Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08COLOMBO244
2008-03-11 14:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT-BACKED EX-TIGERS SWEEP LOCAL

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS CE 
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FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7798
INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0762
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7750
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 5936
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4281
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1878
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 4286
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3382
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 8365
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 5844
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0558
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2641
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000244 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT-BACKED EX-TIGERS SWEEP LOCAL
ELECTIONS IN EAST

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

Reference: COLOMBO 00199

(U) CLASSIFIED BY: Robert O. Blake, Ambassador 1.4(b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000244

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT-BACKED EX-TIGERS SWEEP LOCAL
ELECTIONS IN EAST

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

Reference: COLOMBO 00199

(U) CLASSIFIED BY: Robert O. Blake, Ambassador 1.4(b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The March 10 local elections in
Batticaloa District in eastern Sri Lanka went off without
any serious violations or incidents of violence. The TMVP,
a government-backed anti-LTTE Tamil paramilitary, swept the
elections, winning 8 of 9 local bodies (and in a coalition
with the ruling UPFA, also won the 9th body, the Batticaloa
Municipal Council). The elections were marked by the heavy
presence of army and police forces. Outside groups have
publicly acknowledged the relative peace that prevailed,
despite scattered reports of elections violations and
intimidation at the polls. Nevertheless, Election Day must
be seen in the context of the climate of fear and
intimidation that dominated the overall election process.
The main opposition party, the UNP, and the party that has
traditionally been favored in the district, the TNA, both
declined to contest, citing fear for candidates' safety.
Some reluctant candidates were reportedly forced to stand
for election, and others intimidated through abductions.
Two who refused to comply were killed. Civil society
representatives were virtually unanimous in stating that
the populace did not want the elections, and feels no
freedom to dissent from the line of the victors, the TMVP.
Many worry that the fact that these local elections
proceeded relatively smoothly on a formal basis will be
used by the government to legitimize preparations for
provincial council elections, probably in May, which they
are concerned may not be fundamentally free and fair. End
Summary.

Background of the Elections
--------------


2. (C) On March 10 local government elections were held
in 9 constituencies in Batticaloa district, including
Batticaloa municipality. These took place largely in
formerly LTTE-controlled areas that the government re-
captured last year. More than 800 candidates stood for
election to 101 local council seats. The ruling United
People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) and the government-backed
TMVP (the political wing of the Karuna faction) jointly
contested the Batticaloa Municipal Council (MC) elections -
a clear indication that the government intends for the TMVP
to be its partner in the East. In the other 8
constituencies, the TMVP ran on its own. Several other
anti-LTTE Tamil paramilitary groups (EPDP, EPRLF, and
PLOTE),also supported by the government, formed a
coalition to compete with the TMVP. The opposition Sri
Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC),government-allied Muslim

parties, and several local groups also ran in particular
constituencies.


3. (C) The elections process in Batticaloa district was
widely judged to be significantly flawed from the start
(reftel). The nomination period, which ended January 25,
was marred by widespread intimidation, including
abductions, killings, and physical violence, which led to
forced candidacies and the decisions by the opposition UNP
and the TNA not to contest the elections. This climate of
intimidation was created by government-backed anti-LTTE
paramilitaries and government security forces operating in
the East. Many observers were convinced that the
government wants to use the local elections to provide a
degree of legitimacy for its allied paramilitaries, notably
the TMVP, and to serve as a dry run for provincial council
elections, likely to be held in May or June.


4. (C) In the weeks preceding yesterday's elections,
levels of violence noticeably decreased. Paramilitary
groups put their weapons out of sight, most likely in their
camps in remote areas of West Batticaloa. However, reports

COLOMBO 00000244 002 OF 004


of occasional armed violence persisted. The GSL encouraged
paramilitaries not to bear arms in public, and provided
police security for candidates who requested it.


5. (C) On the weekend before the election, EmbOffs
visited Batticaloa and met with a range of civil society
representatives and religious leaders, as well as the
Government Agent for Batticaloa District. Independent
groups overwhelmingly confirmed what we had heard from
earlier reports - that a climate of fear and intimidation
left no room for dissent, and the public saw the elections
as by and for the government and its friends. Much of the
populace had no desire to participate in the elections and
saw the results as already determined, but planned to
participate because they feared reprisals if they did not.
The security situation had improved since late 2007, but
many abuses likely continued to go unreported. People
regularly claimed that reporting abuses to the police was
futile because it would not lead to any justice, and would
only further endanger them and their families. The
pressing concern of many civil society groups was that the
local elections would proceed relatively smoothly, and thus
legitimize preparations for provincial council elections,
which they expected to be similarly unfree and unfair.

Election Results
--------------


6. (U) The TMVP won 8 of 9 local bodies, and with its
ally, the UPFA, also won the key Batticaloa Municipal
Council (MC). In effect, the TMVP won control of every
local body, reportedly securing 70% of the total votes
cast. In the Batticaloa MC, the UPFA-TMVP group won 11
seats, the EPDP-EPRLF-PLOTE coalition won 6 seats, the Sri
Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) won 1 seat, and the Eelavar
Democratic Front (EDF) also won 1 seat. The UNP and TNA
did not participate. Voter turnout in Batticaloa MC was 53
percent, and estimates of overall turnout ranged from 45 to
more than 56 percent. TamilNet reported that the
percentage of spoiled ballots (i.e., protest votes) cast
ranged from 6 to 20 percent across the 9 local bodies.


7. (U) There are conflicting reports about whom the TMVP
will choose as mayor in Batticaloa. Pradeep Master, the
TMVP Batticaloa leader and former Tiger, is widely expected
to claim the post. But Pillaiyan, the ex-Tiger and
militant head of TMVP who claims to be entering the
political arena, has reportedly promised the job to
Pathmini (alias Sivageetha),a former head of the group's
Colombo office. When it was mentioned that Pradeep Master
is aspiring for the same position, Pillaiyan told
journalists that his party has not taken a "100 percent
decision." Batticaloa residents reportedly feel that
Pathmini is not qualified for the position of mayor, and
prefer Pradeep Master.

Reactions
--------------


8. (U) In a press release on the night of March 10,
PAFFREL (the leading international monitoring organization
that was supported by the Nonviolent Peaceforce) said that
the elections "took place in a peaceful environment," and
incidents observed and reported by monitors "were of a
minor nature." A very heavy police and armed force
presence was observed. Fifteen mobile observation teams
visited 86 out of 285 total polling stations. In areas
where the population was mostly Tamil, the situation
appeared calm, and polling agents of parties other than the
TMVP were very rare. In predominantly Muslim areas, the
electorate and polling stations were "somewhat more
turbulent." In the Vakarai area, an EPDP-EPRLF-PLOTE
candidate lodged a complaint of vote rigging by the TMVP,
and armed policemen were seen inside the polling stations
(a violation of election laws). In Valaichchenai, polling
booths were lively and tense, with heated arguments between

COLOMBO 00000244 003 OF 004


party members; monitors observed incidents related to the
use of fake ID cards. PAFFREL assessed that due to TNA and
UNP not contesting the elections, "in some areas there was
no real contest." However, it commended the relatively
healthy turnout of voters that indicates a desire for "a
restoration of democratic institutions."


9. (C) Nevertheless, the chairman of PAFFREL, Kingsley
Rodrigo, was quoted in the media as taking a more somber
tone: "In Batticaloa, not only TMVP, many other armed
groups are also there. Some of the Muslims also have
arms... so I am not going to say this election is a free
and fair one." When speaking with poloff on a visit to
Batticaloa over the weekend before the elections, PAFFREL
and Nonviolent Peaceforce staff were less congratulatory in
their attitude toward the elections. They made clear that
they had decided to mount a modest monitoring effort to
protect the populace and provide some measure of deterrence
against election violence - not/not to endorse in any way
the election process itself, which they viewed as highly
flawed from the beginning. Speaking with poloff after the
elections, Roland Roescheisen (head of the Nonviolent
Peaceforce in Sri Lanka) said that NP's objective was to
keep violence down. Minor violations observed by monitors
included people filling in ballot papers in pencil, and
people voting twice. NP has requested funding from the
National Democratic Institute to conduct post-election
monitoring. PAFFREL told Emboff that its post-election
monitoring would end on March 13.


10. (C) When asked for his reaction to the March 10
elections, the Executive Director of the Consortium of
Humanitarian Agencies (CHA),Jeevan Thiagarajah (protect),
without explicitly denouncing the elections, stated that
the priority for the north and east should be interim
administrative bodies to deliver services and implement
development projects. Thiagarajah appeared to imply that
the election did not meet minimum standards, noting that
"democratizing areas of conflict is a necessity," for "the
conflict itself is rooted in the lack of democratic
practices, including discrimination." Thiagarajah
recognized that the East has had problems with the
elections process since 1992, In elections yesterday, he
noted "the problem is that the TMVP needs to be cleared by
the law in terms of criminal acts," and that only the
government should wield arms.


11. (C) On March 11 the Ambassador met with Defense
Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, who said he was very happy

SIPDIS
with how the elections turned out, claiming that it proved
the GSL took the elections seriously. Gothabaya said that
compared to elections in the south, the Batticaloa
elections saw relatively few violations or incidents of
violence. He praised the high turnout in Vakarai,
attributing it to the fact that Vakarai has seen the
largest improvement since the GSL pushed the LTTE out.
Gothabaya called the high turnout a testament to good
security in Vakarai, which made the people feel safe to
vote; the people wanted to vote because they had seen such
positive change. Further, he alleged that the high vote
for the TMVP was especially encouraging because once people
went into the booth, their votes could not be seen (and
thus could not have been compelled). The TMVP was
disadvantaged because "everyone had been talking against
them, and they hadn't had the chance to show how they
govern." Despite all these disadvantages, they had gotten
many votes. Now the TMVP had a chance to prove themselves,
he thought.


12. (C) Indian Deputy High Commissioner Manickam told DCM
that he considered the elections in Batti to have been
"manipulated." He said he would wait several days and talk
to party representatives before assessing the extent of the
manipulation. He reckoned that if the voting in different
voting districts turns out to have been reasonably close,
he would conclude that there was not excessive

COLOMBO 00000244 004 OF 004


interference, but if there were landslide victories that
would be a clear sign of significant manipulation. He
predicted that the LTTE would target officials elected in
yesterday's elections. He noted that although India has
advised the GSL to delay provincial elections in the East,
he expects the GSL to nevertheless move quickly to hold
them.


13. (C) Comment: The relative lack of violence and
violations in yesterday's elections is welcome news.
However, as Ambassador commented to Defense Secretary
Gothabaya Rajapaksa, the GSL's critics will likely call it
a flawed election because of the violence and intimidation
that led up to it. In fact, given the physical violence
and intimidation that preceded the elections for months,
and the resulting climate of fear in which they took place,
it would be difficult to assess them as free and fair. The
danger is that if armed groups gain power through a flawed
process and remain armed, the elections will perpetuate an
undemocratic system that is at the root of the 25-year
conflict. Ambassador urged the Defens Secretary to
demobilize the TMVP cadres quickly beginning with the
child soldiers, and not to rsh to organize the far more
important elections or the Eastern Provincial Council
later this year Rajapaksa responded that the GSL already
had dmobilized some child soldiers (septel). The USGmessage to the GSL should
be that if the TMVP seizs the
opportunity to demobilize and recast itsel as a legitimate
political party, stopping its illegal activities, prospects
for a legitimate elecion to the provincial council with
broader partiipation would remain intact.
BLAKE

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