SARG BEMOANS INADEQUATE IRAQI REFUGEE ASSISTANCE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000453 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA AND PRM NSC FOR ABRAMS, SINGH, GAVITO E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2012 TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL SY IZ SUBJECT: SARG BEMOANS INADEQUATE IRAQI REFUGEE ASSISTANCE, WILLING TO CONSIDER EXPANDED RESETTLEMENT OPS REF: DAMASCUS 442 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During a 90-minute discussion, Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee Issues James Foley briefed Syrian Deputy FM Faisal Mikdad on his mission to assess Iraqi refugee assistance needs and programs. Foley acknowledged that Syria had borne a large economic and social burden in hosting Iraqi refugees, and he reviewed recent efforts to convince European and Arab countries, including Iraq, to increase assistance levels. Foley called on Syria to do more to articulate its resource needs with other donors, stressed that Syria could improve relations with Iraq by clamping down on foreign fighters, and made the case that the U.S. could double its resettlement operations in Syria if the SARG would grant permission to expand our processing capability. ¶2. (C) A relaxed but critical Mikdad welcomed Foley's positive remarks on Syria's role and agreed with the need to focus on assistance needs and levels. He claimed Syria had spent billions of dollars in subsidized goods and indirect assistance to Iraqis residing in Syria. Syria had raised the refugee issue with other potential donors, but many of them refused to increase assistance because they viewed the Iraqi refugee crisis as a U.S. responsibility. Iraq, he said, had donated only $15 million since 2003 and was largely seen as neglecting its responsibilities. Mikdad and his staff reviewed a few recent examples of joint projects with the EU and UNHCR and lamented Syria had received very little direct assistance from international assistance programs. Though UNHCR and other international organizations were providing more assistance to refugees in Syria, the Syrian people did not feel much impact from these programs. Mikdad stressed Syria's cooperation warranted a more positive response from Washington and asserted repeatedly that Syria desired better relations with the current and future U.S. administration. Mikdad also pledged to consider Foley's remarks regarding possible expansion of the U.S. Iraqi refugee resettlement program in Syria. End Summary. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Foley, accompanied by Elizabeth Hopkins (PRM/ANE),Elizabeth Harris (PRM/A),and Adrienne Nutzman (Refcoord Embassy Amman) met Syrian Deputy FM Faisal Mikdad June 24. Charge and Poloffs attended, as did Mikdad's Chief of Staff Husam Ala'a, and two mid-level officials from the MFA's International Organizations Office staff. -------------- Reviewing U.S. and International Assistance -------------- ¶4. (C) Foley explained his stop in Damascus came as part of a regional tour to assess Iraqi refugee assistance needs and requirements. He expressed U.S. and international appreciation for Syria's willingness to welcome Iraqi refugees, shoulder the burden of supporting them, and cooperate with international organizations and NGOs. Foley characterized the Iraqi refugee issue as evolving. Many Iraqis had fled to Syria and other countries with at least some resources that were now largely depleted, which left them increasingly vulnerable. Foley described his mission as one that would help feed an assessment by the Executive Branch and Congress regarding the urgency of refugee needs and attempt to make new determinations about U.S. and international assistance priorities. ¶5. (C) The positive news, Foley continued, was that international organizations were now better equipped to assess refugee needs. Appeals for 2008 had increased to $900 million, up from nearly $400 million the previous year. Unfortunately, donor response had not kept up with changing realities. Although European and Arab countries had made varied contributions to international and regional appeals, international organizations potentially faced as much as a $400 million shortfall. Moreover, UNHCR and other international organizations were facing difficult decisions on which 2008 programs to cut because of budget gaps. The U.S. would be looking to provide additional assistance to cover these immediate shortfalls, but over the longer term, more help would be needed from the international community. ¶6. (C) Foley noted he and others were continuing a worldwide campaign to raise awareness about the Iraqi refugee crisis and urge donations in response to international and regional appeals. In the Arab world, the UAE had pledged $10 million to the UNHCR's 2007 regional appeal, and Kuwait had also pledged modest assistance. Foley recounted his meeting with a Qatari foundation in Doha, which was working on creative projects to provide educational assistance in Syria that would benefit Iraqi and Syrian students. Foley said he had met with Arab League officials in Cairo to urge a recognition of shared responsibilities and need for burdensharing among Arab countries. Arab League officials said they recognized the crisis had important implications for Iraq and the region as a whole. Nonetheless, Arab League members had not yet been convinced to donate to the Iraqi refugee fund. Foley added that the Gulf states had told him they would consider increased assistance only if the Iraqi government contributed substantially to meeting Iraqi refugee needs in the region. ¶7. (C) In Europe, Foley reported, there continued to be skepticism among some EU members about the magnitude of the refugee crisis and uncertainties about the numbers of refugees in Syria and other countries. The USG view was that there would always be uncertainty about numbers, the central focus should remain on providing assistance for those who need it, and the UN and NGO actors in Syria had a good sense of those communities in need. Nonetheless, the view in Brussels and London was different. The U.S. would work with international organizations and continue to address these doubts and concerns, but the Syrian government could bolster the case for more assistance by providing more information. While European countries were making contributions, the challenge remained to convince them to respond at a level equal to the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis. ¶8. (C) Iraq's unwillingness to provide more assistance also represented a frustrating hurdle, observed Foley. To be sure, the Iraqi government viewed the refugee issue in part through the prism of its bilateral relationship with Syria, and we along with the GOI believed Syria must increase its security cooperation with Iraq, particularly in clamping down on foreign fighters. ¶9. (C) On the refugee issue itself, Foley agreed with Mikdad's assessment that there were deep divisions within the Iraqi government about whether and how to assist displaced Iraqis outside the country. Up to now, the government had provided only $25 million, despite its growing budget surplus. Foley said he would continue to press Iraq to change its position, but he predicted doing so would not be easy. The prevailing Iraqi view remained that priority should be given to some three million displaced Iraqis within the country and to encouraging Iraqis abroad to return. These were no doubt important goals, Foley explained, but the U.S. believed Iraq had a duty and a national interest to demonstrate a commitment to providing humanitarian support for vulnerable Iraqis living in neighboring states as well. Everyone believed the Iraqi government should be doing more, and we will continue to push them, said Foley. ¶10. (C) Regarding U.S. contributions, the USG had increased its assistance from $170 million in 2007 to $220 million in pledges halfway through 2008, Foley asserted. He projected that there would likely be additional U.S. funding in the current year as well. While Congressional appropriations did not earmark these funds by country, the State Department's informal estimate was that substantial assistance to refugees had gone into Syria thus far in 2008. The bulk of these funds went to UNHCR, but the U.S. had also contributed nearly $20 million to the World Food Program and made other contributions to the World Health Organization and UNICEF. In addition, the U.S. was funding six NGOs working in Syria, which received a total of $7 million in 2007 and would receive $8 million this year. These NGO programs alone had reached some 200,000 refugees in Syria in the area of health, education, and immediate needs. ¶11. (C) The purpose of the visit, concluded Foley, would be to consult with countries in the region, including Syria, identify needs, advocate for greater burdensharing, and prepare for upcoming consultations with Congress and within the Executive Branch for funding requirements. -------------- Mikdad: Assistance too Little, Stop Isolation -------------- ¶12. (C) Mikdad welcomed Foley's presentation and thanked him for his positive remarks regarding Syria's cooperation on the Iraqi refugee issue. He concurred with Foley's assessment of increasing needs and saw the visit as an important opportunity for Syria and the United States to continue discussions on this subject. Unlike the 1991 response to the invasion of Kuwait, the 2003 invasion of Iraq had displaced Iraqis in large numbers. Despite warnings from Syria and other countries of this potential outcome, U.S. and Coalition forces had entered Iraq without a plan for dealing with dislocated Iraqis. The result had created a wave of millions of Iraqis fleeing into Syria and other countries. Though the U.S. ignored Syria's warnings when Mikdad was posted as Syria's UN Permrep, Syria nonetheless kept its borders open, welcomed Iraqis into the country, and provided assistance to them without any complaints. ¶13. (C) Until today, Mikdad continued, Syria witnessed an inadequate international and U.S. response to this crisis. Iraq's response in particular had created an atmosphere of bitter frustration within the Arab world and had dissuaded other Arab countries from shouldering more of the burden, Mikdad argued. Syria appreciated the UAE's pledge of $10 million. However, the creation of an Arab League fund for Iraqi refugees had failed to attract any pledges. Iraq's commitment of $25 million ($15 million of which went to Syria) represented a failure to live up to its responsibilities. Syria had decided to accept Iraq's contribution of $15 million rather than reject the funds, like Amman had done. Still, Iraq needed to do more, and Syrian officials had driven this point home in meetings with Iraqi officials. ¶14. (C) Foley reiterated that Syrian steps to improve bilateral relations with Iraq through increased security cooperation, especially regarding foreign fighters, might prompt a more positive response from Baghdad. Mikdad asserted that Syria had taken many steps to improve border security, noting that Syrian border guards were deployed along the border, while there was no similar action on the Iraqi side. The SARG had also employed additional measures at its airports to scrutinize foreigners seeking to enter the country. Even high level U.S. officials such as General Petraeus had publicly acknowledged the reduction of foreign fighter attacks in Iraq, giving some credit to Syrian efforts. ¶15. (C) Foley interjected that foreign fighters remained a significant threat to Iraqi security. Even as violence levels dropped, the suicide attacks by these foreign elements became all the more conspicuous, and arrests of foreign fighters revealed that they had come from Syria. Again, he urged Syria to do more by engaging Iraq on security issues and taking steps to interdict the Syria-based networks facilitating the flow of foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria. ¶16. (C) Mikdad reiterated that Syria had taken important steps to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate. Moreover, Syria had provided generous assistance in all fields to Iraqis living in the country. There were over 50,000 Iraqi students studying in Syrian schools, and Syria remained committed to providing primary and secondary education and vocational training to ensure that Iraqis would be well prepared to return and rebuild Iraq. Tens of thousands of Iraqis were receiving medical care in Syrian clinics and a dedicated hospital to treat chronic illnesses. Food and other assistance was available to Iraqis through Syrian Arab Red Crescent centers. Because many goods, such as diesel fuel, bread, and some commodities, were subsidized, the Syrian government had easily spent billions of dollars in indirect aid because Iraqis were able to benefit from this government support. ¶17. (C) Still, Mikdad claimed, the international and U.S. response remained disappointing. In Europe, Syrian officials continued to discuss the Iraqi refugee crisis. The prevailing European view was that America had caused the problem by invading Iraq and it therefore bore the responsibility. Syrian officials continued to believe there had been over 1.5 million Iraqi refugees in Syria, but this number had fluctuated since last year because of back and forth travel between the two countries. He did not provide a current estimate of the number of refugees. ¶18. (C) Mikdad said that while assistance to international organizations and NGOs now was in the hundreds of millions of dollars, the SARG felt like it was seeing very little direct benefit. Turning to a member of his staff, Mikdad asked for a review of recent joint projects with UNHCR and EU countries. These included assistance provided through UNHCR, the World Food Program, and UNICEF. These projects totaled no more than $30 or $40 million, when international organizations and NGOs were receiving far more, Mikdad claimed. Consequently, SARG officials concluded that Syria had benefited very little from international organizations assisting Iraqis. ¶19. (C) Diverting the conversation to the subject of trafficking in persons, Mikdad took issue with the 2008 U.S. G/TIP country report on Syria. Syria had a draft anti-trafficking bill pending in parliament and had ratified three relevant international protocols on this subject. Syria was working with international organizations and had built its own government-funded shelter to protect vulnerable women and children. Yet the U.S. had singled out Syria for criticism and accused it of condoning torture and mistreatment of Iraqi women when the opposite was true. Syria had taken steps to address these issues; perhaps more could be done, but Syria desired a more cooperative tone, not confrontation, in response to the positive steps it had taken. ¶20. (C) In fact, continued Mikdad, Syria desired better relations with the current and future U.S. administrations. He urged Foley to establish better ties with Syria's Ambassador to the U.S., Imad Moustafa, who (Mikdad claimed) was working hard to improve ties. Instead of excluding Moustafa from meetings Foley reportedly had conducted with other Arab ambassadors prior to traveling, the State Department should deal with Moustafa, argued Mikdad. Foley denied any such meeting had occurred, noting that he had met only with a few European ambassadors. Mikdad took the point and asserted Moustafa had heard this information from the Jordanian Ambassador, who must have been reporting erroneously. -------------- -- Expanding U.S. Resettlement Operations in Syria -------------- -- ¶21. (C) Summing up, Mikdad appealed for more international assistance, acknowledging that Syria "needs help." He cited Syria's agreement to allow U.S. DHS circuit riders to conduct interviews in Syria as yet another tangible gesture of Syria's desire to cooperate with the U.S. He also called for better relations with the USG and urged Foley to advocate more constructive and less confrontational policies that would facilitate enhanced cooperation with Syria. Mikdad said Syria would continue to cooperate on the Iraqi refugee issue. ¶22. (C) Foley replied that as the Secretary's Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee Issues, his brief was to speak to these issues and not address overarching bilateral U.S.-Syrian relations. On the ongoing U.S. resettlement operations in Syria, Foley thanked Mikdad for raising the issue and said the U.S. believed it could double the output of its current output of 5,000-to-6,000 refugees if Syria were willing to allow the U.S. to expand its operating space, hire additional Syrian staff, and bring foreign trainers to operate in Damascus. Just as DHS needed more space, UNHCR wanted to reclaim the space used by DHS to meet its own operational objectives, he added. Foley stressed the Administration would soon be setting its FY 09 admissions goals in consultations with Congress, and Syria's position would be a key variable. ¶23. (C) Mikdad replied he would consider our requirements to expand the resettlement program (passed as a non-paper) and pledged to reply through the U.S. Embassy. Mikdad's office director, Husam Ala'a, asked whether the operating facility referred to in the non-paper was IOM's. Foley clarified that we believed the IOM facility was best suited to perform this task. We were not objecting to the current arrangement but needed more space and trained employees, he explained. The U.S. wanted to let Syria know more processing was possible and to see if there was any flexibility. Ala'a warned that re-raising the issue of using IOM for reprocessing interviews might attract negative attention to the current arrangement, which Mikdad noted was based only on an oral agreement. Mikdad nonetheless repeated his pledge to study the proposal and provide a response. ¶24. (C) Ambassador Foley cleared this cable prior to his departure. CORBIN