Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08COLOMBO659
2008-07-09 10:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:
SRI LANKA: FONSEKA MOVES GOALPOSTS ON VICTORY AGAIN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000659
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FONSEKA MOVES GOALPOSTS ON VICTORY AGAIN
Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000659
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FONSEKA MOVES GOALPOSTS ON VICTORY AGAIN
Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).
1. (U) In a June 30 interview widely reported in the Sri
Lankan press, ARMY Chief Sarath Fonseka estimated LTTE
strength at 5,000 cadres and stated "maybe a maximum of a
year from now the LTTE should lose large areas." He also
said "Even if we finish the war, capture the whole of the
north, still the LTTE might have some members joining
them...The LTTE might survive another two decades with over
1,000 cadres...it might continue as an insurgency forever."
2. (U) Fonseka has made a habit of predicting that victory is
just around the corner. In a Sunday Observer interview in
December 2007 he stated the LTTE had 3,000 cadres and would
be "wiped out" within six months. This estimate of the
Tigers' strength followed a May 2007 assertion that 4,000
Tigers remained and that if they lost 2,000 cadres they would
be finished. By the December interview the military figures
had put LTTE fighters killed at over 2500 yet the overall
fighting strength had only been reduced by 1000.
3. (C) COMMENT: Fonseka's term as ARMY Commander will end
December 6th and he is widely believed to be angling to
continue on with a new appointment. The President's
political popularity is partly dependent on Fonseka and the
Army delivering progress against the LTTE. Fonseka's
shifting of the goal posts on when victory can be expected
may be a conscious attempt to manage public expectations, to
give himself cover for not winning the war sooner, secure
re-appointment and allow the President to maintain his strong
political position. The shifting figures on LTTE personnel
illustrate the difficulty in measuring success in a war of
attrition, in which the LTTE seek to conceal their actual
losses by recovering the bodies of their dead and wounded and
by transmitting misleading casualty figures that they know
the GSL monitors. Even as the military seeks to control more
territory the overall political strategy has not likely
significantly affected the LTTE's ability to recruit, train
and deploy new fighters to replace those killed in the
fighting. Fonseka's comment about the possibility that the
insurgency could continue "forever" is different in tone than
previous statements. It mirrors Post's comments to the
government that there can be no purely military solution to
the conflict. Nothing in the GSL's approach to the conflict
at this point however, reflects the sort of
counter-insurgency thinking that views the local population
as the center of gravity and employs a predominantly
political strategy that seeks to address core grievances of
the populations, with military forces in a supporting role.
The interview could be the first hint of the GSL attempting
to prepare the public for an outcome well short of total
victory over the LTTE. End Comment
BLAKE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FONSEKA MOVES GOALPOSTS ON VICTORY AGAIN
Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).
1. (U) In a June 30 interview widely reported in the Sri
Lankan press, ARMY Chief Sarath Fonseka estimated LTTE
strength at 5,000 cadres and stated "maybe a maximum of a
year from now the LTTE should lose large areas." He also
said "Even if we finish the war, capture the whole of the
north, still the LTTE might have some members joining
them...The LTTE might survive another two decades with over
1,000 cadres...it might continue as an insurgency forever."
2. (U) Fonseka has made a habit of predicting that victory is
just around the corner. In a Sunday Observer interview in
December 2007 he stated the LTTE had 3,000 cadres and would
be "wiped out" within six months. This estimate of the
Tigers' strength followed a May 2007 assertion that 4,000
Tigers remained and that if they lost 2,000 cadres they would
be finished. By the December interview the military figures
had put LTTE fighters killed at over 2500 yet the overall
fighting strength had only been reduced by 1000.
3. (C) COMMENT: Fonseka's term as ARMY Commander will end
December 6th and he is widely believed to be angling to
continue on with a new appointment. The President's
political popularity is partly dependent on Fonseka and the
Army delivering progress against the LTTE. Fonseka's
shifting of the goal posts on when victory can be expected
may be a conscious attempt to manage public expectations, to
give himself cover for not winning the war sooner, secure
re-appointment and allow the President to maintain his strong
political position. The shifting figures on LTTE personnel
illustrate the difficulty in measuring success in a war of
attrition, in which the LTTE seek to conceal their actual
losses by recovering the bodies of their dead and wounded and
by transmitting misleading casualty figures that they know
the GSL monitors. Even as the military seeks to control more
territory the overall political strategy has not likely
significantly affected the LTTE's ability to recruit, train
and deploy new fighters to replace those killed in the
fighting. Fonseka's comment about the possibility that the
insurgency could continue "forever" is different in tone than
previous statements. It mirrors Post's comments to the
government that there can be no purely military solution to
the conflict. Nothing in the GSL's approach to the conflict
at this point however, reflects the sort of
counter-insurgency thinking that views the local population
as the center of gravity and employs a predominantly
political strategy that seeks to address core grievances of
the populations, with military forces in a supporting role.
The interview could be the first hint of the GSL attempting
to prepare the public for an outcome well short of total
victory over the LTTE. End Comment
BLAKE