EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING JANUARY 7, 2008

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000022 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/SCA, DS/DSS/ITA, CA, S/ES-O-CMS AND SA/INS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC SUBJECT: EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING JANUARY 7, 2008 REF: A. COLOMBO 00015 ¶B. COLOMBO 00006 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: AmEmbassy Colombo convened an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting on January 7, 2008. The EAC discussed Post's security profile and security for American citizens in general in light of the Government of Sri Lanka's (GSL) abrogation (ref A) of the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA). After reviewing all available information, the EAC determined that security measures currently in place were appropriate to the threat level. The EAC concurred that it is not necessary to amend the current Travel Warning as the information and advice outlined in the document is valid for the present security environment. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) On January 7, 2008, AmEmbassy Colombo convened meeting of the core EAC. Present for the meeting were the DCM, RSO, PAO, MGT, ECON, POL, DATT, ODC, RAO, CONS, and USAID. The agenda items for the meeting were: ¶A. Mission security in light of the GSL's annulment of the CFA ¶B. Security for the general American expatriate community ¶3. (SBU) The RSO noted that contacts within the Sri Lanka Police Service (SLPS),including the desk officer for LTTE matters and the director of Western Province (in which Colombo is located) Intelligence conjectured that the LTTE would try to cause maximum damage to political and economic targets. These officers noted that LTTE's aim would be to show that the GSL was at fault for abrogating the CFA, and therefore the focus of possible LTTE actions would continue to be GSL political or economic targets. Neither source provided specific or actionable threat information beyond their speculations. Other SLPS contacts noted that the LTTE had, in the recent past, made maximum efforts to launch attacks in Colombo, but the extraordinarily stringent security measures had prevented several incidents. The RSO commented that there still exists no information to indicate that the U.S. Mission, Americans, or American interests are targets of LTTE actions and that the main threat remains being in the wrong place at the wrong time. RAO and DATT concurred with the RSO's comments, adding that inquiries of their sources had yielded basically the same information the RSO obtained from the SLPS. ¶4. (SBU) The RSO averred that it is not necessary to increase security measures at Mission facilities beyond the measures currently in place, since the U.S. historically has not been a target of LTTE attacks and given the lack of information indicating otherwise. The RSO reiterated advice for Mission employees to change their routes to and from work, and especially change their times of arrival and departure, so as to avoid the congestion of rush hour traffic in front of the Chancery and American Center, both of which are in proximity to the residence of the President of Sri Lanka and the Collpetty Police Station. The EAC concurred with the RSO's comments that the security measures currently employed at Mission facilities are commensurate with the threat. The EAC further recommended that the RSO remain engaged with the Overseas School of Colombo (which most American children attend) regarding security issues. ¶5. (SBU) Concerning the general American community, the EAC agreed that a revision of Post's current Travel Warning (issued October 19, 2007) or Warden Message (issued January 3, 2008) is not indicated because the information in both documents is valid for the current security environment. The Travel Warning advises American citizens of the possibility of being in the wrong place at the wrong time; that the LTTE has conducted politically-motivated assassinations throughout Sri Lanka, including several in Colombo; to be aware of their personal surroundings; and, to avoid large crowds, public gatherings and particularly stay away from political rallies and military bases in Sri Lanka. The Warden Message repeats advice from the Warning, includes information regarding a January 2, 2008 bombing (ref B) of a military transport bus in Colombo, and recommends that American citizens defer non-essential visits to crowded public places and high-profile public venues. ¶6. (SBU) The EAC agreed that while at this time the abrogation of the CFA does not change Post's security profile, the situation is fluid and subject to change, and should be monitored closely. The DATT and PAO noted some important dates to remember - January 16 (date of formal abrogation) and February 4 (60th anniversary of Sri Lanka's independence). EAC members with responsibility for liaison with GSL security elements will continue to engage their contacts. The EAC will convene whenever necessary to review the security environment. ¶7. (SBU) In summary, the EAC determined that current security measures at Mission facilities and homes are commensurate with Colombo's "High" indigenous terrorist threat (as determined by DS/ITA),even taking into account the abrogation of the CFA. The EAC further determined that the Travel Warning and Warden Messages adequately describe the threats and provide good advice to American citizens to lessen their chances of becoming victims of terrorist attacks. Therefore, the EAC recommended no additional steps for the security of the official American community or the expatriate American community. ¶8. (U) Post will continue to monitor the security environment and will report further developments, if any, per septel. POC for this message is RSO Michael V. Perkins, who may be contacted at 94.11.249.8885, 94.11.249.8888 (MSG Post 1 after regular business hours),or via the classified and unclassified email systems. SIPDIS BLAKE