GENERAL CAMARA LOOKING TO GET SITUATION UNDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000308

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC GV
SUBJECT: GENERAL CAMARA LOOKING TO GET SITUATION UNDER
CONTROL

REF: A. A) CONAKRY 0047

B. B) CONAKRY 306

Classified By: A/DCM SHANNON CAZEAU FOR REASON 1.4 B AND D


1. SUMMARY. According to General Camara, certain elements
of the military are out of control, but he has a plan for
dealing with them. He blamed the situation on poor
communication and rumors, which enabled the "Bulletin Rouge"
to take on a life of its own. Focused and calm, Camara came
across as absolutely committed to restoring order within the
military, in a carefully measured way. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On June 19, Ambassador Carter met with the Chairman
of the Guinean Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Camara, who has
been serving as the defacto head of the military since the
dismissal of the Minister of Defense a few weeks ago. The
A/DCM, the DATT, and the RSO also attended the meeting.


3. (U) Ambassador Carter commended the general for his June
19 televised apology for recent events, stressing that it is
critical for the GoG to communicate with the population,
especially during times of political turmoil. Camara thanked
the Ambassador and then quickly looked for a pen and paper to
jot down notes when the Ambassador said "if you control the
message, you can control the problem."


4. (SBU) General Camara said he could not agree more. He
said that the whole issue with the Bulletin Rouge and the
payment of salary arrears (ref A) stems from poor
communication. The general pointed out that under Prime
Minister Kouyate, the GoG had set up a commission of 35
people to investigate the Bulletin Rouge in order to
determine once and for all whether it existed, and whether
any money was owed to soldiers. Camara stressed that the
commission worked for six months straight on the
investigation, but found that there was absolutely no
evidence supporting the existence of the Bulletin Rouge.


5. (SBU) According to Camara, the Bulletin Rouge took on a
life of its own precisely because of the lack of
communication. "People were obsessed with the money," he
said. Camara said that the GoG only worsened the situation
when Kouyate issued the public declaration stating that the
Bulletin Rouge did not exist, but offering a 2 million GnF
payment to each soldier in "good faith" in order to put the
issue to rest permanently. Camara said that President Conte
was against this decision, and reportedly said "if you give
them 1 franc for something that does not exist, they will
come back and ask for 10 more francs just as soon as they
finish spending what you gave them." Shaking his head,
Camara said this is exactly what happened.


6. (C) The General said that the GoG now has to find funds
to pay out the rest of the Bulletin Rouge, but that the funds
do not exist. He added that the GoG is looking to dialogue
with the different groups, including the military and the
police, in order to resolve the financial issues.


7. (C) In regards to the military mutiny and Claude Pivi
"Coplan," the self-identified leader of the mutineers,
General Camara agreed that certain elements of the military
are out of control. At one point, he referred to them as
"bandits." He also mentioned that he had just finished
meeting with Coplan before the Ambassador's arrival. When
asked about the meeting, Camara said that he has "a plan for
dealing with the situation." He said he is creating mixed
force brigades (i.e. army, AIR force, navy, etc.) to patrol
various districts in Conakry and arrest any rogue military
elements, although he did not refer directly to Coplan.


8. (SBU) When asked whether he had any plans as to how to
manage civil demonstrations if they should develop over the
next few days, the general said that the police should handle
such situations, and then said he hopes that they are up and
running again soon.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) The general appeared frustrated, but unlike the PM
(ref B),he also seemed fully aware of the situation before
him and the absolute necessity of getting it under control as
soon as possible. He clearly saw Coplan as a problem that
must be carefully addressed. He was measured and thoughtful
in both his analysis and approach, and committed to resolving
the problem. With respect to the possibility of civil

CONAKRY 00000308 002 OF 002


unrest, he did not see intervention as an appropriate role
for the military. He seemed to be simply hoping that the
situation remains peaceful, and that the police get back to
work. END COMMENT.
CARTER