REVISITING THE ELEMENTS OF INSTABILITY - AN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CONAKRY 000777 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC GV SUBJECT: REVISITING THE ELEMENTS OF INSTABILITY - AN ANALYSIS REF: A. CONAKRY 0287 ¶B. CONAKRY 0180 ¶C. CONAKRY 0182 Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF SHANNON CAZEAU FOR REASON 1.4 B AND D ¶1. (S) Guinea has been traversing a difficult political transition for more than two years now. The country's political situation is unstable and its future, uncertain. Over the past year, Embassy has periodically submitted analytical pieces assessing Guinea's ever-evolving political and social environment, and anticipating potential transition points (reftels). Since our last analysis in June, which was written just after the military mutiny in May, there have been several significant developments that suggest that we may quickly be approaching a critical transition point. -------------- CURRENT SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT -------------- ¶2. (SBU) PRESIDENT'S HEALTH - Embassy reporting indicates that President Conte's health has been in a relatively steady decline for several months. He was reportedly on the verge of death in September, but then recovered. He has been seen publicly, but did not attend Guinea's national celebration of 50 years of independence in early October, nor the military's 50th birthday celebration in early November. Rumors of the president's poor health and imminent death have peaked once again this week, sparking widespread speculation in the press and in the streets that a change of regime is just around the corner. ¶3. (SBU) RETURN OF THE OLD GUARD - Since the May appointment of the new prime minister, Ahmed Tidiane Souare, the Guinean Government has quietly, but steadily, been bringing presidential loyalists and "old guard" bureaucrats back into government. These loyalists include the Minister Secretary General of the presidency, Alpha Ibrahima Keira, a number of ministers, and many high-level civil servants throughout the government. Much of the population sees these appointments as proof that nothing has changed, and that the government of consensus they demanded in early 2007 essentially failed. ¶4. (S) ECONOMIC CRISIS - The Guinean Government appears to be in an increasingly dire economic crisis. There is no long-term budgetary planning in place, and the 2009 draft budget, which is supposed to go into effect January 1, was only recently turned over to the legislature for initial review. It includes a planned budget defict of 5%. Various societal sectors, including labor unions, the police, and the military, have made significant financial demands that the government has promised to meet in the near future. The biggest obligation is expected to come due at the end of January when the government must deliver on its promise to provide substantial salary increases to military personnel. The GoG has been focused on fulfilling the requirements to meet the HIPC completion point, in order to take advantage of some $2 billion in debt relief in the new year. Embassy has been increasingly concerned that the GoG does not intend to use this money in good faith, and may be counting on it to keep its budget from collapsing. There are rumors that newly printed cash will be dumped on the economy as a short-term fix. ¶5. (S) GROWING MILITARY POWER - The military seems to be the GoG's most powerful national institution. The State has been completely ineffective in restoring discipline among the rank and file soldiers, and essentially capitulates every time the military makes a new demand. Discussions with high-level government contacts suggest that the government is afraid of the military and is at a loss as to how to control it. Ethnic and generational differences within the military have left the organization deeply divided, creating at least three different factions competing for power and influence. We know that one of these groups is plotting a coup d'etat, and we expect that other groups may be doing so as well. The general consensus among both military and civilian contacts is that ultimately, the military will step in when the president is removed from power, either by force or as a result of his death. However, it is not clear who is in charge of the military, and there are signs of factionalism at all levels over ethnicity, rank, and connections to the regime. ¶6. (S) WEAKENING OF THE STATE - The Guinean State may be at its weakest point in history. Power is centralized in the president, but the president's illness and general absence from the political scene, means that the decision-making CONAKRY 00000777 002 OF 003 process is null. There are many actors maneuvering behind the scenes, but they are also fighting amongst themselves for power and money, so that no one individual is clearly in control. On a bilateral level, it is extremely difficult to work with the Guinean Government because individual ministers are fundamentally powerless to implement reforms, or to commit to cooperative efforts. The government lacks any long-term vision because no-one knows how long they are going to be in office. Widespread allegations of corrupt behavior suggest that many officials seem to simply be stuffing their pockets while they have an opportunity to do so. -------------- SCENARIOS -------------- ¶7. (S) In Reftel A, Embassy outlined a number of potential scenarios that could play out as the anticipated political transition continues to evolve. These scenarios remain relevant. ¶8. (S) Much of our diplomatic efforts focus on the importance of legislative elections. However, given the mounting socio-political pressures in the near-term, elections may end up being more of a long-term prospect. There are four likely scenarios with respect to elections: -- Credible legislative elections bring better government -- Credible legislative elections bring minimal change -- Fraudulent legislative elections bring more of the same -- GoG continues to postpone legislative elections. The steady return of old guard presidential loyalists and continued delays in organizing elections suggests that the first scenario may be difficult to achieve. ¶9. (S) The remaining scenarios focus on what may happen if elections do not take place, if the president dies while in office, and/or other elements force a political transition. They include: -- Death of the president sparks military take over -- Elements of the military successfully execute a coup d'etat -- Mounting civilian pressure forces president to resign -- Criminal elements influence events to favor continued criminal activity, especially narco-trafficking -------------- MILITARY INTERVENTION -------------- ¶10. (S) Available information and recent events suggest that Guinea may be approaching the first or second scenario. There is at least one group reportedly mobilized to implement a coup. If this group deems Conte's health to be genuinely in jeopardy, they may decide to wait him out and then take action immediately after his death, or conversely, they may decide to move more quickly in order to preempt a coup attempt by competing military factions. ¶11. (S) Either of these scenarios comes with a heightened potential for violence. The general sense in Guinea has been that if violence erupts, it is likely to be relatively short-lived, i.e. anywhere between a few days and a few months. We expect plenty of actors will try to manipulate the situation with ethnocentrism perhaps playing a major role. At the same time, the Guinean population seems generally weary of the country's continued political uncertainty, and ready for some stability so that things can begin to constructively move forward. Guineans also have a reputation of distaste for conflict. ¶12. (S) Should the military intervene and successfully restore order, civil society leaders are expected to push hard for a civilian transitional government leading to elections. If violence were to continue, civilians and military alike might begin to cut deals in order to avoid a protracted conflict, much as they did during the 2007 strike. Political manipulations based on ethnic ties have become increasingly potent tools in recent months, and it is likely that ethnicity would play a similar role as actors work to shape the transition period. Once the dust settles from any military intervention, Guineans would likely look to the international community and bilateral partners, especially the United States, to help them move forward. -------------- MORE OF THE SAME -------------- ¶13. (S) It is important to note that Guinea has been CONAKRY 00000777 003 OF 003 balancing on a precipice for some time now. The political situation is inherently volatile. We have seen escalation of tensions before that have quietly died down a few days later. We may be in yet another such period, but it is too early to tell. The scenarios we submitted in June are still relevant and provide a useful roadmap of the full range of possible situations that could develop. Embassy officers have repeatedly made clear that the USG would not support a military coup or other extra-legal measures to topple the government. Embassy continues to monitor the situation closely, and to prepare accordingly through Emergency Action Committee meetings. RASPOLIC