GENERAL CAMARA LOOKING TO GET SITUATION UNDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000308 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC GV SUBJECT: GENERAL CAMARA LOOKING TO GET SITUATION UNDER CONTROL REF: A. A) CONAKRY 0047 ¶B. B) CONAKRY 306 Classified By: A/DCM SHANNON CAZEAU FOR REASON 1.4 B AND D ¶1. SUMMARY. According to General Camara, certain elements of the military are out of control, but he has a plan for dealing with them. He blamed the situation on poor communication and rumors, which enabled the "Bulletin Rouge" to take on a life of its own. Focused and calm, Camara came across as absolutely committed to restoring order within the military, in a carefully measured way. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On June 19, Ambassador Carter met with the Chairman of the Guinean Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Camara, who has been serving as the defacto head of the military since the dismissal of the Minister of Defense a few weeks ago. The A/DCM, the DATT, and the RSO also attended the meeting. ¶3. (U) Ambassador Carter commended the general for his June 19 televised apology for recent events, stressing that it is critical for the GoG to communicate with the population, especially during times of political turmoil. Camara thanked the Ambassador and then quickly looked for a pen and paper to jot down notes when the Ambassador said "if you control the message, you can control the problem." ¶4. (SBU) General Camara said he could not agree more. He said that the whole issue with the Bulletin Rouge and the payment of salary arrears (ref A) stems from poor communication. The general pointed out that under Prime Minister Kouyate, the GoG had set up a commission of 35 people to investigate the Bulletin Rouge in order to determine once and for all whether it existed, and whether any money was owed to soldiers. Camara stressed that the commission worked for six months straight on the investigation, but found that there was absolutely no evidence supporting the existence of the Bulletin Rouge. ¶5. (SBU) According to Camara, the Bulletin Rouge took on a life of its own precisely because of the lack of communication. "People were obsessed with the money," he said. Camara said that the GoG only worsened the situation when Kouyate issued the public declaration stating that the Bulletin Rouge did not exist, but offering a 2 million GnF payment to each soldier in "good faith" in order to put the issue to rest permanently. Camara said that President Conte was against this decision, and reportedly said "if you give them 1 franc for something that does not exist, they will come back and ask for 10 more francs just as soon as they finish spending what you gave them." Shaking his head, Camara said this is exactly what happened. ¶6. (C) The General said that the GoG now has to find funds to pay out the rest of the Bulletin Rouge, but that the funds do not exist. He added that the GoG is looking to dialogue with the different groups, including the military and the police, in order to resolve the financial issues. ¶7. (C) In regards to the military mutiny and Claude Pivi "Coplan," the self-identified leader of the mutineers, General Camara agreed that certain elements of the military are out of control. At one point, he referred to them as "bandits." He also mentioned that he had just finished meeting with Coplan before the Ambassador's arrival. When asked about the meeting, Camara said that he has "a plan for dealing with the situation." He said he is creating mixed force brigades (i.e. army, air force, navy, etc.) to patrol various districts in Conakry and arrest any rogue military elements, although he did not refer directly to Coplan. ¶8. (SBU) When asked whether he had any plans as to how to manage civil demonstrations if they should develop over the next few days, the general said that the police should handle such situations, and then said he hopes that they are up and running again soon. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) The general appeared frustrated, but unlike the PM (ref B),he also seemed fully aware of the situation before him and the absolute necessity of getting it under control as soon as possible. He clearly saw Coplan as a problem that must be carefully addressed. He was measured and thoughtful in both his analysis and approach, and committed to resolving the problem. With respect to the possibility of civil CONAKRY 00000308 002 OF 002 unrest, he did not see intervention as an appropriate role for the military. He seemed to be simply hoping that the situation remains peaceful, and that the police get back to work. END COMMENT. CARTER