CORRECTED COPY: MFA ADVISOR: SARG HIGH POLICY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000349 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO NSC FOR ABRAMS, SINGH, GAVITO PARIS FOR JORDAN; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL SY IS TU SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: MFA ADVISOR: SARG HIGH POLICY COUNCIL MEETING SUGGESTS DIVISIONS ON LEBANON, CORE SUPPORT FOR HIZBALLAH REF: A. DAMASCUS 330 ¶B. ANKARA 903 Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, American Embassy Damascus, Reasons 1 .4 b and d. CORRECTED COPY -- PARA 1 ¶1. (S) Summary: On May 14, Orient Center Director and MFA advisor Samir al-Taqi (protect strictly) provided a readout of a May 12 SARG High Policy Council that suggested deep divisions between those favoring supporting Syria's allies in Lebanon and those more concerned about fostering a viable Golan track. Back from Washington for consultations, Syrian Ambassador Imad Mustafa briefed policymakers on a strong sanctions bill circulating in the House and predicted its passage. The Turks, said al-Taqi, were furious that Hizballah had gone "too far." Reports from Beirut indicated that Hizballah's gains on the ground had cornered the GOL, but at the high cost of alienating the SARG's Sunni and Christian allies. The High Policy Council recommended continued pressure on Siniora, supporting Hizballah's conditions for reopening the airport, and efforts to shore up Syrian allies, reported al-Taqi. At the same time, Syria was bracing for UN Security Council action and the possibility of additional U.S. sanctions, and trying to prevent the Lebanon crisis from disrupting the Golan track. According to al-Taqi, who put himself firmly in the moderate camp, "measured U.S. pressure" would give Syrians who favored restraint more influence in SARG policy discussions. End Summary ¶2. (S) Samir al-Taqi told us a hastily organized May 12 meeting of the High Policy Council -- a group that includes leaders from the security services, Vice President Shara, FM Muallem, and other foreign policy and security advisors -- had pitted Syrian hawks (Shara and security service officials) who advocated support for Hizballah and Syria's political allies in Lebanon against FM Muallim and others who counseled a more restrained approach that would seek to moderate Hizballah's demands and avoid confrontation with the West. After agreeing that Hizballah's reactions to the Siniora cabinet's decision on the Beirut airport and Hizballah's communications net had gone farther than anyone had predicted, the meeting descended into what al-Taqi called "a battle over Syria's regional identity." ¶3. (S) MFA and security service personnel briefed the group on the extent of Hizballah's operations in Beirut and ongoing clashes involving pro-Syrian allies in Tripoli and the Shuf mountains. From a military perspective, Hizballah's dominance had embarrassed Sunni and Druze militias and intimidated the LAF from doing much more than playing the role of a "concerned, but powerless observer," al-Taqi recounted. Politically, however, Hizballah soldiers had crossed a line by pointing their guns at other Lebanese and had threatened the LAF with massive resignations. These actions had the undesired effect of alienating pro-Syrian Sunni and Christian politicians, who now faced the accusation that Hizballah's arms had nothing to do with resisting Israel, but rather were tools to ensure Hizballah's dominance at the expense of the rest of the country, al-Taki asserted. ¶4. (S) Assessing international reactions, Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustafa told the group that Washington's recent briefings to Capitol Hill and the press on Syrian-N. Korean nuclear cooperation had revived a House sanctions bill against Syria that would go much farther than the current Syrian Accountability Act. The Lebanese crisis, assessed Mustafa, would likely increase support within Congress and the Administration. MFA officials also reported that Turkish interlocutors (primarily foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu) had conveyed deep concerns about the extent of Hizballah's operations and the spread of violence to areas outside Beirut. The Turks, reported al-Taqi, were privately "furious" that the Syrian regime was not doing more to restrain its Lebanese allies and for risking the delicate back-channel negotiations with Israel. The "moderate" camp had argued in the meeting for the importance of maintaining DAMASCUS 00000349 002 OF 002 the Golan track alive, reflecting Syria's "true" national interests, rather than alienating the Turks and others over Lebanon, noted al-Taqi. ¶5. (S) On the other side of the debate, VP Shara criticized the GOL's confrontation of key Hizballah interests (including rhetoric questioning the legitimacy of Hizballah's arms). He praised Hizballah's restraint, noting that Nasrallah had ordered his troops to stop well short of a coup. While violence had escalated out of control in some parts of the country, Hizballah soldiers had acted in a disciplined fashion, confiscated arms of rival militias and turned them over to the LAF, and shown respect for Lebanese citizens. This behavior stood in marked contrast to Mustaqbal militia behavior, which anecdotal evidence indicated had targeted civilians, resulted in the death of innocent Syrian laborers trying to leave Lebanon, and had imposed road-blocks on the Beirut-Damascus highway, Shara reportedly asserted. Shara and other officials reviewed efforts to supply pro-Syrian Druze and other militias and advocated Syrian press articles that justified Hizballah's actions. ¶6. (S) Al-Taqi said the meeting's conclusions reflected a mix of these points, with a recommendation for supporting Hizballah publicly and putting more pressure on Siniora's government to rescind its controversial decisions that prompted Hizballah's response. In the meantime, FM Muallem and others would try to reassure the Turks of Syria's desire to end violence and reach a political compromise. ¶7. (S) Al-Taqi said his schedule for the upcoming month would include travel for conferences to Qatar, Geneva, and possibly Ankara. These events would likely include opportunities for discussions with the Turks on the Golan (although he continued to deny that he his a principal mediator between Syrian and Turkey.) Al-Taqi expressed deep concern about the negative effects of Hizballah's operations on pro-Syrian Lebanese Christians and Sunnis and assessed Hizballah's military victory as a "political disaster" that could result in Lebanese election results that would diminish support for Hizballah's arms. In the meantime, al-Taqi advised the U.S. not to disappoint Syrian officials who had predicted more Western pressure. "Measured pressure can be good" under the current circumstances, so long as it left room for negotiations with Israel and Turkey, he said. Sighing deeply, al-Taki expressed fear that the biggest danger in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region was the collapse of a viable negotiating process. "Zero-sum thinking leads to zero-sum outcomes," he observed. Returning to the subject of U.S. pressure, al-Taqi thought that more targeted designations would be effective in stigmatizing unpopular regime insiders without punishing the Syrian people. ¶8. (S) Comment: Al-Taqi's call for U.S. pressure on Syria goes well beyond his normal outlook as a Syrian moderate. As Syria's best advocate of track II contacts, al-Taqi recapitulation of the High Policy Council meeting probably played up views held by SARG moderates such as FM Muallem. But the fact that he reported on an internal regime debate suggests that events in Lebanon pose a complex set of issues for the SARG to manage. Post is preparing septel an assessment of potential pressure points that might be effective in pushing the SARG toward more constructive behavior. CORBIN