GUINEA BISSAU:THE USG SHOULD RE-OPEN EMBASSY BISSAU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000416 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA, OBO, DS ACCRA FOR USAID/WA PARIS FOR POL D'ELIA AND DEA HOUSTON LAGOS FOR DEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018 TAGS: AMGT ABLD PGOV PREL PU SUBJECT: GUINEA BISSAU:THE USG SHOULD RE-OPEN EMBASSY BISSAU Classified By: Charge Jay T. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. This is an action request. See para 14. ¶2. (C) Summary. Prospects for achieving USG goals in Guinea-Bissau are problematic at best as long as the embassy in Bissau remains shuttered. Weak security, porous borders, poor governance, fragile democracy, and unchecked narcotics trafficking make the country a potential flashpoint for regional de-stabilization. The Government of Guinea-Bissau (GOGB) has repeatedly and emphatically requested the return of U.S. leadership to help them confront their problems. With years of relative stability after the 1998-9 civil war behind them and the specter of becoming a thoroughly corrupt narco-state ahead of them, now is the time for the United States to reengage and reopen the embassy. End Summary. USG NEEDS AN EMBASSY IN BISSAU -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In the FY 2010 MSP for Guinea-Bissau, the first ever done for that country, Post's plans to work toward goals of achieving peace and security, governing justly and democratically, and promoting economic growth and prosperity are all dependant upon achieving the highest priority goal: reopening the embassy. The first step proposed is moving the Guinea-Bissau Watcher position from Embassy Dakar to Bissau. Without permanent, on-the-ground presence, post is significantly limited in its abilities to achieve the goals in the MSP. For example, EUCOM and INL have expressed plans to contribute to the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) sponsored project in 2010 and both will require Post support in monitoring and managing contributions. The participation of both agencies is sorely needed, but Post may be unable to provide the necessary level of support from Dakar. POTENTIAL FAILED STATE THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Several factors come together in Guinea-Bissau to give it the potential to cause a disproportionately grave threat to stability and peace in West Africa relative to its size and population: a weak government that only rules with the permission of the armed forces; territory used periodically by separatist rebels from Senegal's Casamance region; poorly guarded munitions stocks which occasionally get pilfered; small arms and light weapons trafficking; a large yet unknown number of men under arms, including those who fought in the war for independence and have never been properly demobilized or surrendered their weapons; and the presence of al Qaida-trained terrorists and Hezbollah financiers. President Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira enjoys a close relationship with President Conte of Guinea and owns a house in Conakry, linking his fortunes closely with the neighboring country. Drug trafficking operations reportedly move fluidly between Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry depending on the level of vigilance at any given time. ¶5. (U) The weak economy is based almost exclusively on a single crop (cashews) and the irregularities in government policies and world markets result in almost annual food shortages. There is infrequent access to basic services such as water and electricity. The GOGB would not be able to pay civil service or military salaries without foreign donations. The justice system does not function. Police and public security forces cannot even afford fuel for the few vehicles that they have and there is no prison to house any criminals that they manage to capture and convict. Hospitals are scantily staffed by foreign doctors and are short of all basic medicines, technologies, and electricity. Schools are closed almost as much as they are open because teachers rarely receive salaries. High infant mortality, malaria, HIV/AIDS, malnutrition, and trafficking in children for forced begging plague the countryside. The UN Human Development Index places Guinea-Bissau just three spots from the bottom of 177 countries. GROWING ROLE AS HUB FOR NARCO-TRAFFICKING DAKAR 00000416 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶6. (U) All these problems alone are daunting enough, but in Guinea-Bissau they are merely backdrop for the entrenched cocaine trafficking and associated corruption that has seized the country. The massive influx of narco-dollars on one side and international community concern and donations on the other are significantly raising the profile of drug operations that stayed below the radar screen for many years. Tensions are rising, people are getting killed, and urban youths are becoming addicted to crack. ¶7. (C) Guinea-Bissau has an absorption capacity problem and may quickly become inundated with international support. Already, donors are concerned about coordination and implementation of assistance from the UN Peacebuilding Commission, EU Security Sector Reform, and UNODC counter-narcotics program, which are starting to filter in the same time as IMF post-conflict assistance and World Bank infrastructure projects are getting started. The few members of the GOGB that are still fighting drug trafficking, including the Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Defense ministers, tell us what they need more than U.S. financial aid is our presence. They say a U.S. Embassy in Bissau will send a message of confidence and stability. What they imply but will not say outright is that without a permanent U.S. presence and demonstration of strong support, Guinea-Bissau will never be able to confront the most dangerous of those corrupted by drug trafficking, the chiefs and deputies of the GB armed forces. While there are still elected officials with whom we can work, legislative elections scheduled for late 2008 could usher in a government whose campaigns have been fully financed by drug money. PROVIDING A DEMOCRATIC COUNTERBALANCE TO CHINA AND CUBA -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) The United States is virtually the only great power that does not have an embassy in Guinea-Bissau. In addition to the former colonial power, Portugal and regional neighbors Senegal and The Gambia, China, Russia, and France, as well as the European Commission, Brazil, Cuba, Nigeria, and Libya all have embassies in Bissau. Spain and Angola both opened embassies last year. Among these missions, little is being done to help politicians, political parties, and civil society understand the democratic process. Politics in Guinea-Bissau is governed almost solely by petty personal interests. ¶9. (C) China is one of the most active bilateral donors. It built the National Assembly, military staff and officer housing and has promised to build a government palace and a major hydro-electric dam with imported prison labor. China's influence has grown significantly in the past two years as these projects materialize. President Vieira visited Beijing in 2007 and China's Foreign Minister visited Bissau later the same year. In Guinea-Bissau, as other places, China does not require good governance or adherence to human rights norms as a condition of its assistance. Beijing only seeks access to the rich fishing waters, which it and others have heavily overfished, and Guinea-Bissau's support on its Taiwan policy. ¶10. (C) Cuba has historically close ties to Guinea-Bissau and many elites have studied there, including the Prime Minister. Cuba is active diplomatically and holds occasional anti-U.S. rallies to highlight specific policy grievances. It also supports health and development initiatives, including dispatching doctors throughout the country. OIL AND RADICAL ISLAM ON THE HORIZON -------------- ¶11. (U) Companies from several countries continue to search for commercially viable petroleum offshore and U.S. firm Occidental Petroleum is among them. If and when deposits are found, the USG will want a presence on the ground to support the increase in American visitors and have input as to how the government manages the windfall. ¶12. (C) Also looming is a changing demographic shift toward a DAKAR 00000416 003 OF 003 more radical form of Islam. Today, the country of about 1.5 million is roughly a third Muslim, but countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are pumping money into communities and tilting the balance. Contacts say they see more strict observance of Muslim customs, hear more radical messages on the radio, and see more Koranic schools and madrassas going up. The United States has a positive image in Guinea-Bissau and Post has made some efforts to reach out to the Muslim community in particular but without a permanent presence it is difficult to cultivate relationships in those communities. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶13. (C) Establishing a permanent U.S. presence in Guinea-Bissau would provide unparalleled opportunities for project management, engaging locals on discussions of U.S. policies, promotion of human rights, and U.S.-style democracy. It would allow Post to provide clearer and more frequent reporting about politics, security, and regional concerns. However, moving the Guinea-Bissau Watcher position to Bissau should only be the fist step toward re-opening the embassy. With full diplomatic and consular services restored the United States would enjoy the benefits of a grateful government: easy access to top leadership and openness to working toward and supporting U.S. goals on any number of issues. ¶14. (C) Action Request: Post requests a detailed timeline and budget for moving the Guinea-Bissau Watcher position to Bissau and re-opening the embassy. Post has received commitments from OBO and DS to re-open the embassy in Bissau and Post has communicated that intention to the GOGB but with no specific timeline. In preparation for the move, Post has opened an office in mixed commercial space and is in the process of hiring a second FSN to handle administrative issues. Visit Embassy Dakar's classified website at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar. SMITH