BENIN: POLITICAL STATE OF THE NATION - NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COTONOU 000420 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/W MCC FOR JBLOOM PARIS FOR BKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD NSC FOR BPITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2018 TAGS: PGOV SOCI EFIN PINR KDEM BN SUBJECT: BENIN: POLITICAL STATE OF THE NATION - NATIONAL MEDIATOR'S VIEW REF: A. COTONOU 417 ¶B. COTONOU 408 ¶C. COTONOU 348 ¶D. COTONOU 201 COTONOU 00000420 001.4 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Gayleatha Brown. Reasons: 1.4 (b&d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The uncertain legitimacy and role of Benin's Presidential Mediation Entity (OPM) headed by National Mediator, Albert Tevoedjre, is indicative of the political quagmire that engulfs the administration of reform-minded President Boni Yayi. The latter is beset on one hand by the intrigues primarily of opposition party members in the National Assembly that block action on Government of Benin (GOB) proposed legislation, including that to create the National Mediator position, and on the other by rising fuel and food prices to his electoral base. At the President's request, Tevoedjre has presented a series of analyses and recommendations since late 2007 on the country's socio-political situation, proposing bold actions several of which Yayi has accepted. Tevoedjre shared with the Ambassador his views on the best way forward. End summary. ¶2. (C) Background: The National Mediator's role is akin to an Ombudsman in the US system. It was initially created as an independent body that the Constitutional Court ruled illegal and unconstitutional (Ref A). In reply, the GOB issued another decree establishing the position in the Presidency. However, this requires National Assembly endorsement, something that Yayi's opponents - joined by Deputies associated with the President's FCBE party - have successfully blocked. National Mediator Albert Tevoedjre is an elder statesman. He seemed an ideal choice for the new position and has worked tirelessly to mediate the political sparring between Yayi and opposition party leaders that has imperiled pro-Yayi National Assembly President Nago's tenure. Both Teveodjre and Nago expected FCBE to renegotiate a majority in the parliament shortly. That majority has not yet materialized, and the deadlock continues. End background. ¶3. (C) Mr. Albert Tevoedjre understood in a July 8 meeting the Ambassador's rationale for postponing signing of an agreement of understanding between the National Mediator's office and MCA-Benin pending clarity of the National Mediator position's role and constitutionality. He explained that a second GOB decree addressed the Constitutional Court's objections and awaited National Assembly action. //GENESIS OF POLITICAL STALEMATE// ¶4. (C) Tevoedjre reported to President Yayi that since the March 12, 2008 declaration by four opposition parties (MADEP, PSD, PRD, and RB) (Ref D),political tensions were at levels unprecedented since Yayi's assumption of power in March 2006 (with no end in sight). He urgently initiated dialogue with the "principal protagonists of this situation" and members of NGOs and civil society to solicit their views on the roots of the "malaise" and to find solutions. Over a period of two weeks, Tevoedjre consulted with Idji Kolawole (MADEP),former president Nicephore Soglo (RB),Emmanuel Golou (PSD),Lazare Sehoueto (Force Cle),Issa Salifou (G-13) and Sports Minister Galiou Soglo (estranged son of Soglo). He also met with FCBE members Deputy Mama Chabi Sika and National Assembly President Mathurin Nago, former president Derlin Zinsou and Stanislas Kpognon. A scheduled meeting with MADEP leader Sefou Fagbohoun fell through. ¶5. (C) Tevoedjre called attention to the March 12 declaration's five major points of contention with Yayi: - non-respect of a March 2006 agreement with various parties between the two presidential electoral rounds. Soglo, Kolawole, Golou and Sehoueto contend that Yayi's election victory was in large part due to their support - media use only to promote the "High authority" (read Yayi) - targeting of certain political figures, notably Sefou COTONOU 00000420 002.4 OF 004 Fagbohoun, who had remained in jail for a long time with no action on the case - encroachment on political "zones" widely understood to be the preserves of the Group of 13 Deputies in the National Assembly (G-13),(i.e., Parakou (Salifou) and Cotonou (Soglo)),and - blocking local municipality control over finances and attempting to discredit local councils in the eyes of the electorate. //TREVOEDJRE'S OBSERVATIONS// ¶6. (C) One of Tevoedjre's reports noted the people's aversion to anything that runs counter to the spirit of the (1990) National Conference (that switched government from Marxist-Leninism to democracy) and cited the following observations: - Yayi's reforms are necessary for the country's future as evidenced by progress in several sectors and for which the people are most grateful. These include: education, health, clean-up of public finance, extending new infrastructure such as roads and schools to all parts of the country, and micro-finance on soft terms. - Soglo's international radio broadcast on RFI and other related broadcasts in Africa damaged the country's reputation as a democracy, one of Benin's principal assets, precipitating requests for explanation from GOB embassies in western countries. He urged the President to stop fighting with Soglo. - Yayi's public image could be better handled with less attention on his person and more on productive action. Presidential engagement with the media should be responsible, based on analysis and critical intelligence, fortified with examples and viable statistics. - Refrain from references to the "old political class," which tends to set up conflict between two generation of political leaders (citing Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle who at advanced ages made substantial contributions in their countries). - Even if the population supports Yayi reforms, it does not understand the tone and style of the implementation of certain decisions. Confrontational practices only generate tension. //RECOMMENDATIONS TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS// ¶7. (C) Tevoedjre made the following recommendations: - Undertake dialogue with the political opponents, especially Soglo. - Open management of some parliamentary business to principal "personalities" regardless of their parties (i.e., reports, investigations, studies). - Seek the support of religious and spiritual communities, major political and civil society leaders, and - Make a speech calling for unity. //HOW THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS PLAYED OUT// ¶8. (C) Tevoedjre decried the disorganization of the municipal elections that created a mess deplored by all. The announced results posed serious problems of credibility in certain regions for which he could only hope that the Supreme Court would take better action. To correct the dysfunctional election system, all political parties should insist on a permanent computerized electoral list and reorganization of CENA, the National Election Commission. Announcement of the election results coincided with the funeral for the widely-respected Cardinal Bernardin Gantin that tended to unite disparate elements in a period of ditente. Tevoedjre hoped that the then upcoming CEN-SAD Summit would have the same unifying affect (Ref C). COTONOU 00000420 003.4 OF 004 //EXPECTATIONS// ¶9. (C) Tevoedjre concluded from his consultations that there is room for compromise based on the necessity to promote a climate of detente and to take into consideration certain concerns and expectations. For example: - Yayi could thank former Chiefs of State and leaders of major political parties for supporting his decision to rename the Cotonou International Airport in the Cardinal's honor and take advantage of the more relaxed exchanges with Soglo. - Circumstances permitting, Yayi could take several other initiatives, including: -- launch the computerized electoral list and distribute voter cards that also serve as ID cards -- adopt and publish the decree applicable to the law related to opposition parties -- take decisive action on the Fagbohoun case -- pursue a preferential dialogue with President Emile Derlin Zinsou and establish a privileged relationship with his UNDP Party. Careful approaches to UNDP and MADEP, with Zinsou's support, could reap immediate political benefits. -- G-13 would be receptive to an approach that does not label it as part of the "opposition" but a particular wing of the presidential majority. Implementing this approach, in Tevoedjre's view, especially in Alibori, would calm things down as would including G-13 in the next government (the anticipated reshuffling of the cabinet to include opposition ministers). //OTHER PACIFYING INITIATIVES// ¶10. (C) Tevoedjre advised Yayi to: - announce a decision to open up to competent and experienced dignitaries and parliamentarians important assignments (special missions) such as preparing groundwork for important milestones (celebrations of 50 years of independence and 20 years since the National Conference, which coincide in 2010. Other such missions would be well received in Tevoedjre's view. - Firm public commitment on application of the decentralization law is awaited, notably by the RB (Soglo's party). With that, doors would open for cooperation with the RB on other dossiers and plans. One criticism heard more often is about weakness of the administration in general and the lack of progress on decentralization in particular. - It is time for an efficient administration. The law calls for 12 departments and 12 prefects and requisite services. Make those reforms on an urgent basis. Ministries need full staffing and efficient administrative services. The MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is a flagrant case (in point) and should be fixed. Now. - Yayi should follow this proposed course of action, announced in a solemn environment such as the National Assembly by the end of June 2008 (date suggested by Tevoedjre). Summarily, Tevoedjre said rapid action in key areas would not compromise Yayi's authority and pose no constraints on an open government, while integrating political figures chosen by their proper groups. These key action areas include: rapid movement on the Fagbohoun case, restarting stalled arrangements with President Zinsou, conciliatory approaches to Soglo on decentralization, and conferring state missions on various dignitaries (read political party leaders). These actions would avoid a dangerously unpredictable government of national unity that would require a common program and allow nominations over which Yayi would have no control. ¶11. (C) Comment: Tevoedjre's analysis and recommendations are sound, calling on Yayi to address lack of administrative capacity and weak leadership in the COTONOU 00000420 004.4 OF 004 ministries. To break the logjam in the National Assembly, Yayi has no choice but to negotiate with renegade Deputies from his coalition and those from opposition parties. Successful action along Tevoedjre's suggested lines would allow him to control the government while taking constructive action to maintain Benin's democracy on track. The trade-off is that he may be obliged to deal directly with suspect politicians such as Fagbohoun, widely considered to be corrupt and who now is out of jail and in the Parliament. Yayi's salvation and the success of his administration may remain largely with the Beninese people who in March 2006 gave him their support in the confrontation between a movement for position change versus those in the previous GOB governments tainted with mismanagement, corruption, and theft. Yayi's outreach to donors, including travel to the US for a July 15-21 visit (Ref B),is an attempt to shore-up his reformist policies and obtain emergency food assistance in the face of mounting political resistance at home. BROWN