SYRIAN POLICY AFTER ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000263

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN POLICY AFTER ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT

Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, American Embassy Damascus, Reasons 1
.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: Following in the footsteps of President
al-Asad's relatively moderate rhetoric during the Arab League
Summit, Syrian diplomacy over the last month appears to be in
conflict avoidance mode, while hard-line policies on Lebanon
continue. On April 19, Asad confirmed to a meeting of the
Syrian Baath Party that Syria and Israel had exchanged
messages regarding the possibility of peace negotiations, and
sources are saying the SARG has urged Hizballah to delay any
retaliation operations against Israel for the assassination
of Hizballah's Imad Mugniyeh. SARG rhetoric regarding other
Arab countries is notably less hostile, and Asad appears to
be getting ready for a post-Summit swing through several
North African and Gulf countries. We have also seen
indications of Syria's desire to be seen as being
constructive on Iraq. End Summary

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Defusing Risk of War
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2. (C) Reacting to Hizballah promises of revenge for
Israel's alleged assassination of Imad Mugniyah and Israeli
counter-threats, almost all of our Syrian contacts questioned
us regularly about the likelihood of a regional conflict
during late March and the first ten days of April. Much of
this alarm stemmed from Israeli and other press reports about
Israeli military exercises and public threats of Israeli
retaliation against Hizballah. According to Orient Center
Director Samir al-Taqi, the Syrian leadership received
messages from Israel via the Turks claiming that Syria would
not be immune from any conflagration stemming from a
Hizballah attack on Israeli targets. While seasonal Israeli
and Syrian military exercises continued, says al-Taqi, Syria
quietly conveyed (through Ankara) to Israel its desire to
avoid conflict and advised its Hizballah and Iranian allies
that now would not be the right time to avenge Mugniyah.
Although there remains considerable pressure within Hizballah
to attack Israel, Hizballah SecGen Nasrallah and Iran's
leadership have agreed to wait, at least for the present,
reported al-Taqi.


3. (SBU) On April 19, President Asad told a gathering of
the Baath Party Central Committee that the Syrian government
had exchanged messages with Israel regarding the possibility
of peace negotiations. Asad reaffirmed Syria's desire for
comprehensive peace, stating that Israel was aware of what
Syria needed to begin talks.


4. (C) With the immediate prospect of a conflict apparently
less likely, the Syrian regime is now focused on managing
domestic challenges and "not making the external situation
worse," assessed Al Hayat Damascus Bureau Chief Ibrahim
Hamidi. Though Syria's positions on Lebanon, Palestinian
issues, and Iraq are unlikely to change significantly, the
government is adopting the type of rhetoric employed by
President al-Asad during the Arab League Summit, he said.
Hamidi said his recent conversations with Syrian officials
indicated a strong desire to appear more cooperative, without
changing the core substance of its policies. According to
Hamidi, Syrian thinking during and after the summit reflected
recognition that inter-Arab divisions were at the root of
regional tensions. As a result, most of the after-Summit
action items were focused on exploring rapprochement between
Syria and Egypt, and Syria and Saudi Arabia, the former
undertaken by the Algerians and the latter by the Kuwaitis.

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Ongoing Tensions with Iran and Hizballah
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5. (C) Still stung by the embarrassing assassination of
Imad Mugniyeh, Damascus is still trying to smooth over
ruffled relations with Iran and Hizballah, according to
al-Taqi. The Syrian government's prolonged delay in
releasing the results of its investigation of the
assassination also has created tensions, as the Iranians are
anxious to have the culprits (i.e., Israel) identified
publicly. Iranian FM Mottaki's attendance as an observer at
the Arab League Summit was not the high-level representation
Iran had in mind when the two countries had discussed Iranian
President Ahmedinejad's participation, but Mottaki had been
the only observer present in a room close by the private

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session among heads of government and state. Still,
according to Hamidi, Mottaki stirred controversy by publicly
condemning the Arab League's canned language on the return of
three former UAE islands seized by Iran in the 1970s.
According to al-Taqi, these incidents shed a spotlight on
tensions that continue to run through
Syrian-Iranian-Hizballah relations, allowing the world a
"momentary glimpse" of the day-to-day operations of Syria's
relations with Iran.


6. (C) At the same time, Syrian officials are quietly
hoping that Arab countries (especially Saudi Arabia and
Egypt),which had criticized Syria for its proximity to
Tehran, may be developing better relations with Iran,
according to Hamidi. "The Syrian regime believes it picked
the right side in this fight," and it may have concluded that
the U.S. is leaving the Iran issue to Israel, asserted
al-Taqi. If true, this situation could cause significant
problems for the Saudis and Egyptians, he said. Al-Taqi
suggested, however, that the SARG was trying to adopt a more
nuanced approach that would avoid provoking more
confrontation with key Sunni countries. "Bashar is committed
to his relationship with Iran" but now seems to grasp the
importance of good relations with the Arab world "like his
father cultivated," said al-Taqi.

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Appeasing the Saudis?
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7. (C) Though post-Summit responses from Cairo and Riyadh
have been prickly toward efforts to reconcile with Syria,
Syrian officials are saying they are doing their best to
avoid make the problem worse, assessed Ziad Haydar, a
well-connected al-Safir journalist. Haydar cited the SARG's
decision to forgo release of an ongoing investigation into
the assassination of Hizballah's Imad Mugniyeh, out of a
desire to avoid revealing the arrest of a Saudi suspect.
(Note: Other contacts are saying Syria's motive for the
delay is to extract a concession from the Saudis.) Another
example, according to Hamidi, was the SARG's decision to ban
the distribution of the Lebanese daily "al Diyar," a Lebanese
Syrian party publication printed in Syria, because of two
op-eds by editor in chief Charles Ayoub criticizing Saudi
policies in Lebanon. Reuters journalist Khaled Oweiss
concurred with this assessment, adding that the absence of
public remarks by Vice President Faruq al Shara'a was another
indicator that the SARG was attempting to muzzle officials
known for their hard line and anti-Saudi remarks.


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Bashar Planning Regional Travel?
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8. (C) Several media contacts have told us that President
Asad is planning trips to the Gulf and North Africa in the
coming months. Countries that sent heads of state
representation to Damascus (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Tunis, and
Algeria) would be likely be the priority stops, according to
Hamidi, who hastened to add that planning was still in the
preliminary stages. The pretext for these visits, according
to Hamidi, would be to follow up Arab League Summit
discussions.


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SARG May Pushing More Constructive Line on Iraq
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9. (C) Pointing to Syria's desire to host a session of the
Iraqi Neighbors' Border Security Working Group before the
April 22 ministerial neighbors' meeting in Kuwait, al-Taqi
argued that Syria was ready to work constructively on Iraq.
Both Charge and UK Ambassador heard Muallem's Office Director
say that FM Muallem was focused on a positive and
constructive approach on Iraq at the April 13-14 Border
Security Working Group hosted by Damascus.


10. (C) Ironically, mused al-Taqi, the U.S. and Syrian
governments have for the present ruled out expanded
cooperation on Iraq even though conditions were ripe.
Al-Taqi suggested that Syria sent a signal of its desire to
engage by hosting a March 29-April 1 meeting between the U.S.
NGO Search for Common Ground and a Syrian group of

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individuals close to the regime. Among other topics, al Taqi
said, the two sides agreed that U.S. and Syria share a mutual
interest in seeing a strong central Iraqi government capable
of maintaining stability. In this respect, Syria and the
U.S. have the same counter-terrorism goals, a shared desire
to avoid a confessional system of government in Iraq, and a
shared purpose in supporting Iraqi reconciliation. Not
least, Iraq is perhaps the most important country in the
region from the perspective of Syria's economy, insisted
economic consultant Samir Sayfan, another Syrian who
participated in talks with the Common Ground group. Al-Taqi
and other Syrian participants reported the discussions
reflected recognition by both sides that improved bilateral
relations would require near-term steps in order to increase
the prospects for more meaningful engagement.


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No Signs of Cooperation on Lebanon
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11. (C) Al-Taqi asserted that the lack of progress in
Lebanon was the primary obstacle to better U.S.-Syrian
relations. President al-Asad had offered during the Arab
League Summit the idea that Syria was not prepared to
intervene in Lebanon to influence Hizballah after so many
countries had called on Syria to cease its intervention.
Taking a slightly different tack, FM Muallim said quite
candidly during a lunch with EU ambassadors after the Arab
League Summit that either the Lebanese factions would have to
come to agreement or rapprochement would have to occur
between Syria and Saudi Arabia. In the meantime, suggested
al-Taqi, Syria's tactics would aim to neutralize any Arab
efforts to pressure concessions from the March 8 minority.
Up to now, he observed, Syria's approach had succeeded in
avoiding an Arab League consensus in favor of electing a
Lebanese President without agreement on how to divide
government ministries. "For us, the significant cost of
attempting to influence Hizballah's position require
something in return," Hamidi told us. "The status quo may
not be ideal, but efforts to pressure Syria have failed," he
said.


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Recognition of the Costs?
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12. (C) At the same time, there appears to be some
recognition in the SARG that Syria's Lebanon policy may be
costing Syria a great deal. Sayfan argued that the Syrian
government had taken a minimalist approach to managing
Syria's economy and now faced widespread unhappiness as
Syrians began to feel the pinch of rising prices and the
possibility of lower subsidies for key items, such as diesel.
Being blamed for Hizballah's stand in Lebanon -- whether or
not Syria had the will and capability to shape it -- was a
major diplomatic liability as well, asserted al-Taqi.
Correcting Syria's policies would be more than just a matter
of Bashar ordering it, he maintained. The Syrian government,
according to al-Taqi and a growing number of other plugged-in
contacts, was preparing for a personnel shake-up that would
remove impediments to allowing Bashar to exercise greater
flexibility on Lebanon and other issues. A likely candidate
for replacement, added al-Taqi, would be the President's
brother-in-law Asif Shawkat, whose power was already on the
wane. Rumors of his "house arrest" were untrue, but Bashar
was nonetheless curtailing Shawkat's influence in order to
"shake the roots" of regime elements that had not served
Bashar or the country well, said al-Taqi.


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Palestinian Track Still Unclear
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13. (C) Several contacts have argued that the SARG
continues to look for openings to promote Hamas, but it
nonetheless does so in a way that is not openly seeking to
undermine the Palestinian Authority. According to Khaled
Oweiss, Syria is not unique among Arab countries in its
belief that Hamas and the Palestinian Authority need to
reconcile before there can be a viable Israeli-Palestinian
peace. President Asad has identified Syria as the keeper of
the Arab resistance flame, which requires a good deal of

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support for Hamas and other Palestinian groups with
headquarters here, observed Ziad Haydar separately.
Supporting Hamas also reflects the Alawite regime's desire to
find some common ground with the Sunni majority, according to
Ibrahim Hamidi. Syria's support of Hamas' dialogue with U.S.
interlocutors such as former President Carter promotes these
equities, and demonstrates that U.S. attempts to bypass Syria
will fail, argue many Syrians.


14. (C) Comment: More confident that U.S. efforts to
isolate Syria are waning and the West will eventually engage
Damascus out of a desire for a solution in Lebanon and the
Palestinian track, Bashar's post-Arab League policies are
markedly less confrontational than before. Bashar will
likely seek to use post-Summit visits to the Gulf and North
Africa as a way to highlight Syria's desire to play a
constructive regional role. Despite this more "moderate"
approach, we have seen very little evidence to indicate that
Bashar is willing to consider concessions on Lebanon or the
Palestinian track that would represent a tangible step in the
right direction. For now the conflict-averse Syrian regime
appears content to wait out the situation in the Middle East.


CORBIN