Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DAKAR1365
2008-11-26 16:43:00
SECRET
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

GUINEA-BISSAU: DISSIDENT SOLDIERS ATTACK

Tags:  KOCI PGOV PREL PU XY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0577
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #1365/01 3311643
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261643Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1488
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1160
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 001365 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, PARIS FOR DEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018
TAGS: KOCI PGOV PREL PU XY
SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU: DISSIDENT SOLDIERS ATTACK
PRESIDENT'S HOME

REF: A. DAKAR 1357

B. DAKAR 1324

C. DAKAR 960

Classified By: DCM JAY T. SMITH FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 001365

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, PARIS FOR DEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018
TAGS: KOCI PGOV PREL PU XY
SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU: DISSIDENT SOLDIERS ATTACK
PRESIDENT'S HOME

REF: A. DAKAR 1357

B. DAKAR 1324

C. DAKAR 960

Classified By: DCM JAY T. SMITH FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In the early morning hours of November 23, at
least nine dissident soldiers fired on the private residence
of Bissau-Guinean President Joao Bernardo Vieira. Forces
loyal to Vieira returned fire, prompting a three-hour gun
battle. The President and his family were unharmed. Initial
reports suggest that former President Kumba Yala, exiled
former Navy Chief-of-Staff Bubo Na Tchuto, and former
Interior Minister Ernesto de Carvalho may have been the
masterminds of the attempted coup. Military leadership,s
role in the attack and the possibility of future violence
remain unclear. END SUMMARY.

--------------
FIREFIGHT AT THE PRESIDENT,S RESIDENCE
--------------


2. (C) At approximately 12:00 am on November 23, a group of
at least nine low-ranking dissident officers opened fire on
President Vieira,s private residence. According to the
Ministry of Interior, the mutineers were predominately from
the Balanta ethnic group, with loose ties to the Party for
Social Renewal (PRS),a pro-Balanta political party headed by
former President Kumba Yala. Over the course of the battle,
at least one person was killed and several injured, including
the Chief-of-Staff of President,s security detail. (Note:
Reports conflict as to whether the fatality was among the
President,s guards or among the mutineers.) The dissident
soldiers eventually fled when reinforcements finally arrived
at the scene, two hours after the fighting began.


3. (S) The reasons for the delayed arrival of reinforcements
remain unclear. Preliminary conversations with the United
Nations Secretary General,s Representative to Guinea-Bissau,
Shola Omoregie, suggested that Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff
General Tagme Na Wai could not be reached by telephone when
the fighting erupted, perhaps because he was ill. In the
afternoon of November 23, General Na Wai publicly dismissed
the possibility that the Armed Forces, himself included, were
more broadly involved, noting that if he had been involved,

the attempted coup would have been successful. COMMENT:
Whatever the cause, the two-hour delay in deploying
reinforcements suggests either incompetence, a tactical
hedging-of-bets, or at worst, complicity in the attack. The
armed force,s apparent lack of responsiveness and commitment
to protect the President has led Vieira and other observers,
including POLCOUNS who traveled to Bissau on November 24, to
conclude that perhaps the violence is not yet over. END
COMMENT.

--------------
THE AFTERMATH
--------------


4. (C) Later in the morning of November 23, Vieira opened his
residence to journalists and international observers, who
reported extensive damage to the master bedroom and bathroom.
The President,s vehicles, parked in front of the residence,
were also destroyed. According to media reports, spent shell
casings were present in the floor of the master bedroom,
suggesting that the insurgents penetrated the inner chambers
of the residence. In a telephone conversation with
Ambassador Bernicat on November 24, Vieira sounded troubled
and suggested that he had not yet left his damaged residence.
Omoregie later confirmed on November 24 that Vieira was
still being guarded at his residence and that the President
had not yet ventured out. In the evening of November 23,
Vieira addressed the country on national television, urging
residents to remain calm.


5. (C) By November 24, according to Ministry of Interior
sources, security forces had arrested six of the mutineers,
while at least four others, including the insurgent leader,
remained at large. Those arrested were being held at an
undisclosed military facility. Security forces closed the
borders in hopes of apprehending the remaining insurgents.
In a November 24 meeting with Attorney General Luis Manuel
Cabral, General Na Wai reportedly refused to hand the
detainees over to civilian authorities. Post has been unable
to confirm media reports linking the suspected leader of the
insurgents, navy sergeant Alexandre Tchama Yala, to Kumba
Yala.

--------------

DAKAR 00001365 002 OF 003


LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION
--------------


6. (SBU) On the afternoon of November 23, representatives
from all the Bissau-Guinean political parties, with the
notable exception of PRS, issued a joint statement condemning
the attack and pledging their support for President Vieira.
Representatives from the European Union, the African Union,
the Economic Community of West Africa, the West African
Economic and Monetary Union, the Community of Portuguese
Language Countries, and the United Nations all publicly
condemned the violence. Post joined the embassies of Canada
and Japan in a joint statement calling on all parties to
renounce violence. On the evening of November 23, in a show
of support for Vieira, thousands of Bissau residents took to
the streets to condemn the violence. Another mass
demonstration occurred November 25.

--------------
THE SUSPECTED MASTERMINDS
--------------


7. (C) According to Ministry of Interior sources, the
captured mutineers have all implicated three civilians as the
instigators of the attack: former President Kumba Yala,
exiled former Navy Chief-of-Staff Bubo Na Tchuto, and former
Interior Minister Ernesto de Carvalho. According to the
Ministry of Interior, on the evening of the attack, Yala was
at the home of Carvalho. Na Tchuto is believed to still be
residing in the Gambia, where he fled following what was
described as an attempted coup in August, 2008. (Ref C)


8. (C) In the run-up to the November 16 legislative
elections, Yala repeated accused Vieira of being
Guinea-Bissau,s principle drug trafficker and the single
greatest source of the problem of narcotics trafficking in
the country. In response, Vieira sued Yala in the local
courts for defamation. On November 21, hours after the
National Electoral Commission (CNE) announced the preliminary
results of the November 16 legislative elections, which saw
the African Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and
Cape Verde (PAIGC) capture a solid majority of 67 seats in
the 100-seat National Assembly, Yala attempted to drive from
Bissau to Dakar. Security officials stopped Yala at the
Senegalese border and prevented him from leaving, citing that
Yala was the defendant in an ongoing civil suit, and that he
was also under investigation for connections to narcotics
trafficking. Border officials confiscated Yala,s passport
and ordered his return to Bissau. PRS officials vigorously
protested the actions against their president and vowed a
firm response.


9. (C) On November 17, as the news of the landslide PAIGC
victory was emerging, Yala publicly declared that he would
not respect any election result that did not give PRS a
majority in the National Assembly. Yala claimed that votes
in the PRS strongholds in the north of the country were not
properly counted. Over 150 international election observers,
including a team of three EmbOffs, witnessed no serious
irregularities. (Ref. A) Sources indicated that Yala was
attempting to extort money from the international community,
offering to accept the election results in exchange for
payments. On November 19, Zubaida Rasul, Senior Political
Affairs Officer in the United Nations Peace-Building Support
Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS),confirmed that Omoregie
had met with Yala and that money was discussed.


10. (C) Carvalho, a member of the PRS, served as Minister of
Interior in 2006-2007 as part of the government of national
unity. He resigned amid charges of corruption, and was
implicated in a corruption scandal in Brazil. (Septel to
follow). Conventional wisdom on the streets of Bissau held
that Carvalho was heavily involved in narcotics trafficking.
Former Navy Chief-of-Staff Na Tchuto fled to the Gambia in
August following allegations of his involvement in an aborted
coup attempt. Na Tchuto, who enjoyed an opulent lifestyle,
also was a reputed leader of the narcotics trade in
Guinea-Bissau.


11. (S) COMMENT: Yala, Na Tchuto, and Carvalho have a long
history of criminal irresponsibility. Their status as the
usual suspects makes them easy targets as scapegoats.
However, it is equally plausible that their union, and that
of the military dissidents, represents a convergence of
mutual interests. Yala and Na Tchuto, both Balanta, can
readily appeal to a Balanta-dominated military weary of
PAIGC-backed security sector reform. (Ref. B) As evidenced
by his suspect conversion to Islam, Yala apparently longs to
return to the Presidency, while Na Tchuto and Carvalho

DAKAR 00001365 003 OF 003


plausibly would welcome a return to their lucrative positions
a top the narcotics trade.


12. (S) What remains, unclear, however, is the motivation of
General Na Wai, a Balanta leery of security sector reform,
and his commitment to protecting Vieira and the constitution.
It is difficult to believe that a handful of low-grade
officers thought they could assassinate Vieira and install a
new president, without the assurance that military
accomplices subsequently would seize control of the apparatus
of state power: the military, communications, transportation
and key government buildings. The possibility of broader
military involvement renders the two-hour delay in responding
to the attack suspicious. Furthermore, the possibility of
high-level military involvement increases the probability
that another coup attempt may be forthcoming. If violence
persists, it will be difficult not to conclude that Na Wai is
at least tacitly complicit. END COMMENT.
BERNICAT