DAMASCUS EAC 10/23/2008

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000739 SIPDIS NOFORN FOR DS/IP, DS/IP/NEA, DS/TIA/ITA, DS/SPC/MSG, NEA/EX, NEA/ELA, CA/OCS/ACS ABU DHABI FOR MCESG REGION TWO E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2028 TAGS: ASEC PTER SY SUBJECT: DAMASCUS EAC 10/23/2008 REF: A. TDX-315/077086-08 ¶B. STATE 737 ¶C. STATE 99467 ¶1. (S/NF) The Damascus Emergency Action Committee (EAC) met October 23 to review the potential threat information in Ref ¶A. Charge, chaired the meeting; A/DCM, MGT, POL/ECON, PAO, RSO, DAO, CONS, MSGDETCMDR, IMO, and GRPO attended. ¶2. (S/NF) GRPO briefed EAC on ref A, which contained information pertinent to the security of the Embassy. EAC members observed that Post's working assumption had long been that any extremist group seeking to attack the SARG security infrastructure may also attempt to attack USG targets in Damascus, including the Embassy. EAC members noted that the additional security measures put into place following the September 27 attacks, including the requests to limit access to the streets outside the Chancery (denied) and to stop and search suspicious vehicles at access routes to our facilities (apparently granted),had been based on the operating assumption that Mission facilities were a logical target for the extremists who attacked the SARG last month. EAC members also noted that the ongoing security crackdown (ref B) appeared to have put extremists on the defensive, as evidenced by the lack of a follow-on attack in the nearly four weeks which have elapsed since September 27. ¶3. (S/NF) In light of the considerations above, the EAC agreed that Mission facilities and services should remain open. EAC members discussed possible follow-on actions to be taken in case more detail is developed in connection with ref A, or in case of a more specific threat to the Mission: --Closure or restriction of services requiring the screening of unknown visitors, including visa operations and the PD Information Resources Center; --Implementation of the "Critical Staffing Pattern," designed to allow for skeleton staffing of key Post functions by a selected group of pre-designated personnel. --EAC also discussed on possible additional measures requiring longer-term planning and coordination, to include the possible deployment of a DS/MSD Security Support Team in case of more sustained future threat reporting and/or an intensification of the SARG/extremist conflict. RSO briefed EAC on the very initial steps taken to research the possible deployment of signals-jamming equipment to Mission facilities in order to inhibit certain types of IED detonations, noting that the technical feasibility of, and USG approval for, such equipment remained to be determined. CONNELLY