SYRIA'S LACK OF ENGAGEMENT ON IRAQ: POSSIBLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000420

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH, GAVITO
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR JORDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY LE
SUBJECT: SYRIA'S LACK OF ENGAGEMENT ON IRAQ: POSSIBLE
CAUSES AND REMEDIES

CDA Todd Holmstrom for reasons 1.4 (b and d).


1. (C) Summary: With Syria's recent effort to gain credit
for the Doha Agreement and publicly announcing indirect
negotiations with Israel, it hopes for engagement with the
West and a loosening of its international isolation. Still,
the SARG has yet to make any substantial concessions on the
key issue of Iraq such as disrupting key foreign fighter
networks that continue to use Syria to infiltrate Iraq or
rendering Iraqi insurgent leaders. The SARG has an
increasing need to reap the economic benefits commensurate
with a closer relationship with Iraq, but can be expected
to give as few concessions as possible in return.
Additionally, the SARG believes its policy of waiting and
playing for time on Iraq is working, which tied to its
palpable dislike of the Bush Administration, makes real
security contributions to Iraq unlikely at best. Also, the
SARG calculates movement on engaging Israel and allowing
political progress in Lebanon will be enough to assuage the
international community and compel U.S. reengagement.
Syria, however, likely underestimates the impact of
continued foreign fighter flows through Syria on U.S.
policy. Focusing on Bashar's desire to improve his image
and exploiting Syria's economic vulnerabilities may induce
the SARG to give higher priority to Iraq's security
concerns. End Summary.

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Syrian Foreign Policy - Where's Iraq?
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2. (C) Syria appears to be firmly focusing its foreign
policy priorities on Lebanon and on indirect engagement
with Israel over the Golan Heights. The SARG knows Iraq is
important for improving its relations with the U.S. yet
appears unwilling to make any concessions. The SARG hopes
increasing stability in Lebanon and negotiations with
Israel will lead to a reduction in its international
isolation and eventual improvement in its relations with
the U.S. The questions this cable seeks to address are: 1)
What is Syria's approach to Iraq? 2) Why is Syria so
unwilling to compromise on what it understands is a top
U.S. foreign policy priority? and 3) What are some possible
levers to induce Syria to respond constructively on Iraq?

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What the SARG Wants From Iraq
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3. (C) The SARG longs for increased trade, especially of
Syrian exports to Iraq and trans-shipments from Europe and
elsewhere. Two top SARG priorities on this front include:
-- The completion of a rail track connecting its port in
Latakia to Baghdad, with work already completed on the
Syrian side of the border just south of Abu Kamal.
-- An increase in cross border trucking/shipping with
unhindered movement of goods from Syria to Iraq.


4. (C) Syria aspires to be an export corridor for Iraqi oil
and gas.
-- The SARG sees the development of the Akkas Gas Field as
a way to become an alternate corridor for supplying the
European market with natural gas.
-- Also, repairing and replacing the Kirkuk to Banyas oil
pipeline remains an important priority given Syria's
falling oil production.


5. (C) In need of private investment to fuel economic
growth, Syria wants both increased investment from Iraq.
Regime intimates likewise want to cherry pick key
investment opportunities in Iraq.
--Iraqis resident in Syria have been an important source of
foreign direct investment in the last few years.
--Also, regime intimates, like Shia business leader Saeb
Nahas, made significant profits from lucrative investments
in Iraq from 1998 to 2003 and hunger to return.


6. (C) The SARG wants Al-Qaida, other Islamic extremists
and foreign fighters contained in Iraq and has a vested
interest in seeing that their associated violence does not

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spill back into Syria.


7. (C) The SARG ultimately wants Iraqi refugees to return
to their homeland but will continue to house them as guests
for the time being.

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How Syria Deals with the Iraq File
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8. (C) Though Bashar needs Iraqi oil and gas now to help
fight off Syria's economic woes, the SARG continues to give
the minimum while holding out for the maximum benefit.
This mind-set has resulted in a stand off between the
Syrian and Iraqi governments.
-- Iraqi Charge reports that relations between the two
countries are "frozen" because the SARG demands economic
benefits up front while the GOI wants to first see tangible
SARG security contributions.
-- Syria will not cooperate on Iraqi security requirements
if it does not first see movement on oil and/or gas
proposals.


9. (C) While the SARG reestablished diplomatic relations in
December 2006 its subsequent engagement has been faltering.
-- There has still been no exchange of ambassadors since
formal diplomatic relations were reestablished.
-- Numerous Iraqi dignitaries/ministers have visited,
signed a slew of agreements, and yet no substantial
progress has been made on the economic or security fronts
between the two countries.
-- While Bashar (like other Arab leaders) has accepted the
Maliki government, relations are not warm. Even with
successful visits by Iraqi leaders, the SARG has failed to
maintain a positive rapport. For example, President
Talabani was warmly received in January 2007 but the
October 2007 spat over Turkish raids against Kurds in Iraqi
soured the relationship.


10. (C) The SARG likely views foreign fighter flows into
Iraq as a means to:
-- Gather intelligence on what is going on in Iraq,
-- Pressure the GOI (and in the eyes of some in the SARG
security establishment, the USG),
-- Monitor/control Islamic extremism at home,
-- Keep Iran from gaining unchallenged hegemony in Iraq.


11. (C) The SARG continues to try and link stopping the
flow of foreign fighters to border improvements and
inaction on the part of the Iraqi government.
-- The SARG constantly and persistently blames Iraq for not
doing enough on its side to secure the border,
-- SARG will continue to impede security cooperation by
raising moot issues like its 2004 request for night vision
goggles and other technical support to help secure the
border.


12. (C) The SARG continues to calibrate its support for
groups like the Iraqi Baathists in response to its
perception of developments in Iraq and the current state of
its political engagement.
-- While exiled Iraqi Baath conferences and meetings
continue to occur in Syria, we are not aware of the SARG
publicly supporting such meetings since January 2007,
-- The SARG had been courting exiled Baath Party leaders
like Izzat Ibrahim Al-Douri and Muhammad Yunis Al-Ahmed,
but public support has diminished steadily since the start
of 2007,
-- Bashar's government has accepted numerous high-level
visits including Iraqi PM Nouri Maliki.

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Why the SARG Has Not Put Iraq on the Agenda?
--------------


13. (C) The SARG imagines it has made a number of positive
gestures, from border improvements to establishing an
embassy in Iraq, but believes the U.S. and GOI have failed
to acknowledge and reciprocate.


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14. (C) The SARG may have only limited ability to deliver
on Iraq and therefore may not want to put its credibility
on the line by making promises it can not deliver upon.
-- We believe for example, that the Saudis may well have
more influence with the Bedouin tribes in Anbar then
Bashar. Though Bashar purports to be able to exert
significant influence over the tribes, his efforts have so
far borne few obvious results.


15. (C) The SARG believes that it can wait out the current
U.S. Administration.
-- The SARG does not want to give any concessions that
might politically benefit the Bush Administration on Iraq.


16. (C) Bashar and FM Muallem may have miscalculated and
overestimated the value of the Doha Accord and the SARG's
recent engagement with Israel not understanding the level
of the U.S. commitment to stopping the foreign fighter
flow.

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How We Influence the SARG - Image, Economy, Iraq and
Information
-------------- --

- Bashar Assad cares about his image


17. (C) Bashar's domestic and international image is
something he cares about and weighs heavily in the decision
making calculus of the SARG. Since coming to power eight
years ago, Bashar now has a firmer grasp of the reins of
power and has recently spent a significant amount of time
improving his image as an internationalist.
-- We may be able to move Basher to take action his
advisors, focused on self-preservation, would oppose as a
result of his overdrawn concern over his international
image.


18. (C) Bashar seeks public accolades for any positive
action Syria takes on Iraq, especially on the issue of
refugees, but the positive overtures by US officials on
these subjects over the past year have yielded little. --
Focusing on how to offer more praise in exchange for
constructive movement on the part of the SARG would likely
not yield real results in the near term.


19. (C) Conversely, damage to Bashar's image caused by
showing foreign fighters are in a struggle with Iraqi
forces not American forces and making links to Al-Qaida
would resonate here, as there are few fans of Al-Qaida in
Syria.
-- Make the cost of being complicit in the foreign fighter
business more costly to his image.

- Economic levers


20. (C) Bashar promotes himself as an economic reformer,
but he faces serious, immediate economic challenges:
drought, rising inflation, lack of foreign direct
investment, ballooning budget deficit, unsustainable
subsidies.
-- These difficulties make him more likely to deal, make
Iraqi oil all the more important, and continued economic
sanctions all the more costly.

- Iraq


21. (C) The GOI has the greatest ability to influence SARG
behavior. If the GOI indicates that it is a suitable
partner (minor trade gestures, contribute to Iraqi refugee
relief efforts),the SARG would be compelled to reciprocate
and perhaps reign in foreign fighter networks/facilitators
in Syria. The more fully the SARG believes that economic
ties will proceed at the same pace as the SARG response to
actionable intelligence, passed by the GOI on the foreign
fighter pipeline, the more likely it is that the SARG will
deliver.

- Focused Local U.S. Influence


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22. (C) The Embassy could relay non-actionable declassified
information associated with the foreign fighter pipeline,
thematic in nature, to key members of the Syrian Foreign
Ministry. The intent of this information would be to
influence the SARG, making it clear to it that the U.S. is
aware of Syrian activities and that the SARG is complicit
in the foreign fighter pipeline.

HOLMSTROM