HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION AND SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000818 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR AF/W, PM/WRA, DRL AND INR/AA HQ USAFRICOM FOR SCPO JOSEPH SEVERINO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KDEM HDP SG SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION AND SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS PROGRAMS IN SENEGAL AND GUINEA-BISSAU SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. A joint visit by State Department PM/WRA Program Manager Deborah Netland, AFRICOM Humanitarian Mine Action Manager Senior Chief Joseph Severino to Dakar, Senegal and (with Dakar demining watcher) Guinea-Bissau from 15-22 May shed valuable light on the progress in demining and arms and ordnance destruction and education in the southern Casamance region of Senegal and in neighboring Guinea-Bissau. After conferring with Handicap International (HI) Senegal, State Department PM/WRA Deborah Netland and post concur to place humanitarian mine action (HMA) funding for FY 08 under review. Should funds become available, USG funding to continue HI efforts in the Senegalese Casamance could continue to grow a local popular constituency that would be a basis for an eventual peace agreement. In Guinea-Bissau (GB),the USG end-state would be more realistic as achieving an impact-free status as opposed to completing capacity building. Unfortunately the GOGB does not have funds to keep deminers employed, therefore without continued financial support, capacity developed through DOS and DOD will deteriorate. With a commitment of no more than $1 million a year to sustain US developed operational capacity, GB could be completely free of ERW in as little as 5 years. SENEGAL -------------- ¶2. PM/WRA agreed to assist Senegal to clear mines and UXO (unexploded ordnance) in the southern Casamance region and to eliminate small personal stockpiles of small arms/light weapons (SA/LW). The destruction of currently known stockpiles was completed in July 2007, and planners anticipated that the Casamance would be mine-free by the end of FY08, assuming that the region would be safe enough to demine during this time. This has not turned out to be true, though. Funding is however uncertain and PM/WRA will place further Casamance HMA funding under review for FY ¶08. ¶3. Post strongly agrees with this review, because the simmering Casamance conflict that frequently comes to a boil since its outbreak in 1982 is part of a larger strategic sub-regional setting that includes frequent street-level discontent with lack of economic opportunity in northern Senegal, a minority dictatorship in the Gambia deeply involved for ethnic reasons in the Casamance rebellion, the failure of the state of Guinea-Bissau, and easy passage of terrorist suspects from neighboring Mauritania to Senegal, Gambia, and finally to Guinea-Bissau. Abandoned and buried munitions can be abused as IED (improvised explosive devices). The prevalence of cocaine trafficking through Guinea-Bissau could spread northward to the Casamance because the Senegalese state is weak there and instead in large parts it is controlled by rebels. American interests are strongly served in the region by providing a safe and environment and potential economic growth for local populations by demining and otherwise clearing hazardous areas so that peasants can return to cultivating their fields. GUINEA-BISSAU -------------- ¶4. Accompanied by Dakar demining officer Matt Dever, Netland and Severino visited former mine/UXO impacted sites to observe the benefits to local communities. Although the city of Bissau is now mine impact-free, it still has serious UXO contamination. The U.S. team visited impacted locations in Bissau and other parts of the country as well as ordnance disposal sites. Sites visited were: a. Illonde UXO site b. Plaque 1, Interramento, and two Paiol de Bra minefield sites c. Xime, a minefield and UXO site d. Buruntuma, Mines & UXO e. Cataba minefield f. Rossun UXO contamination and ordnance disposal site. Although the planned DOS end-state was completion of capacity building in FY08, this visit has determined that this is not a realistic approach to making Guinea-Bissau safe from all explosive remnants of war (ERW). It is unrealistic to expect the Government of Guinea-Bissau to provide the resources to sustain the required capacity without adequate donor support. With modest but realistic support to sustain the capacity developed through DOS and DOD resources, Guinea-Bissau could reasonably become free of ERW within 5 years. DAKAR 00000818 002 OF 003 ¶5. DoD Training. In 2007, through coordination with the National Mine Action Coordination Center (CAAMI),USAF training teams provided extensive and successful training in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD),battlefield clearance (BAC),first responder field medics and mine risk education (MRE). This resulted in the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) certification of seven EOD level 3, five EOD level 2 and nine EOD level 1 operators with the national NGO HUMAID. a. During a meeting with CAAMI, it was noted that a significant amount of demining equipment and medical supplies used during the DoD training has been held in the CAAMI compound since Dec 2007. The equipment is stored in two (2) DoD provided ISU 90 containers. Although a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by CAAMI that the equipment would be used to support operational demining in Guinea-Bissau, no action has yet been taken to distribute this equipment to the HUMAID and LUTCAM national operators. This equipment is mandatory for the DoD trained instructors to maintain their EOD level I, 2 and 3 IMAS certification. Severino will take follow-on action to resolve the situation in regards to the appropriate distribution of the DoD equipment. (SBU) b. Observations of the CAAMI organization during this visit make it clear that corruption and a lack of commitment in managing mine action activities hinder rather than support the efforts of operators to deal with legitimate priorities in the country. c. Although CAAMI leadership is corrupt, some of the mid-level staff appear to be sincere in their desire to obtain training that will improve their job skills. As a result of this expressed interest, SCPO Severino will explore possible DoD management training in areas such as operational planning, finance/budget, information technology (IT) support, etc. Severino made it clear to the Director of CAAMI that in order for AFRICOM to consider training support, a formal request from CAAMI that specifically details what training is required must be submitted through Embassy Dakar for consideration. ¶6. In-Country Operations. Two national NGOs HUMAID and LUTCAM and one international NGO, Cleared Ground, carry out operations in the country. Regrettably, donor support is limited and HUMAID, who has successfully conducted the majority of clearance over the years has run out of funds. LUTCAM operations continue only as a result of their partnership with Cleared Ground, which has been able to mobilize some donor funding. a. $200,000 in FY08 NADR-HD funds allocated for use in Guinea-Bissau was intended for local purchase of a cab and flatbed to support movement of the DoD Humanitarian Demining R&D MAXX mini-excavator. During this visit, however, the USG team found that Cleared Ground has already obtained other donor funding for a truck with crane and a trailer for the MAXX to support their demining and EOD operations in the country. Therefore, the $200,000 from PM/WRA will now enable HUMAID to start work again. b. Cleared Ground has agreed to partner with HUMAID so that both organizations can maximize operational resources and experienced personnel. This will also streamline the funding process by enabling PM/WRA to amend the existing CG grant, incorporating the HUMAID funding. ¶7. This funding and partnership fits neatly into American interests in Guinea-Bissau: sustainable development in Guinea-Bissau cannot occur without the maximum possible cultivation of land to produce cash crops. Although demining and UXO removal have freed up thousands of hectares of land to cultivate cashews, the country's most important crop, much remains to be done as demining NGOs work thoroughly from site to site across the country to make land available to peasants anxious to recommence tilling their land after decades of dangerous fallowness. As in Senegal, terrorists can procure UXO to refashion mines, missiles and bombs into IEDs that HUMAID and Cleared Ground would otherwise remove and destroy. SA/LW and MANPADS -------------- ¶8. PM/WRA-AFRICOM-Mission Dakar team discovered the existence of MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense System) in Guinea Bissau. CG stated that they are currently in military stockpiles, and that CG had already destroyed a few, and will provide identification information to PM/WRA forthwith. CG further indicated that it has strong reason to believe in the existence of more MANPADS that the DAKAR 00000818 003 OF 003 Guinea Bissau armed forces will turn over to CG for destruction. Netland asserted the high USG priority of MANPAD destruction and that PM/WRA will engage in more detailed discussions with CG on MANPAD destruction initiatives. ¶9. With continued USG funding, CG and HUMAID continue to destroy small arms and ammunition from military arms stores, including cluster bomb units (CBU) that contain cluster munitions housed inside. CONCLUSION -------------- ¶10. HUMAID and Cleared Ground are dedicated professionals whose commitment in a difficult physical and bureaucratic environment could translate into emergence of an impact-free country in less than 5 years. Financial resources to meet this goal are relatively modest and realistic. USG investment in the goals of achieving an impact-free Guinea-Bissau support the American objectives of sustainable development, denial to terrorists of explosive ordnance, and prevention of loss of civilian life and limb. USG investment in demining the Casamance to the extent possible is a strategic sub-regional US priority given the geopolitical interdependence of Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau: demining the Casamance increases a local popular constituency for a peace settlement because Casamancais will literally and figuratively reap the harvest of land they have not cultivated for significant periods of time. SMITH