SRI LANKA: SCENESETTER FOR DAS ERICA

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000478 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR DRL (MIKOSZ) AND SCA/INS DHAKA FOR POL - D BIERS - PLEASE PASS DAS BARKS-RUGGLES E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS PTER CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: SCENESETTER FOR DAS ERICA BARKS-RUGGLES' VISIT REF: A) COLOMBO 344 B) COLOMBO 407 Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT O. BLAKE, JR. REASONS: 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary and Introduction: Your visit comes at a time when our relations with Sri Lanka are strong, but show some strain from the pressure we have applied on key issues, particularly human rights. Nonetheless, we continue to have access at the highest levels of the GSL and to play an important role on most issues. Most observers agree that India and the U.S. continue to exert the greatest influence here. Our priorities remain encouraging the development of a political solution to the conflict and a de-escalation of hostilities, which would help improve human rights, civil liberties, and media freedom. Our task is made more difficult by the GSL's decision to address the conflict through military means, at least through the end of 2008. We anticipate that the conflict, including terrorism and human rights abuses, will get worse before it gets better. The GSL has demonstrated that it is not willing to make major concessions to international community demands, even at a cost. Your visit can help us reinforce the message that improvement on human rights and progress toward a negotiated solution will allow us to increase military to military engagement and provide additional humanitarian and security assistance. ¶2. (C) We suggest that in your meetings with government interlocutors you advocate early action on the following: -- Sri Lanka should make a concerted effort to get the remaining TMVP child soldiers released as quickly as possible, ideally in the next one to two months. -- The Government should indict the security force members who are widely believed to be responsible for the murder of the 17 ACF workers and five murders in Trincomalee. -- The GSL should allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish a full-fledged office, or appoint an independent and internationally respected person to head the national Human Rights Commission. -- Sri Lanka needs to be able to make a credible case that overall human rights conditions are improving by bringing down the number of "disappearances," especially in the East. -- Finally, the GSL should release detained journalist J.S. Tissainayagam. 
End Summary and Introduction. Prospects Dim for a Political Solution -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Our most important goals remain the development of a political solution that meets the aspirations of all Sri Lankans, including Tamils and Muslims, and an end to hostilities. The GSL claims it is prepared for talks, but is actively pursuing a military solution and has shown little interest developing a political proposal. The All Parties Representative Committee (APRC) process is stalled. In January, the GSL diluted the APRC initiative by insisting that the committee focus its report on recommendations for implementing the 13th Amendment, passed in 1987 but never implemented, which provides for limited devolution. The 13th Amendment, although a good first step and confidence-building measure, cannot be an end in itself or a substitute for a negotiated political solution. For now, the GSL's strategy appears to be to implement what it can of the 13th Amendment, while proceeding with its plans to defeat, or at least seriously weaken, the LTTE militarily. ¶4. (SBU) The GSL is committed to pursuing a military solution to the conflict and defeating the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the North, just as it "cleared" the East last year. Defeating the LTTE in their northern stronghold will be an order of magnitude harder. We have counseled the GSL that even in the unlikely event they are able to occupy all of the Vanni, the LTTE will go underground and continue to launch terrorist attacks. Although the GSL currently has the upper hand, and has seen some success, its territorial gains since July 2007 have been modest. We expect that as the LTTE comes under increasing pressure, it will resort to more frequent terrorist attacks on political and economic targets in the South. Since January, we have seen an increase in attacks on political targets and civilians. Economy Resilient Despite Conflict -------------- ¶5. (SBU) One check on military activity could be the increasing cost of the conflict and the impact of rising defense spending on the country's 25 percent inflation rate. In 2007, SL continued its healthy economic growth, reporting a 6.8% increase in real GDP for the year. (Note: Actual growth may have been closer to 6%). Total GDP was USD 32 billion, yielding a per capita income of about $1,600. However, the conflict has an opportunity cost, as many estimate that GDP growth would be at least 2% higher annually without it. Inflation has risen to over 25% year-on-year. The rapid escalation in the cost of living, and in particular the cost of rice, is a significant strain on the population and a political liability for the Rajapaksa administration. The government is turning to local friends such as India, Pakistan, and even Burma, to help ease a rice shortage. The rising cost of oil, much of which the government buys from Iran and uses to produce electricity, is a major strain on the government's budget. Few U.S. companies operate in Sri Lanka, although many are represented by local agents. The conflict, tender transparency issues, and investment obstacles continue to deter greater U.S. investment. Thus far, the voters in President Rajapaksa's base in the south have been willing to bear the high inflation costs becuase of their confidence that he is weakening the LTTE. A lack of clear military gains and/or even higher inflation could change those calculations. Government Unhappy about Human Rights Report -------------- ¶6. (C) The GSL reacted strongly to the release of the 2007 Human Rights Report, claiming it contained egregious inaccuracies and unfounded allegations and protesting that we did not consult with them when preparing the report. Throughout the last year, we repeatedly stressed to Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama, Minister of Disaster Management and Human Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe, and other senior officials our concerns about human rights abuses and the lack of accountability. The failure to communicate these concerns to the President reflects personal ambitions and rivalries as well as the GSL's dysfunctional interagency process. The MFA has recently designated, at our suggestion, a working level point of contact to engage directly with our POL section on human rights, although the channel has not yet been activated. Military Relations Strained -------------- ¶7. (C) Our overall relationship with Sri Lanka remains strong, but has experienced some recent friction. In addition to tensions over the Human Rights Report, military to military relations are showing signs of strain due to the impact of recent U.S. legislation restricting military assistance as a result of poor performance on human rights and support for a paramilitary group, the TMVP, that retains child soldiers (see also para 9). Recent refusals of candidates for training, based on Leahy vetting requirements, have also created tensions. This friction has the potential to further impact broader bilateral relations. Eastern Provincial Council Elections -------------- ¶8. (C) The government has pushed forward with local and provincial level elections in the East as a way of demonstrating government control over the area and the GSL's ability to deliver democracy to the recently liberated East. The ruling UPFA, in partnership with the TMVP (formerly "Karuna group") won the May 10 Eastern Provincial Council Elections amidst criticism by opposition parties and observer groups of significant electoral malpractices. A climate of fear and intimidation by armed groups, primarily the TMVP, marred the overall process. The UNP-SLMC alliance posed a significant threat to the government alliance by giving the opposition the support of large Muslim populations in Batticaloa, Ampara and Trincomalee districts. In the end, the opposition actually outpolled the government in Trincomalee. ¶9. (C) It is impossible to say whether the manipulations that occurred were enough to change the outcome; although the opposition claims this was the case. The UPFA-TMVP won 18 seats plus the two bonus seats that go to the winning party or coalition; the UNP won 15 seats, while the JVP and a coalition of minor Tamil parties each took one seat. The TMVP remains armed, and its credentials as a political party are unproven. After the election, the government found itself in a bind regarding the important question of the chief ministership. Senior Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa had reportedly made promises to both the TMVP leader, Pillaiyan (a former LTTTE cadre) and to M.L.M. Hisbullah, who left Rauff Hakeem's Sri Lankan Muslim Congress to campaign for the government side. "Disappearances" a Stubborn Problem -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite our best efforts, and those of several other countries, we have seen little improvement in the human rights situation over the past year. The GSL has largely failed to rein in abuses by security forces and allied paramilitary groups. For example, the overall numbers of abductions and "disappearances" remain stubbornly high at well over 1,000 per year in both 2006 and 2007, and rose from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2008. These disappearances are largely connected with informal, unregistered detentions by the security forces, including the Terrorism Investigation Division of the police, the Special Tactics force, and military intelligence. It may be true that some of the missing are either LTTE operatives or sympathizers. Relatively few of those "disappeared" are heard from again and must be presumed dead. The senior military leadership appears grimly determined to continue using these tactics in the counterinsurgency campaign, whatever the cost. While the situation with abductions has improved from its peak in early 2007, particularly in Colombo and Jaffna, new "hot spots" for disappearances have emerged, including the East, especially Batticaloa, and areas near the military activity in Vavuniya and Mannar. Progress on Child Soldiers -------------- ¶11. (SBU) There has been progress on the release of child soldiers, and a window of opportunity has opened for more progress. Following pressure by the U.S. and by UNICEF, there have been two recent releases totaling 39 child soldiers by the TMVP. UNICEF reported that in April, the number of child soldiers with the TMVP on whom it has files dropped by 55, to a total of 76. (Note: Many cases go unrecorded. The actual number still with the TMVP is likely higher, possibly 200-250.) Nevertheless, the GSL is clearly pushing the TMVP to release child soldiers, and achieving results. While the GSL and UNICEF prefer to release children directly to their parents when possible, the government is also mobilizing to provide rehabilitation at a center in Ambepussa. ¶12. (C) Minister of Disaster Management and Human Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe and Justice Secretary Suhada Gamalath continue to engage closely on this issue and predict further releases in the near future, as the TMVP seeks to establish itself as a legitimate political party. The U.S. is pushing hard for more releases and "effective measures" as required by Section 699c of the FY-08 foreign operations bill. Ambassador Blake personally urged Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa to do his utmost to press the TMVP for more progress on child soldiers, noting UNICEF reports that the TMVP still has not released all its child soldiers. Rajapaksa responded that the TMVP has agreed to release "100%" of its child soldiers, and requested information about the location of remaining child soldiers, so the GSL can get them released. IIGEP Withdraws After One Year -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) has ended its work in country and released its final public statement on April 15. The statement concluded that the Commission of Inquiry's (COI) work has not met international standards and detailed the reasons for this conclusion: a conflict of interest in the proceedings of the Commission, namely the involvement of the Attorney General's office; the lack of effective victim and witness protections; the lack of transparency and timeliness in the proceedings; the lack of full cooperation by State bodies; and the lack of financial independence of the Commission. IIGEP included a set of recommendations to address these issues. IIGEP noted an "absence of political and institutional will on the part of the government to pursue with vigor the cases under review." ¶14. (C) Despite IIGEP's withdrawal, or perhaps because of it, COI proceedings have continued, and the COI seems determined to prove it can succeed. Over the past few weeks, key witnesses have given testimony on the killing of 17 Action Contre La Faim workers and the killing of 5 young men in Trincomalee (ref a),including some video testimony by protected witnesses abroad, the first ever in Sri Lanka. Despite the emergence in the public domain of the essential facts of these two high-profile cases, it is not clear whether anyone will be held to account. No one is currently in custody for those crimes, and the some of the accused in the police and security forces continue to occupy important positions. ¶15. (C) The COI has asked four of the donor countries to IIGEP, including the U.S., to continue to facilitate such video testimony, and specific arrangements have been put in place to ensure this. U.S. Eminent Person (and former PRM Assistant Secretary) Arthur "Gene" Dewey was instrumental in providing leadership for this effort, as he was throughout IIGEP's existence. His professionalism and sound judgment proved crucial to resolving sensitive disputes with both the COI and the GSL and deserve the highest praise. Sri Lanka's Media Still Under Pressure -------------- ¶16. (C) 2008 has so far produced only a few incidents of concern regarding media freedom and the safety of reporters. Defense journalist Iqbal Athas reported increased surveillance and threats against him following critical reports about the military's conduct of the war, and again chose to leave the country temporarily. Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa has recently repeated his assertion that any reporting detrimental to the morale of the armed forces is treasonous and should be punished. The Tamil owners of an independent publishing house and website and a Tamil columnist for the Sunday Times, two-time IVP grantee J.S. Tissainayagam, have been detained as suspected terrorists under the emergency regulations on what appears to be flimsy evidence. Ambassador has repeatedly intervened in the case of Tissainayagam. We hope that reports he will soon be released will be borne out in reality. Tissainayagam may have fallen afoul of the authorities for a critical article he wrote on the TMVP's child soldiers. Humanitarian Access Remains Limited -------------- ¶17. (C) Sri Lanka continues to be a challenging environment for NGOs, UN agencies, and international organizations due to GSL restrictions on work visas, the increase of income tax levies on expatriate staff, and the requirement of access permits for travel to the North. Obtaining work visas has become increasingly difficult and time consuming over the past year, in part because of the GSL's lack of clarity and transparency regarding procedures and requirements. Their work is constrained by what is perceived as a deliberate effort by the GSL to reduce the number of international humanitarian assistance workers in Sri Lanka. The GSL's recent announcement that taxation of expatriate salaries will increase from 15 to 35 percent has been met with wide protest and will hamper agencies' recruitment of staff. Access to LTTE-controlled areas of the Northern Province, which is likely to be the primary theater of armed conflict during 2008 and possibly beyond, has been restricted for international staff normally not based there, severely limiting program development and monitoring activities. The GSL has delayed or denied the issuance of permits, including those requested by agency and NGO country directors, for travel to Jaffna and the LTTE-controlled Vanni. We play a leading role in the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance, a coordination body comprised of high-level GSL officials and representatives from humanitarian organizations and embassies, and it has proven to be a valuable mechanism for addressing obstacles in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Universal Periodic Review -------------- ¶18. (SBU) In Geneva, nearly 70 countries signed up to speak during the UPR session on Sri Lanka. Several interventions focused on "softer" issues like Sri Lanka's enviable progress on education and health. However, a number of countries focused on tough issues, including regret at the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement, the downgrading of Sri Lanka's National Human Rights Commission, concerns about press freedom and safety of journalists, child soldiers, disappearances and impunity. The U.S. and others stressed the need for an expanded presence of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Afterwards, the Sri Lankan delegation fought a rearguard action to try to water down some of the formal UPR recommendations, threatening not to accept some of them. Human Rights Council Seat -------------- ¶19. (SBU) The Foreign Ministry reacted to our demarche on Sri Lanka's candidacy by sending the Embassy its standard paper on Sri Lanka's commitments to human rights, including its adherence to many UN Conventions. On May 15, in an opinion piece in the UK Guardian, South African Bishop Desmond Tutu took a strong position that Sri Lanka's record of human rights abuses should disqualify it for seat on the HRC. ¶20. (C) Your visit comes at a sensitive time for U.S.-Sri Lanka relations. You will have the opportunity to emphasize that progress on human rights will allow us to increase our engagement with Sri Lanka. We suggest that in your meeting you ask Sri Lankan government interlocutors to take the following actions: -- Sri Lanka should make a concerted effort to get the remaining TMVP child soldiers released as quickly as possible, ideally in the next one to two months. The release of a substantial number of child soldiers would enable the Embassy to make a recommendation in favor of the Department certifying that the GSL is taking "effective measures" to demobilize child soldiers as required by 699c of the FY08 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. That, in turn, would enable the US to resume licenses for air and maritime surveillance equipment. -- The Government should indict the security force members who are widely believed to be responsible for the murder of the 17 ACF workers and five murders in Trincomalee. Indictments on these two high profile cases now before the Commission of Inquiry would help the GSL to rebut those who claim Sri Lanka lacks the political will to bring members of the security forces to justice. -- The GSL should allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish a full-fledged office, or take steps to show that it is willing to empower its own human rights institutions. One effective measure would be to appoint a truly independent and internationally respected person to head the Human Rights Commission and thereby enable that institution to monitor and report on human rights abuses and act as an effective check. -- Sri Lanka needs to be able to make a credible case that overall human rights conditions are improving. Probably the most important issue is that of abductions and disappearances. The real problem is now in the East, where the numbers over the last several months were up substantially, and in Vavuniya and Mannar. With all the GSL is now trying to accomplish in the East, it is in the GSL's interest to work with the TMVP to stop this trend, which would not only improve security in the East but would help on the larger human rights front. - The GSL should release detained journalist J.S. Tissainayagam, unconditionally if possible. If credible evidence shows he is either dangerous or risk of fleeing the country to avoid charges, then he could be released on bail and with conditions. ¶21. (SBU) It is important that the pressure we are rightly putting on Sri Lanka results in improvements and progress, rather than frustration and disengagement on the part of the GSL. We look forward to ensuring a productive visit for you. BLAKE