Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DAKAR163
2008-02-08 12:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:
GUINEA BISSAU:AL-QAIDA TERRORISTS NABBED
VZCZCXYZ0007 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHDK #0163/01 0391230 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 081230Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0007 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0266 RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0990 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0824 RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0442 RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0483 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 5046 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1102 RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 0732
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAKAR 000163
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA, INL/AAE, OBO AND DS
ACCRA FOR USAID/WA
PARIS FOR POL D'ELIA AND DEA HOUSTON
LAGOS FOR DEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: ASEC SNAR PGOV PREL TER MR FR PU
SUBJECT: GUINEA BISSAU:AL-QAIDA TERRORISTS NABBED
Classified By: Charge Jay T. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAKAR 000163
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA, INL/AAE, OBO AND DS
ACCRA FOR USAID/WA
PARIS FOR POL D'ELIA AND DEA HOUSTON
LAGOS FOR DEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: ASEC SNAR PGOV PREL TER MR FR PU
SUBJECT: GUINEA BISSAU:AL-QAIDA TERRORISTS NABBED
Classified By: Charge Jay T. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The Government of Guinea-Bissau cooperated with French
authorities to apprehend and extradite five Mauritanians, at
least two of whom admitted to being al-Qaida members wanted
in the December 24, 2007 murder of French tourists in
Mauritania. At least one of the men had previously lived in
Guinea-Bissau and the killers appear to have had a support
network in the country. The Judicial Police (JP) Chief
believes there may be a link to drug trafficking but lacks
proof. Without resources or support from the GOGB, the JP
will be unable to conduct further investigations related to
this case and will continue to be impotent in the face of
drug trafficking. Prime Minister Cabi requested a meeting
with EmbOffs to urge rapid action in reopening the embassy.
End Summary.
AL-QAIDA IN BISSAU
--------------
2. (U) On January 11, security and government officials
reacted quickly and effectively to a request by French
officials to arrest Mauritanian al-Qaida terrorists. The two
men apprehended in Bissau confessed to an attack on a family
of French tourists in Aleg, Mauritania that left four dead
and one seriously wounded. The attack led organizers to
cancel the annual Dakar rally, a race from Lisbon to Dakar
which pumps millions of tourism dollars into local economies.
A third suspect escaped and is suspected to be in Dakar.
The men confirmed they had trained at an Al-Qaida terrorist
camp.
3. (U) In addition to the two men involved in the Aleg
attack, three other Mauritanians were arrested in Bissau as
collaborators and on January 12 all five were extradited to
Mauritania. The three collaborators raised suspicion by
photographing French and Bissau-Guinean authorities during
and after the arrest.
4. (C) One of the men arrested in connection with the
killings, Sidi Ould Sid Na, alias Abou Jenden, threatened the
people of Guinea-Bissau in a dramatic rant as he boarded the
plane arranged specifically for the extradition. His promise
to make Guinea-Bissau pay for their treatment of a "soldier
of Allah" was captured by a local news crew and struck a
chord of fear into a nation that has never seen terrorist
activities. The threat was all the more chilling because it
was delivered in Bissau-Guinean Creole, a language not spoken
outside the country. JP Chief Lucinda Ahukarie confirmed to
Poloff that Sid Na had previously lived in Guinea-Bissau for
two years as a merchant. She did not have further
information about the type of commerce or other activities in
which he may have been involved during that time.
5. (U) French authorities controlled this operation from
tracking them to the hotel in Bissau to arranging their
extradition. The JP, which has jurisdiction over
transnational crime including terrorism and drug trafficking
does not have the resources to carry out these types of
operations on its own. The JP only possesses one vehicle
which functions only occasionally; they do not have any
communications equipment; or even basic office supplies.
Only in the past two months have a few computers, a camera,
desks and a printer been donated by the UN office in Bissau.
A generator was given by another donor, but the JP cannot
afford fuel to keep it going. The handcuffs used on the
Mauritanians were just donated by the United Kingdom in late
2007. JP officers do not receive overtime or danger pay and
their regular salaries are often many months delayed as are
those of all public officials. Moreover, JP officers do not
receive regular training and any officer that joined the
force after 1991 has never received any formal training of
any kind. JP Chief Ahukarie used her own money to buy food
for the men who worked 48 hours strait on the Mauritanian
case.
LINK TO DRUGS?
--------------
6. (C) Ahukarie believed at least one of the Mauritanians was
involved in drug trafficking but offered no further
information. The JP confiscated about 600 Euros, 300 US
dollars and two late-model Mitsubishi SUVs from the suspects.
She said they entered Guinea-Bissau by going overland from
Mauritania through Senegal and Gambia and planned to continue
through Guinea-Conakry to Mali.
7. (C) Former drug czar Aphonso Te told Poloff he was
concerned about the rise of drug trafficking and fundamental
Islam side-by-side in Guinea-Bissau. He said a significant
portion of the Fula tribe is converting to a more radical
form of Islam called Mohabitas thanks to activist mosques and
schools funded from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. He said Muslims
have much more influence in Guinea-Bissau now than they did
several years ago. He also noted most formal commerce is run
by Muslim foreign nationals, primarily Lebanese and
Mauritanians. Although he did not go so far as to link their
commercial activities to terrorist financing, he does suspect
many Lebanese business owners are involved in drug
trafficking.
PM LOOKS TO U.S. FOR HELP
--------------
8. (C) Prime Minister Martinho N'Dafa Cabi requested a
meeting with EmbOffs in Dakar on January 22 to express
concern over the al-Qaida link. Cabi reiterated that
Guinea-Bissau does not even have a high security prison;
police and border guards have no training or equipment; and
the overwhelming need for assistance on every level makes for
an enticing environment for transnational criminals or
terrorists. Cabi feared there would be insufficient security
for carnival festivities given Sid Na's threats of revenge.
He told Poloffs that the most important need of Guinea-Bissau
to confront all of these challenges is the return of the U.S.
Embassy to Bissau. He said not only is the U.S. presence
needed in the long term to strengthen bi-lateral cooperation,
but it is also needed in the immediate term to take away the
psychological edge traffickers and would-be terrorists have
in the current environment of lawlessness.
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST
--------------
9. (C) The efficiency with which the arrest and extradition
were carried out is a testament to the GOGB's willingness to
cooperate with friendly nations. However, this case also
showed that without French intervention, the JP would have
had no way of knowing the terrorists had entered Bissau and
in any event would have been incapable of capturing them on
their own. While the GOGB is chronically broke and unable to
provide even the basic necessities to government agencies
across the board, the JP seems particularly hard hit given
the international outcry on drug trafficking. Most ministers
drive around in new SUVs while JP investigators ride the bus.
Ahukarie, who has been on the job less than one year, feels
set up to fail and the pressures of the job are clearly
getting to her. She appeared exhausted and at one point
broke down in tears while listing the basic items she lacked
to do her job.
10. (C) PM Cabi's plea to re-open the embassy was interesting
given he has never been shy about requesting training and
material assistance. His comments were earnest and probably
reflected a real fear that Guinea-Bissau is at the mercy of
terrorists. Currently, we provide no counter-terrorism
assistance to Guinea-Bissau.
Visit Embassy Dakar's classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar.
SMITH
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA, INL/AAE, OBO AND DS
ACCRA FOR USAID/WA
PARIS FOR POL D'ELIA AND DEA HOUSTON
LAGOS FOR DEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: ASEC SNAR PGOV PREL TER MR FR PU
SUBJECT: GUINEA BISSAU:AL-QAIDA TERRORISTS NABBED
Classified By: Charge Jay T. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The Government of Guinea-Bissau cooperated with French
authorities to apprehend and extradite five Mauritanians, at
least two of whom admitted to being al-Qaida members wanted
in the December 24, 2007 murder of French tourists in
Mauritania. At least one of the men had previously lived in
Guinea-Bissau and the killers appear to have had a support
network in the country. The Judicial Police (JP) Chief
believes there may be a link to drug trafficking but lacks
proof. Without resources or support from the GOGB, the JP
will be unable to conduct further investigations related to
this case and will continue to be impotent in the face of
drug trafficking. Prime Minister Cabi requested a meeting
with EmbOffs to urge rapid action in reopening the embassy.
End Summary.
AL-QAIDA IN BISSAU
--------------
2. (U) On January 11, security and government officials
reacted quickly and effectively to a request by French
officials to arrest Mauritanian al-Qaida terrorists. The two
men apprehended in Bissau confessed to an attack on a family
of French tourists in Aleg, Mauritania that left four dead
and one seriously wounded. The attack led organizers to
cancel the annual Dakar rally, a race from Lisbon to Dakar
which pumps millions of tourism dollars into local economies.
A third suspect escaped and is suspected to be in Dakar.
The men confirmed they had trained at an Al-Qaida terrorist
camp.
3. (U) In addition to the two men involved in the Aleg
attack, three other Mauritanians were arrested in Bissau as
collaborators and on January 12 all five were extradited to
Mauritania. The three collaborators raised suspicion by
photographing French and Bissau-Guinean authorities during
and after the arrest.
4. (C) One of the men arrested in connection with the
killings, Sidi Ould Sid Na, alias Abou Jenden, threatened the
people of Guinea-Bissau in a dramatic rant as he boarded the
plane arranged specifically for the extradition. His promise
to make Guinea-Bissau pay for their treatment of a "soldier
of Allah" was captured by a local news crew and struck a
chord of fear into a nation that has never seen terrorist
activities. The threat was all the more chilling because it
was delivered in Bissau-Guinean Creole, a language not spoken
outside the country. JP Chief Lucinda Ahukarie confirmed to
Poloff that Sid Na had previously lived in Guinea-Bissau for
two years as a merchant. She did not have further
information about the type of commerce or other activities in
which he may have been involved during that time.
5. (U) French authorities controlled this operation from
tracking them to the hotel in Bissau to arranging their
extradition. The JP, which has jurisdiction over
transnational crime including terrorism and drug trafficking
does not have the resources to carry out these types of
operations on its own. The JP only possesses one vehicle
which functions only occasionally; they do not have any
communications equipment; or even basic office supplies.
Only in the past two months have a few computers, a camera,
desks and a printer been donated by the UN office in Bissau.
A generator was given by another donor, but the JP cannot
afford fuel to keep it going. The handcuffs used on the
Mauritanians were just donated by the United Kingdom in late
2007. JP officers do not receive overtime or danger pay and
their regular salaries are often many months delayed as are
those of all public officials. Moreover, JP officers do not
receive regular training and any officer that joined the
force after 1991 has never received any formal training of
any kind. JP Chief Ahukarie used her own money to buy food
for the men who worked 48 hours strait on the Mauritanian
case.
LINK TO DRUGS?
--------------
6. (C) Ahukarie believed at least one of the Mauritanians was
involved in drug trafficking but offered no further
information. The JP confiscated about 600 Euros, 300 US
dollars and two late-model Mitsubishi SUVs from the suspects.
She said they entered Guinea-Bissau by going overland from
Mauritania through Senegal and Gambia and planned to continue
through Guinea-Conakry to Mali.
7. (C) Former drug czar Aphonso Te told Poloff he was
concerned about the rise of drug trafficking and fundamental
Islam side-by-side in Guinea-Bissau. He said a significant
portion of the Fula tribe is converting to a more radical
form of Islam called Mohabitas thanks to activist mosques and
schools funded from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. He said Muslims
have much more influence in Guinea-Bissau now than they did
several years ago. He also noted most formal commerce is run
by Muslim foreign nationals, primarily Lebanese and
Mauritanians. Although he did not go so far as to link their
commercial activities to terrorist financing, he does suspect
many Lebanese business owners are involved in drug
trafficking.
PM LOOKS TO U.S. FOR HELP
--------------
8. (C) Prime Minister Martinho N'Dafa Cabi requested a
meeting with EmbOffs in Dakar on January 22 to express
concern over the al-Qaida link. Cabi reiterated that
Guinea-Bissau does not even have a high security prison;
police and border guards have no training or equipment; and
the overwhelming need for assistance on every level makes for
an enticing environment for transnational criminals or
terrorists. Cabi feared there would be insufficient security
for carnival festivities given Sid Na's threats of revenge.
He told Poloffs that the most important need of Guinea-Bissau
to confront all of these challenges is the return of the U.S.
Embassy to Bissau. He said not only is the U.S. presence
needed in the long term to strengthen bi-lateral cooperation,
but it is also needed in the immediate term to take away the
psychological edge traffickers and would-be terrorists have
in the current environment of lawlessness.
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST
--------------
9. (C) The efficiency with which the arrest and extradition
were carried out is a testament to the GOGB's willingness to
cooperate with friendly nations. However, this case also
showed that without French intervention, the JP would have
had no way of knowing the terrorists had entered Bissau and
in any event would have been incapable of capturing them on
their own. While the GOGB is chronically broke and unable to
provide even the basic necessities to government agencies
across the board, the JP seems particularly hard hit given
the international outcry on drug trafficking. Most ministers
drive around in new SUVs while JP investigators ride the bus.
Ahukarie, who has been on the job less than one year, feels
set up to fail and the pressures of the job are clearly
getting to her. She appeared exhausted and at one point
broke down in tears while listing the basic items she lacked
to do her job.
10. (C) PM Cabi's plea to re-open the embassy was interesting
given he has never been shy about requesting training and
material assistance. His comments were earnest and probably
reflected a real fear that Guinea-Bissau is at the mercy of
terrorists. Currently, we provide no counter-terrorism
assistance to Guinea-Bissau.
Visit Embassy Dakar's classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar.
SMITH