CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000130

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

S/CT FOR GAIL ROBERTSON; NEA/ELA FOR MONZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2018
TAGS: ASEC EFIN EIND EINV ETTC PGOV PTER SY
SUBJECT: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT

REF: STATE 6461

Classified By: A/DCM Todd Holmstrom for reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) In response to reftel, Post has determined there is
no/no critical infrastructure or key resources in Syria that
would have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United
States if destroyed, disrupted or exploited. Due to the
strained bilateral relationship, we do not engage the SARG on
its plan to assess and protect critical infrastructure or key
resources, if one even exists.


2. (C) Within Syria, the electrical power grid is the most
obviously vulnerable infrastructure, as greater Damascus
experiences frequent, year-round power outages and
peak-season power rationing. Local experts estimate that as
much as 35 percent of all Syrian electricity generated is
wasted due to antiquated distribution infrastructure and
illegal tapping into the grid.


3. (C) Key natural resources in Syria include water, oil and
natural gas. Although dry-season water rationing was
implemented decades ago, year-round water rationing was
introduced in 2006 and public water remains unavailable
between the hours of 6:00pm and 8:00am. Syria's petroleum
assets are the country's most valuable resource, although oil
production has declined from a peak 600,000 bpd in 1996-7 to
approximately 360,000 bpd in 2007. Several oil and gas
pipelines transit the country, and the Syrian portion of a
pipeline designed to bring Egyptian gas to Turkey through
Jordan and Syria is under construction. Although Post has
not assessed SARG measures to protect petroleum
infrastructure, local media recently reported SARG
frustration over its inability to prevent smugglers from
tapping into the primary diesel pipeline between Homs and
Damascus.
CORBIN