SARG PRESSES AHEAD WITH PALESTINIAN CONFERENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000048 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL SY IS SUBJECT: SARG PRESSES AHEAD WITH PALESTINIAN CONFERENCE DESPITE LACK OF CLEAR OBJECTIVES REF: 07 DAMASCUS 1061 Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin for reasons 1.5 B and D. ¶1. (C) Summary: Notwithstanding Palestinian Authority (PA) opposition to the January 23-25 meeting of Palestinian groups in Damascus, preparations are in place for an event in Damascus that will likely (1) underscore the right of return of Palestinian refugees; (2) call for reconciliation between Hamas and the PA; and (3) condemn Israeli military operations in Gaza. The SARG and conference organizers have portrayed the event as a purely Palestinian initiative open to all Palestinian groups, with limited SARG participation. Though some participants are likely to criticize the PA for continuing negotiations with Israel, we expect the main thrust of conference rhetoric will be directed against Israel and the U.S. End Summary -------------- Who's Coming -------------- ¶2. (C) PLO Chief of Foreign Relations in Damascus Mohamed al Batal told Poloffs January 17 that, despite Palestinian Authority attempts to persuade Syrian officials to cancel the conference, event organizers had invited all major Palestinian political groups, Arab and some Western embassies in Damascus, and representatives of Palestinian organizations from all over the region in hopes of boosting attendance to roughly 1,000 participants. Our sources remain skeptical the event, to be held at the Syrian Sahara Trade Union Center near the western Damascus suburb of Yarfur, would attract more than 400-500 participants. PFLP and DFLP have decided not to attend out of loyalty to the PA, according to al Batal. Fatah will not officially be represented, but some Fatah members (such as al Batal) might come as "independents." A Western journalist told us some "old guard" PLO members would probably attend, but Norwegian Ambassador Hans Wilhelm Longva doubted big names like Faruq Qadumi or Hani al Hassan would show up. On the other hand, Embassy sources have reported unconfirmed rumors that Hizballah, and even Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, might participate. (Comment: Nasrallah's appearance would be a major surprise.) -------------- On the Agenda -------------- ¶3. (C) Syria's public statements have denied any desire to undermine the Annapolis agenda or PA President Mahmoud Abbas. According to PFLP-GC leader Talal Naji, who spoke publicly January 21 on the conference, the event is a "popular activity" to give Palestinians an alternative venue to express their views. Syrian officials and Palestinian conference organizers are publicly claiming all Palestinian groups have been invited with the aim of forging Palestinian unity, which they say should take priority over talks between the PA and Israelis. Norwegian Ambassador Longva reported to us Hamas leader Khaled Mishal had told him January 17 that Hamas participants at conference would not seek to be divisive. Longva indicated he would let the results speak for themselves, but surmised this contention might be true if the conference produced statements supportive of the Arab peace initiative and ongoing talks between the PA and Israel. ¶4. (C) Other contacts predicted a more combative conference atmosphere. Reuters journalist Khaled Oweiss suggested the conference's main theme would be to oppose what many Palestinians see as surrender by the PA. According to Oweiss, President Bush's remarks regarding the possibility of compensating Palestinians in lieu of guaranteeing their right of return had stirred deep anger in Syria and Lebanon. In reaction to Israeli attacks and what some Arab capitals are calling a "siege" on Gaza, many Palestinian groups were advocating cessation of talks with Israel. The conference would provide Hamas and other participants a chance to echo these comments and denounced Israeli aggression, Oweiss maintained. Al Batal told us he expected a great deal of internal Palestinian criticism, particularly between Hamas and PLO old guard representatives. Hamas officials were openly accusing the PA of collusion with Israel in trying to assassinate Hamas leaders, he said. At the same time, some Palestinian groups have vocally criticized Hamas for its take over of Gaza, and there was some chance this theme would be reflected in conference discussion. -------------- Assessing SARG Motives -------------- ¶5. (C) Oweiss observed that Syria's efforts to stage the "rejectionist" conference conveyed Syria's support to key Palestinian constituencies, particularly Hamas, after many had interpreted Syria's participation in the November 2007 Annapolis Conference as an endorsement of the U.S. peace initiative. Policy analyst and MFA advisor Samir al-Taqi predicted "there might be some venting" on Israel's military operations in Gaza, but he maintained the SARG had no interest in fomenting Palestinian unrest on Syrian soil. According to al-Taqi, Syria wanted to signal to the U.S., Israel, and the Arab world that it remained an influential player in Palestinian politics and that it had interests to protect in peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Al-Taqi added that the Syrian government sought to avoid provoking the ire of the international community and thus at present would be reluctant to support any calls for an end to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. ¶6. (C) While the SARG had been divided in October 2007 over whether to allow a Palestinian conference to proceed, this time there was regime unanimity that sharp criticism from President Bush against Syria required at least a rhetorical response, asserted al-Taqi. Allowing the conference to go forward would also represent Syria's desire to smooth over tensions with Iranian officials who had openly criticized Syria for attending Annapolis and not allowing the Palestinian conference to take place in Syria or Iran. (Comment: On the subject of Syrian-Iranian tensions, Norwegian Ambassador Longva suggested that Iranian officials continued to be annoyed that Syria, not Iran, was hosting the event. That said, we have heard reports that Iran was financing the event, a rumor PFLP-GC leader Naji denied categorically in his January 21 press conference.) ¶7. (C) Al Hayat journalist Ibrahim Hamidi opined the timing of the conference would give the SARG an opportunity to criticize Israeli military operations in Gaza and amplify criticism of the Bush administration's peace agenda, particularly President Bush's recognition of "facts on the ground" and the suggestion of monetary compensation as an alternative to the Palestinian right of return. Violence in Gaza had led to a series of Syrian statements condemning Israeli military action and the "siege" in Gaza, most recently by FM Muallim on January 21. In addition, Hamidi argued, the SARG had also decided to "unleash" Hamas leader Khaled Mishal. The SARG had granted Mishal a public Syrian venue and live television coverage during his January 4 speech commemorating Hamas' 20-year anniversary. This was unprecedented, contended Hamidi. In addition, Mishal had spoken publicly January 18 and 21 on the violence in Gaza. ¶8. (C) At the same time, there continued to be limits to how far the Syrian regime would allow Palestinian groups to go, argued Oweiss. Syria wanted to maintain its credibility as a supporter of the resistance, but the government would likely continue to avoid direct statements calling for military action against Israel from Syrian soil. "The Syrians are in favor of advocating resistance as long as it does not involve them directly and bring another Israeli strike," he stipulated. ¶9. (C) Comment: SARG and Palestinian organizers efforts to portray this event as a purely Palestinian initiative, even to the point of claiming Syria had no role in postponing an October 2007 conference (reftel),fail to conceal the regime's desire to repair its post-Annapolis relations with Iran and the diaspora Palestinian "resistance." Calls by Palestinian groups outside Syria for ending PA-Israeli peace talks and responding with violence to Israeli military operations in Gaza will pressure Palestinian groups here to follow suit. The question is whether Syria will work to contain these pressures or fan the flames. CORBIN