DID ANNAPOLIS PRODUCE A SHIFT IN SYRIAN POLICY?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000020 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: DID ANNAPOLIS PRODUCE A SHIFT IN SYRIAN POLICY? REF: A. DAMASCUS 002 ¶B. 07 DAMASCUS 1181 ¶C. 07 BAGHDAD 4085 DAMASCUS 00000020 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: CDA Todd Holmstrom, American Embassy Damascus, Reasons 1 .4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Many observers of Syrian foreign policy here assert the November 27-28 Annapolis Conference stimulated a favorable shift towards the West. While it is hard to ignore Syria's public declarations of interest in peace with Israel and its efforts to cultivate better relations with the U.S., France, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan, Syria's continuing ties to Iran and its current approach to Lebanon argue against any meaningful changes in Syria's policy orientation. End Summary -------------- "Annapolis Changed Things" -------------- ¶2. (C) Local observers of Syrian foreign policy who placed side bets on whether Syria would send a representative to the Annapolis Conference told us in early December that Syria had benefited immensely from D/FM Faisal Miqdad's trip to Annapolis. According to Samir al-Taqi, foreign policy analyst and a confidant of FM Muallim, even VP Farouk Shara, who had opposed sending anyone to Annapolis, was in early December praising the conference and touting the opening it had provided Syria. Annapolis' real success, surmised al-Taqi, was that it undercut regime hard-liners such as Shara and opened the regime to debate on engagement. International Crisis Group analyst Peter Harling claimed "you'd have to be blind not to see a change in Syria's policy." He cited Syria's restraint of Hamas leaders in Syria and cooperation with France on Lebanon as solid evidence of Syria's serious desire to engage the West. ¶3. (C) In al-Taqi's view, expressed most recently at a December 29 dinner with visiting Codel Specter, the regime's internal deliberations over Annapolis occurred within the context of a notable shift towards pursuing better relations with its neighbors -- Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan. According to al-Taqi, relations with these countries provided immediate economic and political benefits, while Syria's ultimate aim is to leverage them to improve relations with the U.S., "if not with the current administration, then with the next." Al-Hayat journalist Ibrahim Hamidi cautioned us prior to Annapolis that the regime's foreign policy calculus typically ruled out substantive concessions, regardless of the potential gains. "Especially in Lebanon," Hamidi said. -------------- Turkey: Syria's Strategic Lifeline -------------- ¶4. (C) In al-Taqi's view, the glaring absence of any official Arab condemnation of Israel's September 6 military strike against Syria drove home to the SARG the importance of Turkey's support. Syria saw Turkey as a "strategic lifeline" and a necessary channel to the Israelis and the U.S., he said. Turkey treated Syria like a strategic partner, and "is holding out the prospect of investment and trade," while quietly steering Syria toward more constructive behavior toward Lebanon, Europe, Israel, and the United States. Al-Taqi credited the Turks for lobbying Syria to attend Annapolis and encouraging France and the U.S. to engage Syrian FM Mouallim during and after the November 3 Istanbul Neighbors' Conference. Moreover, as President Asad told Codel Specter December 30, Turkey has brokered indirect discussions between Syria and Israel since May 2007 (ref A). ¶5. (C) The Turkish Embassy here claimed these indirect discussions were routed through PM Erdogan's office in Ankara with little involvement by Turkish diplomats here. But Turkish DCM Tolga Ungu said the direction of Turkish-Syrian relations was overwhelmingly positive. Ungu pointed to D/PM Dardari's early January visit to Ankara, during which Syria and Turkey committed to doubling their trade level from one billion to two billion USD in 2008. The two sides also initialed protocols on creating a joint oil exploration company, increasing air traffic and exploring ways to expand road and rail transportation, and cooperation on maritime affairs. A Syrian-Turkish Businessman's Council is planning DAMASCUS 00000020 002.2 OF 004 a large convention in Damascus in March or April 2008, and the GOT is reportedly considering the possibility that President Gul visit Damascus to kick off the inaugural session with President Asad, according to Ungu. -------------- Iraq: A Flood of Visits -------------- ¶6. (C) Local contacts have been impressed by the flurry of recent discussions between Syria and Iraq on implementing security, trade, and other MOUs since PM Maliki's August 19-22 visit to Damascus. Though there remain differing views about whether this engagement was Syrian-initiated and whether there has been real progress, Syrian and Iraqi contacts here report both sides are approaching the relationship seriously. Finance Minister Zabaida's November 28-29 visit to Damascus occasioned discussions by Syrian and Iraqi Ministry of Interior officials on border security, and Iraq committed to transfer 15 million USD to the SARG in support of Iraqi refugees (ref B.) On December 12-13, FM Zebari visited Damascus and reaffirmed Iraq's plan to repair the Kirkuk-Banyas oil pipeline and its readiness to support a gas pipeline linking the Akkas gas well-heads to Syria (ref C). He reportedly received assurances from Asad and others on Syria's commitment to Iraq's security and territorial integrity. D/PM Barham Saleh visited Damascus December 15-17, and, accompanied by Iraqi Minister of Interior Jawad Karim al-Bulan, he conducted intensive meetings on security, oil, trade liberalization, and restoring full diplomatic relations. ¶7. (C) The Syrians are showing "they are serious about security" and are positioning themselves to deal with whomever governs in Baghdad, opined Harling on Iraqi's recent high-level visits to Damascus. According to Hamidi, who interviewed Zebari and Muallim during the visit, the Syrian regime had been trying to organize a Zebari visit since early November, but he had "played hard to get," which the SARG attributed to U.S. influence. As a result, when Zebari agreed to come, Syrian officials saw the visit, and particularly his press remarks crediting Syria for cutting by half the flow of foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria, as a long-awaited "green light" from the U.S. for Iraqi engagement with Syria. One business contact described the series of Iraqi visits as "Syria's reward" from the U.S. for attending Annapolis. ¶8. (C) Al-Taqi characterized these views as a reflection of the regime's desire to promote better relations with the U.S. through its engagement with Baghdad. To that end, the SARG afforded Saleh the same level of protocol treatment it gave PM Maliki in August, according to al-Taqi and confirmed by Iraqi Embassy contacts here. The two sides reached agreement on re-activating a bilateral Syrian-Iraqi Committee to discuss implementation of agreements. The Committee is scheduled to meet in February 2008 in Damascus. In the meantime, both sides have agreed to continuing discussions on exchanging ambassadors. Though Syria's willingness to engage on security cooperation may still fall short of Iraqi desires, the "SARG is making an concerted effort to be responsive," commented Hamidi. -------------- Jordan: Trade and Diplomatic Imperatives -------------- ¶9. (C) Sources here say Annapolis provided favorable conditions for Jordan to press its bilateral agenda with Syria, and Syria responded favorably on a number of issues. King Abdullah's surprise November 18 trip to Damascus helped to expedite discussions on trade and other disputes and led to Syria's release of roughly 20 of the some 220 Jordanian prisoners in Syrian custody. According to al-Taqi, the King lobbied for Syria's attendance at Annapolis and hinted Jordan would organize meetings for Syria with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in exchange for Syria's cooperation in Lebanon and resolution of long-standing bilateral issues. ¶10. (C) "Access to Saudi Arabia and economic factors" were Syria's two major motives for pursuing better relations with Amman, says al-Taqi. Toward that end, FM Muallim traveled to Amman December 9 with a message from Asad to King Abdullah to DAMASCUS 00000020 003.2 OF 004 express Syria's interest in a mini-Arab summit with Saudi Arabia and Egypt (what the Muallim called "boosting Arab solidarity" in his public remarks) and reached agreement on the next meeting of the Jordan-Syria Higher Committee. VP Shara's December 11 public remarks on the dominance of pro-Syrian "forces on the ground" in Lebanon scuttled reconciliation with the Saudis, but the Syrian-Jordanian bilateral agenda moved forward. Syrian contacts point to Syrian PM Otri's trip to Amman to sign some 12 bilateral agreements with his Jordanian counterparts as a sign of the SARG's willingness to engage, even though prospects of a Jordanian-brokered mini-Arab summit to bring Syria back into the Sunni fold looked unlikely. Still, Reuters journalist Khalid Oweiss reminded us, Syria continues to withhold concessions on key issues, such as sharing information on terrorists wanted by Jordan and releasing the remainder of Jordanian prisoners in Syria. -------------- -------------- Iran: Basic Ties Solid, But Signs of Some Tensions -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Embassy contacts expressed a wide range of opinions on how Syrian-Iranian relations have faired since Annapolis, but the prevailing view is that nothing fundamental has changed. Noting ongoing bilateral tensions over Syria's desire for Iran to replace its ambassador to Syria, Harling suggested to us that Syria's decision to attend Annapolis signaled cracks in Syrian-Iranian relations that could be exploited over time. Long-time Embassy contact Ihsan Sanker told us January 7 he had attended a meeting two days earlier with Iranian FM Larajani, who met Syrian businessmen during his January 4-6 trip to Damascus. The Iranian FM reportedly expressed Iran's desire to protect core Syrian-Iranian interests and purse compromise in Lebanon. While Sankar assessed the Syrian-Iranian relationship as solid, he pointed to inherent tensions. "The Syrian regime sees its primary interest as preventing an anti-Syrian government in Beirut and believes empowering Hizballah and Aoun are the only means to this end." By contrast, Iran's interest in deflecting world attention on its nuclear program gave it reason to avert an extended Lebanese crisis. ¶12. (C) On the Golan, Sankar suggested Syria's "overriding desire to regain the Golan" ultimately conflicted with Iran's desire to maintain Hizballah's role in Lebanon. This potential conflict of interest was the main theme of a December 20 al-Hayat article by Hamidi, who told us he had toned down the theme of Syrian-Iranian tensions since Annapolis because of planned phone call by President Ahminajad to Asad the following day. Annapolis had "definitely strained the relationship," Hamidi continued, citing differences between Damascus and Tehran over whether Hamas should organize an opposition conference in Damascus or Tehran. Moreover, suggested Hamidi, it remained unclear whether Iran was using its influence with Hizballah to calm or prolong the standoff in Lebanon. Syria and Iran had proved adept at managing these tensions, claimed Hamidi, because they continue to share a common interest in maintaining Hizballah as a weapon against Israel. But some Syrian MFA officials had reportedly expressed private concerns that Hizballah and/or Aoun supporters might act preemptively against the majority government without consulting Damascus, Hamidi claimed. -------------- Lebanon: Always Looking for a Better Deal -------------- ¶13. (C) Just as our contacts wagered competing predictions about Annapolis, they also engaged in several rounds of speculation about the prospects of French-Syrian cooperation on Lebanon. Hamidi was one voice who predicted French mediation efforts would likely fail. "The French promised a lot, including a Sarkozy visit," and a commitment to promote Syria in the EU Mediterranean dialogue if France succeeded in mediating a successful election of the next Lebanese president, according to Hamidi and French diplomats here. Hamidi believed the West's inability to predict SARG's willingness to turn down these incentives reflects a misunderstanding of how Syria sees its equities in Lebanon. ¶14. (C) The prevailing view among Embassy contacts is Paris DAMASCUS 00000020 004.2 OF 004 failed to appreciate how far apart the Lebanese minority and majority positions were and "how little give" there was to Syria's position on key issues, such as Syria's sine qua non of preventing March 14 from usurping a dominate role in the next Lebanese Council of Ministers. "Annapolis made the regime more comfortable," according to Hamidi, because it has been able to promote its interests with neighboring countries and engage on Lebanon with France without "making any concessions" that would compromise the position of Syria's allies in Lebanon. ¶15. (C) Al-Taqi told us SARG decision-making was complicated by "deep divisions within the Syrian government," and that Syria's policy one day did not automatically continue to the next. Al-Taqi assessed France's approach as a major opportunity for Syria but said that hard-line elements within the government, vocalized by VP Shara, were able to divert even President Asad's plans to reach a compromise. In response to a question about what he believed Asad's objectives in Lebanon were, al-Taqi replied, "stability, and a better deal." The Syrian regime, he explained, thrived on bargaining and believed it could improve its regional position through continuing to stay involved in the process without compromising its "cards," i.e., the position of Hizballah, Amal, and their Christian allies. Still, insisted al-Taqi, the Syrian regime saw no interest in allowing Lebanon to dissolve into political chaos. ¶16. (C) Another source with access to the Syrian MFA suggested the prevailing view within the Syrian regime was that negotiating with Israel required strong Syrian influence in Lebanon. Mohammed Musli, an Arab-American academic and periodic Embassy contact since the 1990s, claimed January 2 that Busra Kana Fani, Mouallim,s aide du camp, had told him Lebanon "is going badly." The fallout with the French was just the tip of the iceberg in terms of how bad things could get in the future, she had reported. Nasrallah, Musli said, would be speaking the same evening to define the blocking one-third as the Lebanese opposition's key issue: "There will be no President without a blocking one-third" Musli said, quoting his MFA source. (Note: Nasrallah echoed this message in his January 2 evening address on al Manar.) ¶17. (C) According to Musli, the Syrian regime appeared ready to "wait forever," and "pay any price," to protect the interests of its Lebanese allies. "It's worth it for them," he conveyed. Aoun and Hizballah saw eye-to-eye on holding out for a blocking one-third of the cabinet. In fact, continued Musli, Aoun was reportedly telling his aides (which the SARG was picking up in Damascus) that he would be happy to see the status quo continue for the next two years. Musli suggested the Syrian approach stopped short of actively fomenting violent upheaval in Lebanon. Though "some" in the Syrian regime "wouldn't mind" such an outcome, there were stronger voices against going to this extreme. Musli concluded, "Syria is ultimately concerned about negotiating from strength on the Golan." If Syria were to face an emboldened Lebanese government that challenged Hizballah, its ability to negotiate effectively with Israel would suffer, Musli explained. ¶18. (C) Comment: Syria's fickle interest in better relations with the U.S. and the West offers little if any evidence that Annapolis seriously tempted the Syrians away from Iran. Rather, Syria has adroitly used Annapolis to chip away at its isolation while waiting for more favorable conditions to engage the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and Europe. Internal SARG rivalries, the belief that time is on Syria's time, and the Syrian regime's penchant for endless bargaining make it difficult to predict where the regime will ultimately come down on Lebanon. In our view, Turkey's positive influence and the threat of intensified isolation by Europe and the Arab world offer the most viable sources of leverage over Syrian behavior. HOLMSTROM