MOLDOVA VIGILANT FOR RUSSIAN TRAPS, SAYS REINTEGATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000979 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: Declassify 09/30/18 TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS EAID PINR MD RS SUBJECT: MOLDOVA VIGILANT FOR RUSSIAN TRAPS, SAYS REINTEGATION MINISTER REFS: A. Chisinau 971 B. Chisinau 958 C. Chisinau 762 Classified by CDA Kelly Keiderling under 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In his first meeting with Minister for Reintegration Vasile Sova, Ambassador Chaudhry found broad agreement on the basic issues: removing foreign troops from Moldovan territory, reforming the peacekeeping force, continuing confidence-building measures (CBMs),increasing EU participation and including any Transnistria settlement in the 5-plus-2 format. Sova thanked the USG for including Transnistria in its economic and social assistance to Moldova. The Ambassador cautioned against analogies to the Caucasus, and encouraged Moldova to be active in protecting its interests. Sova said that he had booked his ticket for 5-plus-2 talks in Vienna on October 7 and 8, but was concerned about Russia's failure to clarify its stand on issues, and about the Transnistrian leadership's avoidance of bilateral meetings. End summary. ¶2. (C) Sova began with thanks to the U.S. for consistent support, and stated his hope that Russia's position would be made clearer at the 5-plus-2. He declared that security issues, particularly the presence of foreign troops on Moldovan soil and Transnistrian support for paramilitary units, posed the greatest danger to stability. He regretted that Moldovan peacekeeping recommendations, such as an increased OSCE presence in the Joint Control Commission, had been turned down. He noted that, in the absence of OSCE observers, provocations could not be ruled out. He also expressed his concerns about the Transnistrian leadership's "dreams" of independence, and about parallels to fighting in Georgia and South Ossetia. ¶3. (C) Sova also noted that President Voronin's invitation to meet Transnistrian "president" Smirnov remained valid (Ref B),and expressed his hope that Transnistria would behave seriously and not propose meetings two hours in advance. He alluded to the fact that the two-hour deadline had seriously "provoked" Voronin. (Note: On September 25, Voronin stated to the media that "the Transnistrian regime, with which we have to find a compromise, is like a waste dump that for many years has been stinking on the territory of our state." End note.) ¶4. (C) On a more optimistic note, Sova stated that U.S. assistance to both sides of the Dniester had done a great deal to calm the fears of left-bank residents. (Note: Sova was probably thinking of the delivery of 20 truckloads of Operation Provide Hope medical supplies and assistance to Transnistrian hospitals. End note.) He noted that Moldova had no deadlines, and was not going to try to rush a solution before Moldova's spring 2009 parliamentary elections. He said that Moldova would be presenting its case for greater EU involvement at the meetings of EU foreign ministers (October 13) and heads of state (October 15). He declared that Moldova would be vigilant against any attempts by Russia to trap Moldova (Ref A). ¶5. (C) Ambassador Chaudhry noted that he agreed with almost all of the Moldovan position, except for Sova's worries about Georgian parallels and Transnistrian dreams of independence. "Those dreams will remain dreams," the Ambassador said. He stressed USG support for Moldova's territorial integrity, and praised Moldova's patience and watchfulness. He encouraged bilateral negotiations insofar as they contributed to the 5-plus-2 process. He said that the presence of Russian troops on Moldovan soil was unhelpful, but that who should replace them, and when, remained negotiable. He said, to Sova's evident pleasure, that DAS David Merkel would attend the 5-plus-2 talks. Both Sova and the Ambassador dismissed media rumors that the Kozak Plan would be revived. ¶4. (C) Comment: Sova has been on the job for 16 years, and has seen many ups and downs in the negotiating process. His patience, evident in his no-deadline approach, was matched by an active and watchful desire to protect Moldova's interests. Like him, we hope that the upcoming 5-plus-2 will reveal a less opaque and more cooperative Russian approach. We also hope that the desire for a peace-making legacy can overcome hindrances caused by the mercurial personalities and mutual testiness of Voronin and Smirnov. End comment. Keiderling