SYRIA VIEWS LEBANON'S "INTERNAL CRISIS," STRESSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000330 SIPDIS PARIS FOR JORDAN; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV SY LE SUBJECT: SYRIA VIEWS LEBANON'S "INTERNAL CRISIS," STRESSES CONTINUATION OF TIES TO HIZBALLAH AND IRAN REF: A. ANKARA 903 ¶B. DAMASCUS 328 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (C) Summary: After public weekend consultations with Qatar, Bahrain, and Yemen (and private discussions with Turkey,) Syrian officials continue to frame the Lebanese crisis as a "domestic affair" that must be solved by internal dialog. Syria's low-level representation at the May 11 emergency Arab League ministerial in Cairo is being attributed to a death in FM Muallem's family, but privately sources say Syria was trying to dodge Egyptian and Saudi criticism and return Cairo's snub of Syria during the Arab League Summit here in March. Syrian media maintained a strident, pro-Hizballah message; Bashar took time May 9 to reaffirm Syria's intent to maintain close ties with Hizballah and Iran. Despite reports of many attempting to leave Lebanon, the Syrian street appeared relatively relaxed. Most Syrians are supportive of Syria's Lebanon policy to use time and Hizballah's strength to erode March 14's hold on power. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Bashar Views Lebanese Events as "Internal Affair" -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) While violence spread in Beirut on May 9, President Asad hosted Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifah. According to a press release of the meeting, the two leaders agreed "this crisis is a Lebanese domestic affair." Bashar's May 10 meeting with visiting Bahraini FM Sheikh Khaled echoed this message. May 9-10 meetings between Syrian PM Otri and his Yemini counterpart Ali Mohammad Mujawarand in Yemen reiterated the same theme. We have heard that Yemeni President Ali Abdel Saleh is promoting a plan for dialogue among Lebanese factions. We also understand Turkish PM Erdogan has been actively engaging SARG and Lebanese actor (Ref A). ¶3. (C) Al Hayat Bureau Chief Ibrahim Hamidi told us at a Euro-day reception on April 8 that bin-Khalifah would likely urge Syria to participate in a hastily organized Arab League ministerial called by the Egyptians. The death of FM Muallem's sister would likely preclude his attendance, and it was unclear whether Damascus would dispatch anyone from Damascus, he said. Asad and other Syrian officials were unlikely to see the Arab League meeting as a problem for Syria or Syrian interests in Lebanon, Hamidi assessed. Whatever criticism that was likely to come out of Cairo would be blunted by continuing divisions within the Arab fold over Lebanon's political conflict. For now, the Syrian government would likely continue efforts to maintain international focus on internal Lebanese problems. Hamidi suggested that Syrian officials believed events in Lebanon had strengthened their hand and again vindicated Bashar's decision to remain committed to his alliance with Iran and Hizballah. ¶4. (C) Orient Center Director and informal MFA advisor Samir al-Taki told us at the same reception that the prevailing SARG view was that March 14 leaders had committed a serious mistake by openly challenging Hizballah over the Beirut airport and secret phone lines. There were divisions, however, over whether to urge Hizballah to take control of the government. When pushed, Hizballah had acted decisively, observed al-Taqi. Syria would be happy to see Hariri's stature diminished and the Lebanese Army unwilling to take on Hizballah's militia. Al-Taqi confirmed that Turkish PM Erdogan had spoken to President Asad. Thus far, Bashar appeared to be responding favorably to Erdogan's advice and was urging Hizballah not to usurp power, he noted. ¶5. (C) Syria's goal at the Arab League meeting and in its aftermath would be to deflect responsibility for the crisis onto Lebanese actors, predicted al-Taqi. As it has done in previous Arab League meetings on Lebanon, Syria expected harsh words from Saudi Arabia and Egypt but would rely on Qatar and other friends to avoid attribution of DAMASCUS 00000330 002 OF 003 responsibility for Lebanese events, he said. ¶6. (C) Al-Taqi was less sure about Syria's desired end-game. He said that many capitals might be convinced that PM Siniora had overreached and triggered the crisis, but this view would hold only if Hizballah appeared willing de-escalate and pursue a political solution. Al-Taqi said his own view was that, so long as Syria appeared supportive of restoring stability, it stood a better chance of avoiding international action against it. However, there were voices in the Syrian government advocating a more aggressive approach to demand a new Lebanese government. The correlation of forces on the ground in Lebanon heavily favored Hizballah, but Hizballah's domination could weaken Syria's Sunni and Christian allies, al-Taqi argued. At the same time, Syria's desire for better relations with Turkey meant that Bashar could not ignore Turkish calls for applying restraint on Syria's allies in Lebanon. This meant that Syria would likely continue to support a national Lebanese dialogue as the preferred mechanism of reaching a consensus solution, al-Taqi predicted. -------------- -------------- Damascus-Beirut Border Crossing Open Mainly to Foot Traffic -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Poloff and RSO FSN traveled to the main border Syrian/Lebanese border crossing (Jidehdeh/Masanaa) on the morning of May 11. They observed heavy foot traffic of some 300 Syrian workers returning to Syria, according to Syrian border officials. Several hundred thousand Syrian laborers work in Lebanon, but the high volume of travel out of Lebanon coupled with the lack of movement by this highly mobile demographic into Lebanon was unusual. We spotted no traffic, pedestrian or vehicular, heading into Lebanon from Syria. ¶8. (C) Several returning Syrians reported that they were required to pay a fee to what they described as a "Hariri militia" checkpoint in Masannaa, Lebanon before being allowed cross. PolOff counted no more than a half-dozen BMWs and Mercedes bearing Lebanese license plates making their way through the border checkpoint and into Syria. Meanwhile, dozens of Syrian coaches, micro busses and taxis were staged on the Syrian side of the border to ferry the pedestrian traffic (for a fee) to Damascus and beyond (some Syrians reported they were trying to make their way to Aleppo). These vehicles quickly filled, departed and were replaced by returning commercial transport vehicles. -------------- Syrian Streets Remarkably Calm -------------- ¶9. (C) While the Syrian-Lebanese border areas reported growing numbers of people trying to enter Syria from Lebanon, Damascus itself was calm over the weekend. Shop keepers in the Old City area did a brisk tourist business, and a few vendors well-known to the Embassy told us the current situation was unlike July and August 2006, when there was palpable anxiety about the possibility of a wider war involving Syria. The average Syrian, one shop owner told us, remain fixated about recent government policies to reduce fuel oil prices and rising food and living costs. Syrians, said another source, had some memory of Lebanon's civil war and were not likely to worry deeply as long as the unrest "stayed over there." ¶9. (C) One exception to this general sentiment was a news report of an attack against a bus ferrying Syrian workers returning from Lebanon. According to the unconfirmed report, the attack killed four passengers and injured a dozen others. In conversations with various contacts here, the prevailing conclusion was that the rumors of the attack reflected fears of retaliation on Syrians by Lebanese Sunni militias. ¶10. (C) Comment: A day after the Arab League's emergency meeting, the SARG is seeking to deflect international DAMASCUS 00000330 003 OF 003 criticism of its role in Lebanon. In Syrian eyes, Hizballah acted in a measured way to protect its key equities without sending the country over the brink. Despite a push by hard-liners to maximize and consolidate Hizballah's gains, it appears that the Syrian leadership has decided (for the moment at least) that further escalation or a full Hizballah takeover would cross the threshold of international patience and expose Syria to condemnation. While that mind-set could easily change, especially if events on the ground get out of control, Turkish calls for restraint appear to have resonated. CORBIN