DAMASCUS INTENT ON HOLDING ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000158

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: DAMASCUS INTENT ON HOLDING ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT

REF: DAMASCUS 156

Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin,
American Embassy Damascus, Reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: A little more than three weeks from the
appointed date, the SARG appears determined to proceed with
an Arab summit, even if only seven Arab head's of state
attend. Saudi and Egyptian pressure on other Arab countries
to downgrade the level of representation in the absence of
the election of a Lebanese president has registered concerns
here, but the Syrian regime shows no signs of granting
concessions on Lebanon that would facilitate this outcome.
Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa raised the
possibility of postponing the summit during his March 1 visit
to Damascus, but we understand Bashar flatly rejected that
idea. The SARG's ability to play the U.S.S. Cole deployment
and Israel's Gaza incursions as "threats to the Arab nation"
appear to have strengthened its resolve. In the end,
Bashar's desire for photo ops in Damascus with even a few
Arab leaders and his emotional claim to lead "Arab
resistance" may be driving the SARG's position to carry on
with the summit. End Summary


2. (C) Embassy sources are indicating almost unanimously
that the Syrian regime has gone into crisis management mode
in response to a number of recent events, including intense
diplomatic pressure from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the U.S.
regarding Lebanon; the rise in regional tensions resulting
from Imad Mugniyah's assassination and Hizballah threats of
reprisal; Israeli military operations in Gaza; and the
deployment of the U.S.S. Cole outside the territorial waters
of Lebanon. None of these events, including international
pressure to resolve Lebanon's presidential crisis, appears to
have altered Syria's determination to host the March 29-30
Arab League summit or make any concessions on Lebanon.


3. (C) International Crisis Group analyst Peter Harling
(protect) described what he perceived as the Syrian regime's
"battening down of the hatches" in response to U.S.,
European, and Arab pressure on Syria to yield ground on
Lebanon. Harling surmised that Bashar and regime insiders
viewed the Lebanese standoff as a existential struggle that
went well beyond the election of a consensus president.
Syrian leaders believed the outcome of the March 8-March 14
conflict had become a zero-sum struggle that would affect
Syrian interests for a long-time to come. Consequently,
Syria would continue to back Hizballah's tactical demand for
a blocking 1/3 of the Lebanese cabinet to protect any
possibility that the Lebanese government might act to disarm
Hizballah's militia. Hizballah's military capability, judged
Harling, represented Syria's primary interest in Lebanon, and
international attempts to force Syria to wield its influence
with Hizballah to make political progress would fail without
some indication of what Syria stood to gain.


4. (C) Samir al-Taqi, Director of the Orient Center and
informal MFA advisor, indicated that there was firm resolve
now within the Syrian government regarding Lebanon. Senior
regime leaders had repeatedly rebuffed FM Mouallem's
recommendations to demonstrate a SARG willingness to work for
a solution in Lebanon in order to attract more Arab support
for the Arab League Summit. Al-Taqi saw little possibility
that the SARG would yield to increasing international
pressure to elect a consensus Lebanese president in the
absence of clear guarantees protecting Hizballah's position.
Though the Mugniyah assassination had deeply embarrassed the
regime and led to tensions in relations with Iran and
Hizballah, at the end of the day, Syria had made up its mind
to hold firm on its Lebanon policy. That did not necessarily
mean, however, that Syria would automatically rule out
concessions on other files, such as Iraq, if there was a
possibility that doing so might reduce pressure.


5. (C) Although uncertain about who will attend, the Syrian
regime appears intent on going forward hosting the Arab
League summit, come what may. An Egyptian Embassy contact
relayed that Arab League Secretary General Moussa's March 1
visit had yielded no progress on Lebanon. Moussa reportedly
told Bashar that an Arab League Summit in the current context
of the Lebanon crisis and ongoing Israeli military operations
in Gaza would result in a divided meeting and be a bad
outcome for the Arab world. We understand Moussa proposed a
postponement of the summit pending resolution of the Lebanon
issue, which Bashar flatly rejected.


6. (C) Events in Gaza and the deployment of the U.S.S. Cole
have provided the SARG a favorite theme to beat, i.e. the
need for Pan-Arab unity in the face of external threats. The
Egyptian diplomat noted that "Moussa talked about Lebanon"
during his joint press conference with FM Moullem, while
Moullem "scored points by ridiculing the U.S. deployment of
the U.S.S. Cole at the same time that Israelis were
massacring Palestinian civilians in Gaza." Since the start
of the recent hostilities in Gaza, Syrian controlled media
has been focusing almost exclusively on the plight of the
Palestinians and devoted significant live television coverage
to a March 4 SARG sanctioned anti-Israeli protest which
occurred in downtown Damascus and attracted thousands; the
first large protest the SARG has arranged in over two years
(reftel).


7. (C) Saudi Ambassador Ahmed Qatani (protect) back from a
week's recall to Riyadh, told Charge March 5 that the King
had told him "there is nothing left for you to do in Syria,"
and had reassigned him to Doha "where there is work to be
done." Qatani said that he did not believe the SARG would
make any concessions on Lebanon although there was a small
chance they would try and get "some other Lebanese
representative" to take the Lebanon seat at the Summit.
Qatani said he doubted the SARG was smart enough to extend a
personal invitation to PM Siniora, which in his view might
place March 14 in a difficult position. Qatani said the
Syrians planned to go ahead "come what may" and although
there was "a small chance some breakthrough could be
achieved" in advance of the March 11 date for the postponed
Lebanese elections, he "very much doubted it." Qatani
debunked rumors of a Saudi-Egyptian effort to convene a
counter-summit, and blamed the situation in Gaza for making
efforts to minimize the Damascus summit more difficult.


8. (C) Media and diplomatic contacts assess that the SARG
estimates up to 11 Arab heads of state will attend the
summit, "and that will be plenty," according to as-Safir
reporter Ziad Haydar. According to Haydar, the SARG was
encouraged that Qatar may have blocked Saudi efforts to
achieve GCC consensus on boycotting the summit at the March 1
GCC ministerial. Sources here indicate the SARG is fairly
certain to gain head of state attendance from Mauritania,
Sudan, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Qatar, and Yemen. Although
the SARG is attempting to claim Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, and
Iraq will send heads of state, we believe SARG is sanguine
that representation may be lower from these states. SARG
understands Jordan will likely send a FM and assumes, as in
past years, Morocco and Oman will not be represented at the
head of state level.


9. (C) Charge spoke in recent days to both the South African
Ambassador here and the Brazilian Charge about their
countries possible attendance as observers at the Summit.
The South African said there was some interest in South
Africa in line with a proposed head of state visit to the
region and continuing South African efforts to attempt to
play some type of mediating role in Lebanon. When Charge
pointed out the negative image of South African attendance
with Lebanon represented at the summit by an empty chair, the
South African took the point but it was unclear what he was
recommending to his capital. The Brazilian expressed his
capital's irritation that South Africa had received the
Syrian invitation to the summit two weeks in advance of
Brazil. He noted there was no decision on attendance from
Brasilia, but thought there would be low-level attendance (as
the FM had visited the region and Syria so recently) if any.
Brazil had asked the Syrians for details on the extent of
their participation as observers, and had received a minimal
reply that suggested participation lower than at the Foreign
Minister level "was not worth the trip." He noted that
Brazil had chosen to not participate in the Riyadh summit
last year. We have no readout on Indian plans at this point.


10. (C) Comment: As a well-plugged in journalist here
emphasized to us recently, Bashar "cares about his image" and
even if it is only seven Arab leaders who make the trek to
Damascus, can't resist the thought of TV images of him
kissing arriving dignitaries at the foot of the stairs to
their aircraft at Damascus airport. And, despite the Saudi
efforts, the journalist went on, "how much embarrassment will
two days cause?" Unfortunately, events in Gaza have also
given a propaganda boost to Bashar's emotional tendency to
want to lead "the capital of Arab resistance," as he stated
at a recent event celebrating Damascus as the capital of Arab
culture, and he may even be preparing another "half-men"
speech a la his September 2006 blast with which to bash some
of the Arab leaders that boycott his summit and perhaps
achieve some resonance with the "Arab street." While there
remains a remote possibility of some last-minute (and
probably too late) Syrian initiative on Lebanon, we see no
inclination in that direction by the SARG here.
CORBIN