SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT FORCES TAKING CONTROL OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001042

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
DHAKA PLEASE PASS TO DASD CLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PTER CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT FORCES TAKING CONTROL OF
STRATEGIC PENINSULA

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT O. BLAKE, JR. REASONS: 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The recent fall of Pooneryn and the
crossroads town of Mankulam to government forces has greatly
improved the government's military position and put the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in a strategic bind.
Government forces now control virtually all of Sri Lanka's
western coastline and will be able to stop or hinder the
Tigers' resupply efforts. The government says it will
re-open an all-land route to Jaffna via the A-32 highway from
Mannar. When it gains complete control of the Pooneryn
peninsula, the Army should also be able to redeploy up to
20,000 troops from its Jaffna garrison and commit them to the
fight for the Tiger's de facto capital, Kilinochchi. The
battlefield successes will also improve the government's
political fortunes. The President and Cabinet are discussing
whether to dissolve Parliament after the final budget vote in
early December and move for a general election in early 2009.
The loss of Pooneryn puts LTTE leader Prabhakaran under
pressure to demonstrate the continued viability of his
insurgency in advance of his annual Heroes' Day speech on
November 27. Observers speculate that the LTTE will attempt
to carry out a dramatic strike against a military,
government, or economic target in the Sinhalese south. The
government also faces significant constraints in its campaign
to finish off the Tamil Tigers as a military force, however,
as both traditional and prospective arms suppliers show
reluctance to extend new credits for arms purchases. End
summary.

POONERYN FALLS TO GOVERNMENT TROOPS
--------------


2. (SBU) The Sri Lankan military entered the key town of
Pooneryn in Sri Lanka's northwest on November 15 and appeared
on the verge of capturing the rest of the strategic Pooneryn
peninsula. Army troops were conducting mopping-up
operations. These should lead within days to full control of
the strategic 15 km-long spit of land that terminates just
opposite Jaffna. LTTE cadres were continuing to resist on
the Pooneryn peninsula west of the town, but this appeared to
be a delaying action. Several days before, the LTTE had
removed their heavy artillery from the area, with which they
had often bombarded the Sri Lankan military HQ for Jaffna in
Palaly, as well as Army positions on the northern Forward
Defense Line (FDL) at Muhamalai.


3. (C) Renewed attempts by SLA troops to advance across the
FDL at Muhamalai reportedly suffered significant losses and,
according to partisan sources like TamilNet, were beaten back
by the LTTE. According to a senior defense analyst, the toll
on Sri Lankan military forces at the northern FDL for three
days, November 15-17, was about 50 killed and 150 wounded.
Army casualties in the Pooneryn operation were also fairly
high. According to one report, the toll of Sri Lankan Army
(SLA) troops killed on just one day, November 13, was about

30.


4. (SBU) After completing clearing operations in Pooneryn,
the SLA is next expected to turn east toward Paranthan on the
A-9 highway. This would directly threaten the de facto Tiger
capital of Kilinochchi. However, it is perhaps even more
likely that government forces would choose to bypass
Kilinochchi temporarily and turn northward toward the
LTTE-occupied base at Elephant Pass. This would split LTTE
forces on the Jaffna peninsula off from the Tiger heartland
in the Vanni. An attack northwards from Paranthan by SLA
armored units might render LTTE positions at Elephant Pass
and, eventually, Muhamalai, untenable.

IMPORTANT CROSSROADS TOWN OCCUPIED
--------------


5. (C) Government troops also established control over about

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2 kilometers of the A-9 highway south of Murikandi and
advanced another 3 km east behind LTTE lines toward
Mullaitivu. On November 17, the Defense Ministry announced
that the SLA had also overrun the important crossroads town
of Mankulam. According to an Embassy source, the force that
occupied the Murikandi area was able to move south on the A-9
and enter Mankulam without encountering much LTTE resistance.
The LTTE had apparently withdrawn from Mankulam and much of
the territory north of the A-9 crossing point at Omanthai.
(Note: this source said that Defense Secretary Gothabaya
Rajapaksa had wanted to occupy Mankulam in order to persuade
the international community, especially the International
Committee of the Red Cross, to relocate the crossing point
from Omanthai north to Mankulam.) On November 18, government
forces were reportedly moving in to fill the vacuum left by
the retreating LTTE, moving north from Omanthai and south
from Mankulam to occupy that stretch of the A-9.


6. (SBU) The insecure situation resulting from the
near-absence of the LTTE had caused the Red Cross to pull
back its personnel from their facilitating functions at the
Omanthai crossing point recently, forcing its closure for
three days. The ICRC returned only after receiving security
guarantees from both sides. The shift of the front line
north from Omanthai to somewhere east of Mankulam could cause
further disruptions to the ICRC-facilitated crossing of
humanitarian convoys from government to Tiger-controlled
territory.

MAJOR STRATEGIC GOAL ACHIEVED
--------------


7. (SBU) The strategic significance of the fall of Pooneryn
is that it puts virtually the entire northwestern coast of
Sri Lanka under government control. This will help stop the
Tigers from resupplying themselves with small craft disguised
as Indian fishing boats. The LTTE will now be obliged to
send any resupply boats all the way around the Jaffna
peninsula, past Point Pedro to the northeastern coast in the
Mullaitivu area it still controls. This will greatly
increase the likelihood of detection and interdiction of
these boats by the Sri Lankan Navy. Equally important, full
control of Pooneryn should allow the government to move as
much as half of its approximately 40,000 strong garrison in
Jaffna toward the front, and commit them to the fight for
Kilinochchi.


8. (SBU) When the SLA achieves control of the rest of the
Pooneryn peninsula, including the ferry landing just north of
Pooneryn town, the government has said it will move to
restore a nearly all-land route from Mannar directly to
Jaffna. Transport Minister (and Presidential confidant)
Dullas Alahapperuma announced to the media that regular bus
service from Colombo to Jaffna along this route would be
instituted within two months, but later admitted privately to
Ambassador that it would probably take 3-4 months.


9. (C) It remains unclear whether this would occur through
restoration of the disused ferry service or by construction
of a pontoon bridge using sections of an old causeway.
Estimates of the time required varied from a week to several
months. Much of the territory such a route would cross is
flat and open, leaving trucks and other vehicles attempting
to use it highly vulnerable to possible LTTE artillery attack
or ambush. Also, according to one analyst, the LTTE has been
able to infiltrate some forces by sea behind SLA positions on
the western coast and has been laying mines and booby traps.
The thin deployment of SLA troops along the A-32 highway from
Mannar to Pooneryn will make it difficult to assure security
even for military convoys, let alone civilian traffic. It is
uncertain whether the security measures required to escort
vehicles would in fact make this route less expensive than
the current system of resupply by ship from Trincomalee.


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BOOST FOR RAJAPAKSA, EMBARRASSMENT FOR PRABHAKARAN
-------------- --------------


10. (SBU) The fall of Pooneryn is a major boost to the
morale of Sri Lankan military forces, as well as to the
political fortunes of President Rajapaksa's government. The
Cabinet was reportedly debating whether to call an early
general election in the wake of the victory, possibly
dissolving Parliament after the third and final budget vote
in early December.


11. (SBU) The loss of Pooneryn is an acute embarrassment for
the LTTE and its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. It will be
difficult to market the defeat as another "strategic
withdrawal" to either the remaining population of the
Tiger-held Vanni (about 70% of which is now displaced,
according to UN estimates) or to Prabharakan's all-important
Tamil Diaspora constituency. Prabhakaran reportedly
reinforced his cadres and moved one of his best field
commanders into Pooneryn in an attempt to hold it, but too
late. The Tigers fell back in confusion and disarray.
Prabhakaran will now be under enormous pressure to carry out
a demonstrative counterblow before his annual "Heroes' Day"
speech on November 27. If unable to counterattack using
semi-conventional tactics, the LTTE may well attempt to
strike against military, government or infrastructure targets
in the south in the days preceding the annual speech.


12. (C) COMMENT: The LTTE cannot afford to give up much more
territory in a delaying action against the SLA. The Army is
now just eleven kilometers from Paranthan; the loss of that
town would probably force the Tigers to withdraw completely
from the Jaffna peninsula and lead to the fall of
Kilinochchi. In that case, the Tiger's last bastion of
Mullaitivu would be vulnerable to SLA artillery fire. If the
LTTE is to survive as a semi-conventional force, it can
afford to cede the southern reaches of the A-9 from Omanthai
to Mankulam, but must hold fast on the Jaffna peninsula at
Muhamalai and at Paranthan and Akkarayan in order to defend
Elephant Pass and Kilinochchi. The GSL, on the other hand,
will want to end the conflict quickly, both because of the
President's political imperatives and because of the
government's increasingly strained fiscal position. Major
traditional arms suppliers to government forces, such as
China and Pakistan, are balking at extending further credits,
given the GSL's steadily weakening foreign exchange reserves.
Other prospective partners, such as Russia, have reportedly
also demanded solid financial guarantees as a condition of
supply. With government coffers bare, the balance of
payments position worsening, and the scarcity of credit on
international markets, the government is likely to find
itself in an acute cash crunch as it attempts to finish the
Tigers off.
Blake