AMMAR AL-HAKIM VISIT SIGNALS NEW SARG EMPHASIS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000560 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR JORDAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL SY LE SUBJECT: AMMAR AL-HAKIM VISIT SIGNALS NEW SARG EMPHASIS ON IRAQ REF: JULY 31 EMBASSY DAMASCUS-NEA/ELA EMAIL. Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Tim Pounds for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On July 30-31, President Asad and other senior officials provided a lavish reception for Deputy Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Chair Ammar al-Hakim. Embassy sources suggest Al-Hakim responded favorably to Syrian lobbying to oppose a a long-term security agreement between the U.S. and Iraq. Al-Hakim also provided assurances that he would support the refurbishment of the Kirkuk-Banyas oil pipeline. Subsequently, Syria's Economic and Iraqi's Trade Minister met in Damascus on August 6 and made superficial progress toward implementing an MOU signed during PM Maliki's August 2007 visit. According to Iraqi Embassy and MFA contacts, FM Zebari is due to visit Damascus in the next two weeks to preside over the opening of a new embassy chancery, and there are rumors that Zebari is pushing hard within the GOI to use the occasion to advance (and perhaps even announce) appointment of an Iraqi Ambassador. The SARG's engagement of al-Hakim and other Iraqi officials suggests a renewed emphasis on expanding ties within the GOI in pursuit of two main objectives: (1) resuming the flow of Iraqi oil and gas through Syria; and (2) preventing a long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq. Without more Syrian efforts to enhance security cooperation, however, bilateral relations are unlikely to improve dramatically anytime soon. End Summary. -------------- SARG Gives Hakim Red Carpet Treatment -------------- ¶2. (C) Deputy ISCI Chair Ammar al-Hakim, son of ailing ISCI Chair Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, received a red-carpet welcome from President Asad other senior officials during an unannounced (but highly publicized) July 30-31 visit to Damascus. Embassy contacts confirm open source reporting that Hakim met Asad, VP Sharaa and Sharaa's national security advisor Mohm'd Nasif Khayrbeck, FM Muallim, Deputy FM Miqdad, Deputy FM Ahmad Arnous, and leaders of the Syrian Parliament. -------------- -------------- SARG Lobbying Against Long-Term U.S. Military Presence -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) According to Iraqi Embassy contacts, Iraqi Charge Sawadi Abd al-Aziz accompanied Hakim to his official meetings but shared little information with his staff. He nonetheless mentioned in passing to some of his staff that SARG officials had pressed Hakim to oppose a long-term security agreement with the U.S. Iraqi Embassy Second Secretary Berivan Dosky (protect) told us that the Syrians had urged al-Hakim to oppose a long-term U.S. military presence and promised to support better relations between ISCI and Iran in exchange. The Syrian side, according to Dosky, reportedly told Hakim that they believed PM Maliki would oppose any deal that lacked a specific timeline for a U.S. military withdrawal, not least because Maliki did not want to jeopardize relations with Iran and Syria. Dosky commented the SARG appeared intent on cultivating relations with al-Hakim as a way to counter Kurdish support in favor of a U.S.-Iraqi security agreement. ¶4. (C) Iraqi Embassy Press Attache Ahmad Saad (protect) told us separately he had heard from al-Hakim's handlers that Hakim responded positively to SARG arguments opposing a long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq. However, Saad cautioned, the buzz within the Iraqi Embassy suggested that Hakim's position on the security deal was more nuanced and non-committal, and that Hakim in fact had avoided a pledge to express any public position on a US-Iraqi security agreement, as the SARG had urged. -------------- Kirkuk-Banyas Oil Pipeline? -------------- ¶5. (C) Another issue, according to Saad, was the re-opening of the Kirkuk-Banyas oil pipeline between Iraq and Syria. DAMASCUS 00000560 002 OF 003 Saad reported that Iraqi Parliamentarians aligned with ISCI had visited Damascus in mid-July under the pretext of discussing Iraqi refugee issues. The delegation reportedly used meetings with Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdallah Dardari, D/FM Miqdad, and Head of Internal Political Security Mohammed Monsurah to arrange al-Hakim's visit and to provide assurances of Iraqi's intent to rebuild the oil pipeline between the two countries. According to Saad, Hakim repeated this assurance during his visit. Saad said the Syrians had also expressed great interest in establishing a pipeline to the Akkas natural gas wells in western Iraq. -------------- Damascus Meeting on Economic Cooperation -------------- ¶6. (C) Syrian Minister of Economy Amr Lutfi hosted Iraqi Trade Minister Abdul Falah al-Sudani August 6 in a session of the bilateral Economic Committee. The focus of the meeting was resolving transportation issues holding up trade between Iraq and Syria, according to press reports. The ministers agreed to continue discussions at the technical level and address the possibility of signing an agreement between national carriers in both countries. They activated clauses of an August 2007 MOU to enable Iraq to import and export goods via Syrian ports. Discussions also focused on drafting a tax agreement and speeding up the establishment of a joint Syrian-Iraqi bank. ¶7. (C) An Embassy contact characterized this meeting as long overdue. He said that Syria desperately wanted to advance bilateral economic relations with Iraq because it "is our natural market." Syria also wanted to resume the heavy crude oil flow through the Kirkut-Banyas pipeline because it would provide roughly a billion USD annually. Equally important was following through on earlier discussion to pipe Iraqi natural gas from Akkas into the Syrian grid. Syria needed not only the extra income, but could use the gas to fuel power generation plants what were currently facing a 750 MW shortfall that was resulting in brownouts around the country. -------------- New Syrian "Vision" for Iraq? -------------- ¶8. (C) Over the last two weeks, Embassy sources have hinted the SARG may be planning an Iraq-related initiative during the month of August. D/FM Miqdad's Chief of Staff Husam Alaa suggested this possibility during an August 5 meeting with visiting Congressional staffers. According to as-Safeer correspondent Ziad Haidar, President Asad focused on improving Syrian-Iranian coordination toward Iraq during an August 2-4 trip to Tehran. Both countries are looking to increase their influence in Iraq, especially on security issues, Haidar asserted. Al-Hayat Bureau Chief Ibrahim Hamidi told us that the Syrian MFA would be emphasizing closer government-to-government ties with Iraq and would seek to use FM Zebari's visit to signal a desire for a new reconciliation initiative that ran "through the Iraqi Government rather than around it." ¶9. (C) The Iraqi Embassy here reports that the MFA and other ministries have begun consulting it more regularly on a wide variety of issues, including Iraqi refugees and economic relations. On August 5, for example, we saw Saad leaving the MFA as we were entering with a Staffdel to discuss Iraqi refugee issues. He told us there had been an up-tick in meetings on a wide range of bilateral issues. -------------- Exchange of Ambassadors - A Murky Picture -------------- ¶10. (C) According to Berivan Dosky, there are rumors that Syria may be getting closer to naming an ambassador to Iraq, with some reports indicating the SARG may do so within a month. She also suggested that FM Zebari may be trying to break the logjam over this issue in Baghdad and position himself to name an Iraqi ambassador during his August visit. DAMASCUS 00000560 003 OF 003 Iraqi Embassy contacts report the Iraqi Charge has been acting "secretive" lately, taking great pains to "manage a positive message" out of the Iraqi Embassy. They suggest he has been fostering closer ties with key GOI officials, and some within the Embassy believe he may be trying to position himself as ambassador. (Note: With us, the Iraqi Charge has reported consistently that internal disputes in Baghdad have blocked the naming of an Iraqi Ambassador to Syria.) On the Syrian side, sources suggest the SARG is still waiting for signs of GOI movement. Al-Hayat's Ibrahim Hamidi opined that exchanging ambassadors might be possible, but he noted that his MFA sources remained doubtful about whether internal GOI divisions could be resolved on this issue anytime soon. ¶11. (C) Comment: The SARG's opposition to a long-term U.S. military presence and desire to resume the flow of Iraqi oil and gas through Syria are well known. Up to now, Syria's reliance on relations with former Iraqi Baath party officials, foreign fighter facilitators, and some Iraqi tribal elements have significantly limited effective engagement of PM Maliki's government and yielded little real influence on GOI policies. The SARG's lavish reception of al-Hakim suggests recognition of Syria's lack of leverage. Syria will probably receive FM Zebari with equal enthusiasm to signal an interest in better government-to-government relations. Hakim's positive overtures may indicate some Iraqi interest in promoting lucrative deals with Syrians that are mutually beneficial. But rapid progress in Syrian-Iraqi relations is hard to imagine without meaningful Syrian efforts to contribute to improving the security situation in Iraq. CHASE