SARG ANTI-TERROR CRACKDOWN - A VIEW FROM THE

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000723 SIPDIS NOFORN FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/TIA/ITA, NEA/ELA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2028 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PTER SY SUBJECT: SARG ANTI-TERROR CRACKDOWN - A VIEW FROM THE SECURITY SERVICES - CORRECTED COPY REF: A. DAMASCUS 720 ¶B. DAMASCUS 678 ¶C. DAMASCUS 696 CORRECTED COPY of Damascus 720 - added NOFORN caption ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The SARG remains committed to its gloves-off crackdown on Salafist terror cells within Syria following the September 27 VBIED attack on a Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) branch office (ref A). While the security services have scored successes in raids on suspected safe houses and bomb-making facilities throughout Syria, authorities are concerned that many extremists capable of executing attacks similar to the September 27 bombing remain at large and that al Qaeda and its inspired/affiliated local variants now view Syria as a legitimate front for jihad in the wider Levant battleground. While our security service contacts agree that security precautions undertaken by the Embassy during this period are appropriate, they believe that the regime itself, and not the Embassy or other U.S. targets, is the extremists' primary focus for attack. ¶2. (S/NF) Over the weekend of October 9-11, senior security service contacts told RSO that the SARG has reacted to the September 27 bombing by moving aggressively against suspected Salafist groups operating within Syria: --According to one senior officer, several suspected terrorists have been killed or arrested in at least five separate raids conducted throughout Syria since late September. --A variety of weapons, suicide belts, and explosives-rigged vehicles have been seized in these raids. One contact told RSO that a raid o/a October 10 in the Damascus suburb of Sayidah Zeinab yielded 1200 kg of explosives (NFI) divided among nine agricultural containers designed for milk storage. According to this officer, the explosives had been packed but not outfitted with detonators or triggering mechanisms. He related the security services' theory that terrorist cells in Syria are highly compartmentalized, with different, mutually unknown individuals responsible for different stages in the bomb-making process. --A contact advised RSO that the security services lack clarity regarding the potential number of VBIEDs, explosives, and terrorists still operational in Syria, and that claims of specific numbers of "at large" vehicles and terrorists should be viewed with a healthy skepticism. ¶3. (S/NF) Two contacts independently told RSO that Sunni extremists appear to have shifted strategy from a "hands off Syria" approach to one that apparently includes Syria as part of the wider campaign for jihad in the Levant. These contacts told RSO that the shift follows over a year of SARG crackdowns against extremist activities, including what they described as SARG measures to limit the Iraq-bound foreign fighter flow. ¶4. (S/NF) A senior contact told RSO he does not believe the Embassy or other U.S.-affiliated sites (including the USG-supported Damascus Community School) are specific targets of the extremists' latest efforts. Rather, he believes that current terrorist efforts are focused on the regime, and especially against the security services. Based on investigation following the September 27 bombing, he believes the perpetrators specifically chose to attack on a Saturday so as to minimize the possibility of casualties at a nearby Syrian school. ¶5. (S/NF) COMMENT: Even if true, the assertion that the Embassy and other U.S. sites are not the primary target of terrorist attention does not fully mitigate the dangers inherent to any further anti-regime violence in Syria. As is the case in general for a city with such a pervasive "police state" apparatus as Damascus, the Embassy, school, and other USG facilities and residences are set cheek-by-jowl among high-value regime and security service targets. While it is encouraging that two weeks have elapsed without a follow-on incident to the September 27 bombing and that the SARG appears determined in its efforts to crack down on violent anti-regime activity within Syria's borders, the continuing discovery of additional terrorists and equipment highlights the risks of operating in this environment. The Damascus Emergency Action Committee continues to meet frequently to evaluate the security implications of the current situation, while the Country Team will provide a more in-depth analysis regarding to what extent recent changes in the security environment reflect any major change in Syria's policy outlook or place in the region-wide struggle against extremist violence (septels). END COMMENT. CONNELLY