HAMAS LEADER KHALED MESHAL'S APRIL 21 PRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000270 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018 TAGS: KPAL PREL PGOV SY SUBJECT: HAMAS LEADER KHALED MESHAL'S APRIL 21 PRESS CONFERENCE Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, Embassy Damascus, Reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Khaled Meshal's April 21 press conference showed some moderation in its lack of criticism of Abu Mazen but gave almost nothing publicly on the Carter visit. Sources say Hamas may be discussing steps to follow up on the Carter visit. End Summary. ¶2. (C) During a 50-minute press conference on April 21, Hamas Political Office Director Khaled Meshal lauded former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's trip to the region and Carter's willingness to meet with Hamas in Jerusalem, Cairo, and Damascus. Meshal's use of the Syrian Ministry of Information as the venue for this press conference signaled the SARG's endorsement of Hamas's message, even though a last minute decision by Syrian officials to withhold a live broadcast from Syrian TV suggested some uncertainty about what might result. Instead of Meshal, Syrians were treated to footage from Carter's press conference in Jerusalem which had occurred earlier in the afternoon. ¶3. (C) The main substance of Meshal's statement -- Hamas would accept an agreement that established a Palestinian state on June 4, 1967 lines, with Jerusalem as its capital, "but without recognizing Israel," all subject to ratification by a Palestinian referendum -- represented a Syrian-approved gesture to a two-state solution, according to contacts here. In subsequent remarks, Meshal suggested Hamas would support a ten-year truce (hudna) between the Palestinian state and Israel "as proof of recognition" of Israel. These remarks provided a subtle "clarification" to Carter's earlier claim that Hamas was willing to accept a two-state solution and recognize Israel. Meshal also said that Hamas still insisted on a "right of return." According to Khaled Oweiss, a Reuters Correspondent who covered Carter's visit and the Meshal press conference, the "unmistakable message" of Meshal's public remarks was that Syria and Hamas were backing away from criticizing Abu Mazen. At the same time, Meshal's statements signaled that he wants more collaboration with the PA as negotiations with Israel proceed, Oweiss said. ¶4. (C) Mohammed Musli, an American academic who visits Damascus periodically and meets with SARG and Hamas officials, told us (while the Meshal press conference was playing in the background) that Carter's visit to Damascus had achieved little progress on substantive issues. But Carter's meetings had indirectly helped to moderate internal Hamas deliberations and given Hamas an opportunity to project a more positive image. Carter's calls for unilateral gestures, such as the release of Shalit or a cessation of rocket attacks in Gaza, went nowhere, Musli confirmed. The Shalit issue was complicated by inner-Hamas politics between Gaza and Damascus, Meshal told Musli, and could not be resolved unless it occurred in the context of a prisoner exchange with Israel, currently being negotiated with the Egyptians. Hamas was in serious discussions about how to follow up the Carter visit with "additional positive steps," which included the possibility of agreeing to an Egyptian-brokered "calming" (tahdiya) in Gaza, according to Musli. ¶5. (C) European diplomatic contacts are citing Meshal's remarks as evidence of Carter's positive influence on Hamas. A Norwegian contact noted that U.S. pressure continued to keep EU policy on Hamas in check, but individual EU states were increasingly expressing interest in engaging Hamas. He characterized Carter's discussions as "encouraging" and argued the visit would open the door for others to talk to Hamas. A UK diplomat at the same meeting agreed, saying Meshal's remarks represented a significant departure from Hamas's previous criticism of Abu Mazen and its categorical rejection of a two-state solution. CORBIN