyers to acquire licenses; however, given the uncertainty of the future, she believed anyone needing to sell quickly would most likely do so. Both Ose and Akko argued the process moves more rapidly for non-Kurds. ¶9. (C) We have heard from diplomats who recently visited the northeastern border areas that economic conditions are desperate. They also report that Decree 49 has further disrupted Kurdish economic activity along the Syria-Turkey and Syria-Iraq borders. Activity along the Syrian border with Lebanon, however, appears by comparison to be relatively unaffected. This discrepancy in enforcement indicates SARG discrimination against Kurds and an attempt to assert greater control over those sensitive border regions. ¶10. (C) On November 2, the Yeketi Party, along with six other Kurdish political opposition parties organized a demonstration against Decree 49 in front of the Syrian Parliament building. It was the first Kurdish demonstration in Damascus in over two years and the first demonstration ever, according Ose, against a specific presidential decree. That Kurds would even consider a gathering of this sort, and at this time, is noteworthy given that Kurds gathered in groups, whether for political or cultural reasons, are regularly arrested and, in some cases, have been killed (reftel A). As Kurds began to gather in Yousef al-Azmi Square (the same location as SARG-sponsored anti-U.S. rally on October 30) and prepare for the short march to the Parliament building, Syrian intelligence and the police's Special Forces Unit began arresting people. 191 Kurdish activists were detained and subsequently released approximately 12 hours later. Hervin Ose was among the detainees (the only woman who was detained). She told poloff that the police "tasered" her in the throat when they took her into custody. ¶11. (C) Comment: Kurdish leaders express rising resentment over the lack of support from Syrian civil society activists who they claim fail to pay sufficient attention to Kurdish issues. These tensions serve the SARG's interest in disrupting any cooperation between Kurds and other Syrian opposition groups. Regarding the recent protest, despite coordination among seven Kurdish opposition groups, only several hundred people turned out to demonstrate against the decree, suggesting there might have been disagreements over the agenda and the timing of the event among Kurdish groups. End Comment. CONNELLY