SENEGAL: MAURITANIA DEMARCHE DELIVERED

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAKAR 000943

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA; DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SG
SUBJECT: SENEGAL: MAURITANIA DEMARCHE DELIVERED

REF: A. BERNICAT - 6 AUG 2008 E-MAIL (NOTAL)

B. STATE 84915

Classified By: Ambassador Marcia Bernicat for reasons 1.4.(b & d).


1. (C) Following a brief discussion (ref A) regarding the
coup in Mauritania with Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade,
Ambassador Bernicat delivered the demarche contained in ref B
on August 11. Wade strongly doubted the utility of Senegal
issuing a public statement condemning the coup, claiming: a)
the Africa Union statement spoke for the individual members
states and provided sufficient condemnation (particularly in
the African context in which so many leaders have benefited
from coups),and b) doing so could hamper Senegal's continued
role to help broker a resolution within Mauritania. Wade
further noted that, as current head of the Organization of
Islamic Conference, he would have to temper any statement he
made, given the reticence of many in the Arab world to
publicly condemn the coup. He urged instead that all
concerned parties should now look for a way forward to
resolve the situation in Mauritania.


2. (C) Wade agreed it would be preferable to find a
resolution consistent with the Mauritanian constitution, but
thought the U.S. position, which he characterized as a
refusal to accept an election organized by coup leader
General Aziz precluded a peaceful option to resolving the
crisis. Wade claimed that Aziz, a proud nationalist whom he
knows well, would not allow Abdallahi to return to power, nor
was he likely to agree to let a multilateral organization
arrange elections. The real dilemma, Wade argued, was how to
break the continual cycle of coup d,etats in Mauritania. He
suggested the cycle will not be broken until Mauritania finds
a way to bind its three disparate ethnic groups and multitude
of "tribes" into a true national identity. Wade views the
latest coup in this larger context, even though it has
unseated an elected (though predictably ineffective in
Wade,s opinion) government, rather than a dictator. He was
optimistic that Aziz, discussions with the diplomatic
community and preservation of Mauritania's remaining
democratic institutions are indicators the coup leader is
searching to find a way to turn over power quickly and in a
constitutional manner.


3. (C) When pressed to suggest what a constitutional way
forward that did not include restoring the former government
to power, Wade contended that the next in line to succeed the
president, the current head of the national assembly and his
deputy, would not be sufficiently trusted to guide the
country to its next elections because both are
afro-Mauritanian and too closely associated with Abdallahi's
dictatorial predecessor. Wade suggested the Mauritanians
could benefit instead from giving tribal leaders a formal
voice in the government, such as by reformulating the Senate.
While acknowledging that this solution is not within the
bounds of the current constitution, he posited that doing so
could form the basis of a more durable national identity.


4. (C) Comment: President Wade made clear that his first
concern is the instability he is monitoring on both Senegal's
northern and southern borders and the role he can play to
broker a resolution in the case of Mauritania, and forestall
a coup (septel) in Guinea-Bissau. (FYI - Interior Minister
Tidiane Sy subsequently underlined these concerns during the
Ambassador's August 12 courtesy call.) Wade leaves Senegal
on August 14 for his annual holiday and physical check up in
Switzerland, but assured he would remain engaged on the
situations in both countries.
BERNICAT