SRI LANKA: APRC RECOMMENCES MEETINGS, JOINED BY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000723 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: APRC RECOMMENCES MEETINGS, JOINED BY TMVP Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador met with All Party Representative Committee (APRC) Chairman Tissa Vitharana to discuss the devolution process and encourage the APRC to invite the Opposition to reach a consensus on a post-conflict political solution. Vitharana told Ambassador that the APRC's main difficulty is in uniting the minority parties on a devolution plan; President Rajapaksa is also reluctant to suspend the military process and risk losing popular support. The APRC, consisting primarily of pro-government allies, met last Monday for the first time in a month, also joined for the first time by a representative from the TMVP. End summary. ¶2. (C) APRC Chairman Tissa Vitharana told Ambassador on July 24 that he had been first approached three months ago by the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) about inviting the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) to join the APRC. He spoke with the President, who decided to wait until after the Eastern Provincial Council election, and agreed to issue the invitation once it was clear that there would be a TMVP Chief Minister: Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias Pillaiyan. ¶3. (C) Vitharana reported that in a face-to-face meeting, Pillaiyan said that though he hoped for the defeat of the LTTE, he was aware that it was only because of the LTTE's rebellion that the TMVP's point of view was even being heard. He further observed that Sinhalese resistance had kept a series of governments from implementing the 13th Amendment since its passage in 1987. Vitharana said he assured Pillaiyan that President Rajapaksa supported devolution and that the psychology of the Sinhalese majority had matured over time. Whereas in 1983 the deaths of a dozen Sinhalese soldiers had sparked violent anti-Tamil riots in Colombo, this year the Army has suffered significant losses in addition to at least ten public transit bombs and yet there has not been a single anti-Tamil attack, Vitharana noted. ¶4. (C) Vitharana told Ambassador that persuading the minority parties to agree to maximum devolution would be much easier if the LTTE would abandon its demand for a separate state (an observation that many minority leaders privately agree with). Ambassador noted that the U.S. has publicly advocated a political solution involving devolution and repeatedly called on the LTTE to abandon its separatist goal, but added we believe military efforts would never be able to eradicate the LTTE completely. To that end, we have consistently urged the government to have ready a political solution that will earn the support of the Vanni Tamils, many of whom have suffered under forced conscription by the LTTE. Vitharana responded that the current government feels that the LTTE must first be militarily weakened. Further, according to Vitharana proposing any change in the "unitary state" holds significant risks for the SLFP, which has only a bare majority in Parliament and in effect leads a minority government. ¶5. (C) Vitharana told Ambassador that he was unsure of the President's military timetable, but said that the President is well aware that the SRI Lankan people are enduring economic burdens because of the recent military successes. According to Vitharana, if the President suspends the military process to enter into peace talks, he would open the door for the JVP to accuse him of betraying the people's sacrifices. The JVP would seek to take advantage of the disillusionment and garner support for its own radical political and economic agenda. ¶6. (C) Vitharana agreed with Ambassador that early Parliamentary elections will likely be held next year. By then Vitharana hopes that the UNP will rejoin the APRC and assist in reaching a consensus; as long as the party remains outside of the discussion, "our message to the Tamil people is weakened." Ambassador encouraged Vitharana to issue the COLOMBO 00000723 002 OF 002 invitation and informed him that Chairman of the UNP Ranil Wickremesinghe has stated privately that he would support an APRC consensus. Vitharana thought Wickremesinghe could regain popularity by supporting the APRC; the Ambassador observed that President Rajapaksa would also gain minority support by endorsing the APRC consensus on devolution. ¶7. (C) Vitharana praised the professionalism of Sivageetha Prabakharan (a/k/a "Pathmini"),Batticaloa mayor and the new TMVP representative to the APRC. The TMVP has already circulated a document to the APRC outlining its fundamental positions; Vitharana said that another one specifically addressing details of devolution will be released soon. ¶8. (C) The JHU and MEP did not participate in the APRC meeting on July 14; however, the parties' central committees have told Vitharana that they will be present at the next one. The most recent meeting was the first in a month; the APRC will not meet next week because of the SAARC conference, but intends to meet weekly thereafter. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: The outlines of a possible devolution plan have been known for many months. However, the same political one-upmanship between the President's SLFP and the opposition UNP that has prevented progress on resolving the ethnic conflict for more than two decades is also the chief stumbling block to progress within the APRC. The UNP commitment to support a government development proposal that emerges from the APRC has been on the table for months. This will not be enough to break the deadlock; only an agreement by the main opposition party to participate in the process and help shape the outcome would give the President enough political cover to persuade him to allow the APRC process to come to fruition. The UNP in turn fears that the President would then blame its leader Ranil Wickremesinghe for any concessions made to the Tamil parties. A corollary of this zero-sum thinking is that the government's current military successes give the President little incentive to pursue a political track. Nontheless, as the Ambassador stated to Vitharana, it is important that the GSL use this time now to lay the groundwork for power sharing once the GSL decides to stop fighting. BLAKE