BASHAR WAITING ON SLEIMAN'S VISIT, FOCUSED ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000526 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL SY LE SUBJECT: BASHAR WAITING ON SLEIMAN'S VISIT, FOCUSED ON SATISFYING FRENCH REF: A. BEIRUT 1075 ¶B. BEIRUT 1068 ¶C. DAMASCUS 498 Classified By: Classified by CDA Michael Corbin for reasons 1.5 b and d . ¶1. (C) Summary: From the SARG's perspective, FM Muallim's July 21 trip to Beirut provided another step toward expanding its new relationship with France, and it paved the way for the next Syrian "deliverable," namely -- Lebanese President Sleiman's upcoming visit to Damascus. Though some within the SARG reportedly expressed reservations that Muallim's trip would risk appearing too conciliatory, the majority of our contacts believe the FM successfully conveyed Syria's desire for a new chapter in bilateral relations, while signaling the process of formalizing diplomatic relations will require lengthy and complicated negotiations. Observers here are focused on the "mechanism" for reaching agreement to establish embassies, ratification procedures, and what to do with the 22 bilateral agreements under the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council framework. Muallim's approach to the Lebanon file and beyond will likely continue to exploit the novelty of these high-level Syrian-Lebanese talks as an ersatz for tangible action. End Summary -------------- -------------- Syria's Approach to Lebanon All About Satisfying the French -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) According to sources who traveled with Bashar July 12-15 to Paris, President Asad used the visit to formally designate FM Muallim as the Syrian executive authority for negotiating an exchange of embassies with the GOL and to reach agreement on the legal framework for conducting future bilateral relations. Asad also pledged to send Muallim to Beirut to invite President Sleiman to Damascus, which he did July 21 (refs a and b). ¶3. (C) According to Orient Center Director and informal MFA advisor Samir al-Taqi, there were concerns within some quarters of the SARG (read security services) that Syrian prestige might suffer if Muallim appeared too deferential during his trip to Beirut. In particular, some SARG officials were reportedly worried there might be efforts by March 14 politicians to embarrass Muallim. Bashar overruled these reservations before returning from Paris to Damascus. Nonetheless, continued al-Taqi, the SARG gave careful consideration to the exact wording Muallim would use in discussions of specific bilateral issues, such as Lebanese prisoners in Syria, border demarcation, and Shebaa farms. Muallim's instructions were to meet the French desire for a significant expression of Syria's desire for a new era in bilateral relations, without "bowing to March 14," he said. ¶4. (C) Muallim achieved this balance "splendidly," assessed al-Hayat Bureau Chief Ibrahim Hamidi, who accompanied Bashar's party to Paris and has been tracking the Lebanon track carefully. Muallim fulfilled Bashar's commitment to the French by declaring a desire for a "new chapter" in bilateral relations and emphasizing the "equal footing" between the two countries. He also mitigated hard-liner concerns that Syria was being weak by issuing cutting remarks on Lebanese prisoners in Syrian jails (they "have waited more than 30 years...they can wait a few more weeks"),the status of Shebaa Farms (UN custody "does not mean the end of (Israeli) occupation),and borders ("there is nothing to prevent the demarcation of borders but me must take into account the fact that many Syrian and Lebanese villages are intertwined...") ¶5. (C) Muallim's visit, according to Syrian contacts emerging July 22 from a meeting with a visiting French Parliamentary delegation, fulfilled part of Bashar's deal with Sarkozy. The overwhelming buzz among European and Arab diplomatic contacts was that Muallim had succeeded and was in control of the process. French diplomatic contacts in particular were pleased with the visit, and the French Charge told us July 22 that it was all but certain that "Sarkozy (would be) coming to Damascus." -------------- -------------- Next Step: Sleiman Visit and the Search for A "Mechanism" -------------- -------------- DAMASCUS 00000526 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) SARG officials expect Lebanese President Sleiman to visit Damascus after the Lebanese cabinet issues a policy declaration. Though everyone here acknowledges this might take time, Syrians in general seem willing to patiently wait for the Lebanese to complete this step. Once here, Sleiman is expected to name Lebanon's counterpart to FM Muallim to begin talks on a mechanism to pursue bilateral relations, Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council SecGen Nasri al-Khoury told us July 23. In addition, Muallim introduced the idea in Beirut (which Bashar plans to explore further) of creating an ad hoc working committee co-chaired by Muallim and his Lebanese counterpart to proceed with examining the steps necessary to sign an MOU to exchange embassies. ¶7. (C) Exactly how negotiations will proceed is uncertain, Hamidi told us. "Bashar wants to demonstrate he's ready to follow through on his commitment to Sarkozy," he said. The Lebanese, however, "could debate a Cabinet statement forever." The key SARG priority will be to demonstrate to the French and international that it is seriously engaged in and committed to a process to establish embassies. "That will keep the Syrian-French relationship moving forward," Hamidi said. If the process slows, he added, the Syrians want to be in a position to argue persuasively that the delay is due "internal Lebanese machinations." -------------- Whither the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council? -------------- ¶8. (C) Related to the issue of reaching an MOU on establishing embassies is the future legal framework for bilateral relations. Al-Khoury has argued (and reiterated to us July 23) that the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council represents a long-standing bilateral structure that has worked to the mutual benefit of both countries. While there was no consensus in either Syria or Lebanon on the Higher Council's future, Al-Khoury argued that the easiest and most viable way to achieve an MOU to exchange embassies would be to amend the Higher Council's provisions regarding the functions of the General Secretariat, in a way that specified the mandate and functions of embassies in Lebanon and Syria. Al-Khoury indicated there had already internal SARG discussion on pursuing such an approach, but there remained a great deal of work to do in specifying how much country-to-country business to conduct through embassies, and how much to preserve the existing Higher Council's structure of 22 separate agreements. ¶8. (C) Al-Khoury cautioned that this approach was only one possible scenario likely to be discussed by Asad and Sleiman. He conceded that many Lebanese saw the Higher Council an "instrument of Syrian occupation" and wanted to abolish it. Some prominent Syrians were just as eager to see the Higher Council go away because it would allow Syria to abrogate agreements on water, electricity, and other bilateral issues which benefited Lebanon, he observed. ¶9. (C) The most likely scenario, al-Khoury suggested, was that Asad and Sleiman would examine a number of options but eventually agree to pursue an MOU to establish embassies within a modified Higher Council framework. Even this approach, however, would require prolonged bilateral negotiations followed by internal domestic debates in both countries. Al-Khoury declined to estimate how long the process would take, but suggested that debate among Lebanese politicians would likely prolong the process considerably. The ratification process in Syria would not likely be "as dramatic," he said. ¶10. (C) Comment: Bashar's decision to delegate negotiating authority to Muallim indicates the FM's expanding control of not just the Lebanese file, but Syria's broader engagement of the West. Key to Muallim's approach is to use the novelty of direct, high-level talks with Lebanon to depict the illusion of serious intentions and concrete action. As Syrian-Lebanese discussions begin to address complicated issues that will take likely take prolonged negotiations to resolve, we should continue to demand tangible evidence of Syria's desire for improved relations -- not just progress on borders, Shebaa Farms, and Lebanese prisoners, but also curtailing the arms flow. We should also stress the desirability of preserving existing bilateral agreements that work to Lebanon's favor. CORBIN