Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08COLOMBO247
2008-03-11 15:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT-BACKED EX-TIGERS SWEEP LOCAL

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS CE 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7810
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RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 5948
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1890
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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000247 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT-BACKED EX-TIGERS SWEEP LOCAL
ELECTIONS IN EAST

REF: COLOMBO 00199

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000247

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT-BACKED EX-TIGERS SWEEP LOCAL
ELECTIONS IN EAST

REF: COLOMBO 00199

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The March 10 local elections in Batticaloa
District in eastern Sri Lanka went off without any serious
violations or incidents of violence. The TMVP, a
government-backed anti-LTTE Tamil paramilitary, swept the
elections, winning 8 of 9 local bodies (and in a coalition
with the ruling UPFA, also won the 9th body, the Batticaloa
Municipal Council). The elections were marked by the heavy
presence of army and police forces. Outside groups have
publicly acknowledged the relative peace that prevailed,
despite scattered reports of elections violations and
intimidation at the polls. Nevertheless, Election Day must
be seen in the context of the climate of fear and
intimidation that dominated the overall election process.
The main opposition party, the UNP, and the party that has
traditionally been favored in the district, the TNA, both
declined to contest, citing fear for candidates' safety.
Some reluctant candidates were reportedly forced to stand for
election, and others intimidated through abductions. Two who
refused to comply were killed. Civil society representatives
were virtually unanimous in stating that the populace did not
want the elections, and feels no freedom to dissent from the
line of the victors, the TMVP. Many worry that the fact that
these local elections proceeded relatively smoothly on a
formal basis will be used by the government to legitimize
preparations for provincial council elections, probably in
May, which they are concerned may not be fundamentally free
and fair. End Summary.

Background of the Elections
--------------


2. (C) On March 10 local government elections were held in
9 constituencies in Batticaloa district, including Batticaloa
municipality. These took place largely in formerly
LTTE-controlled areas that the government re-captured last
year. More than 800 candidates stood for election to 101
local council seats. The ruling United People's Freedom
Alliance (UPFA) and the government-backed TMVP (the political
wing of the Karuna faction) jointly contested the Batticaloa
Municipal Council (MC) elections - a clear indication that
the government intends for the TMVP to be its partner in the
East. In the other 8 constituencies, the TMVP ran on its
own. Several other anti-LTTE Tamil paramilitary groups
(EPDP, EPRLF, and PLOTE),also supported by the government,
formed a coalition to compete with the TMVP. The opposition
Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC),government-allied Muslim

parties, and several local groups also ran in particular
constituencies.


3. (C) The elections process in Batticaloa district was
widely judged to be significantly flawed from the start
(reftel). The nomination period, which ended January 25, was
marred by widespread intimidation, including abductions,
killings, and physical violence, which led to forced
candidacies and the decisions by the opposition UNP and the
TNA not to contest the elections. This climate of
intimidation was created by government-backed anti-LTTE
paramilitaries and government security forces operating in
the East. Many observers were convinced that the government
wants to use the local elections to provide a degree of
legitimacy for its allied paramilitaries, notably the TMVP,
and to serve as a dry run for provincial council elections,
likely to be held in May or June.


4. (C) In the weeks preceding yesterday's elections, levels
of violence noticeably decreased. Paramilitary groups put
their weapons out of sight, most likely in their camps in
remote areas of West Batticaloa. However, reports of
occasional armed violence persisted. The GSL encouraged
paramilitaries not to bear arms in public, and provided

COLOMBO 00000247 002 OF 004


police security for candidates who requested it.


5. (C) On the weekend before the election, EmbOffs visited
Batticaloa and met with a range of civil society
representatives and religious leaders, as well as the
Government Agent for Batticaloa District. Independent groups
overwhelmingly confirmed what we had heard from earlier
reports - that a climate of fear and intimidation left no
room for dissent, and the public saw the elections as by and
for the government and its friends. Much of the populace had
no desire to participate in the elections and saw the results
as already determined, but planned to participate because
they feared reprisals if they did not. The security
situation had improved since late 2007, but many abuses
likely continued to go unreported. People regularly claimed
that reporting abuses to the police was futile because it
would not lead to any justice, and would only further
endanger them and their families. The pressing concern of
many civil society groups was that the local elections would
proceed relatively smoothly, and thus legitimize preparations
for provincial council elections, which they expected to be
similarly unfree and unfair.

Election Results
--------------


6. (U) The TMVP won 8 of 9 local bodies, and with its ally,
the UPFA, also won the key Batticaloa Municipal Council (MC).
In effect, the TMVP won control of every local body,
reportedly securing 70% of the total votes cast. In the
Batticaloa MC, the UPFA-TMVP group won 11 seats, the
EPDP-EPRLF-PLOTE coalition won 6 seats, the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC) won 1 seat, and the Eelavar Democratic Front
(EDF) also won 1 seat. The UNP and TNA did not participate.
Voter turnout in Batticaloa MC was 53 percent, and estimates
of overall turnout ranged from 45 to more than 56 percent.
TamilNet reported that the percentage of spoiled ballots
(i.e., protest votes) cast ranged from 6 to 20 percent across
the 9 local bodies.


7. (U) There are conflicting reports about whom the TMVP
will choose as mayor in Batticaloa. Pradeep Master, the TMVP
Batticaloa leader and former Tiger, is widely expected to
claim the post. But Pillaiyan, the ex-Tiger and militant
head of TMVP who claims to be entering the political arena,
has reportedly promised the job to Pathmini (alias
Sivageetha),a former head of the group's Colombo office.
When it was mentioned that Pradeep Master is aspiring for the
same position, Pillaiyan told journalists that his party has
not taken a "100 percent decision." Batticaloa residents
reportedly feel that Pathmini is not qualified for the
position of mayor, and prefer Pradeep Master.

Reactions
--------------


8. (U) In a press release on the night of March 10, PAFFREL
(the leading international monitoring organization that was
supported by the Nonviolent Peaceforce) said that the
elections "took place in a peaceful environment," and
incidents observed and reported by monitors "were of a minor
nature." A very heavy police and armed force presence was
observed. Fifteen mobile observation teams visited 86 out of
285 total polling stations. In areas where the population
was mostly Tamil, the situation appeared calm, and polling
agents of parties other than the TMVP were very rare. In
predominantly Muslim areas, the electorate and polling
stations were "somewhat more turbulent." In the Vakarai
area, an EPDP-EPRLF-PLOTE candidate lodged a complaint of
vote rigging by the TMVP, and armed policemen were seen
inside the polling stations (a violation of election laws).
In Valaichchenai, polling booths were lively and tense, with
heated arguments between party members; monitors observed
incidents related to the use of fake ID cards. PAFFREL

COLOMBO 00000247 003 OF 004


assessed that due to TNA and UNP not contesting the
elections, "in some areas there was no real contest."
However, it commended the relatively healthy turnout of
voters that indicates a desire for "a restoration of
democratic institutions."


9. (C) Nevertheless, the chairman of PAFFREL, Kingsley
Rodrigo, was quoted in the media as taking a more somber
tone: "In Batticaloa, not only TMVP, many other armed groups
are also there. Some of the Muslims also have arms... so I
am not going to say this election is a free and fair one."
When speaking with poloff on a visit to Batticaloa over the
weekend before the elections, PAFFREL and Nonviolent
Peaceforce staff were less congratulatory in their attitude
toward the elections. They made clear that they had decided
to mount a modest monitoring effort to protect the populace
and provide some measure of deterrence against election
violence - not/not to endorse in any way the election process
itself, which they viewed as highly flawed from the
beginning. Speaking with poloff after the elections, Roland
Roescheisen (head of the Nonviolent Peaceforce in Sri Lanka)
said that NP's objective was to keep violence down. Minor
violations observed by monitors included people filling in
ballot papers in pencil, and people voting twice. NP has
requested funding from the National Democratic Institute to
conduct post-election monitoring. PAFFREL told Emboff that
its post-election monitoring would end on March 13.


10. (C) When asked for his reaction to the March 10
elections, the Executive Director of the Consortium of
Humanitarian Agencies (CHA),Jeevan Thiagarajah (protect),
without explicitly denouncing the elections, stated that the
priority for the north and east should be interim
administrative bodies to deliver services and implement
development projects. Thiagarajah appeared to imply that the
election did not meet minimum standards, noting that
"democratizing areas of conflict is a necessity," for "the
conflict itself is rooted in the lack of democratic
practices, including discrimination." Thiagarajah recognized
that the East has had problems with the elections process
since 1992, In elections yesterday, he noted "the problem is
that the TMVP needs to be cleared by the law in terms of
criminal acts," and that only the government should wield
arms.


11. (C) On March 11 the Ambassador met with Defense
Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, who said he was very happy

SIPDIS
with how the elections turned out, claiming that it proved
the GSL took the elections seriously. Gothabaya said that
compared to elections in the south, the Batticaloa elections
saw relatively few violations or incidents of violence. He
praised the high turnout in Vakarai, attributing it to the
fact that Vakarai has seen the largest improvement since the
GSL pushed the LTTE out. Gothabaya called the high turnout a
testament to good security in Vakarai, which made the people
feel safe to vote; the people wanted to vote because they had
seen such positive change. Further, he alleged that the high
vote for the TMVP was especially encouraging because once
people went into the booth, their votes could not be seen
(and thus could not have been compelled). The TMVP was
disadvantaged because "everyone had been talking against
them, and they hadn't had the chance to show how they
govern." Despite all these disadvantages, they had gotten
many votes. Now the TMVP had a chance to prove themselves,
he thought.


12. (C) Indian Deputy High Commissioner Manickam told DCM
that he considered the elections in Batti to have been
"manipulated." He said he would wait several days and talk
to party representatives before assessing the extent of the
manipulation. He reckoned that if the voting in different
voting districts turns out to have been reasonably close, he
would conclude that there was not excessive interference, but
if there were landslide victories that would be a clear sign

COLOMBO 00000247 004 OF 004


of significant manipulation. He predicted that the LTTE
would target officials elected in yesterday's elections. He
noted that although India has advised the GSL to delay
provincial elections in the East, he expects the GSL to
nevertheless move quickly to hold them.


13. (C) Comment: The relative lack of violence and
violations in yesterday's elections is welcome news.
However, as Ambassador commented to Defense Secretary
Gothabaya Rajapaksa, the GSL's critics will likely call it a
flawed election because of the violence and intimidation that
led up to it. In fact, given the physical violence and
intimidation that preceded the elections for months, and the
resulting climate of fear in which they took place, it would
be difficult to assess them as free and fair. The danger is
that if armed groups gain power through a flawed process and
remain armed, the elections will perpetuate an undemocratic
system that is at the root of the 25-year conflict.
Ambassador urged the Defense Secretary to demobilize the TMVP
cadres quickly, beginning with the child soldiers, and not to
rush to organize the far more important elections for the
Eastern Provincial Council later this year. Rajapaksa
responded that the GSL already had demobilized some child
soldiers (septel). The USG message to the GSL should be that
if the TMVP seizes the opportunity to demobilize and recast
itself as a legitimate political party, stopping its illegal
activities, prospects for a legitimate election to the
provincial council with broader participation would remain
intact.
BLAKE

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